Why do leaders intensify identity entrepreneurship? Existing scholarship treats it as a structural constant, available where cleavages are salient, rather than a behavior whose intensity varies with political conditions. Working within the instrumentalist tradition of social identities, this article theorizes anti-corruption pressure as a cause of that variation. Such pressure varies in biographical content (whether media revelations, congressional proceedings, and prosecutorial acts name the leader and the family), and this content makes legal exposure translatable into a persecution frame. When credible, the translation activates a solidarity mechanism with two outputs emerging at different rates: a loyal base among identity-linked publics whose disapproval attenuates independently of programmatic performance, and endorsement from identity-led social organizations that raises the political costs of accountability. Credibility requires a pre-political biographical anchor; prior polarization and macroeconomic deterioration relax the strategy’s costs. Process tracing of peripheral identity entrepreneurship (PIE) during Pedro Castillo’s presidency in Peru (2021–22) illustrates the argument.

This is the introduction to a debate on Knowledge and Democratic Accountability in Policy Making. The debate is based on an EPS Roundtable event hosted at EUI.

This article examines the conditions under which policy learning occurs, distinguishing between instrumental learning (evidence-based, problem-solving oriented) and political learning (strategic, shaped by institutional position and incentives). Drawing on three cases presented by Claudio Radaelli – examining bureaucrats, politicians, and experts – the paper shows that much of what occurs in policy practice is best understood as political learning: actors acquire and deploy knowledge strategically, filtered through professional hierarchies, electoral pressures, and reputational concerns. While the literature has long recognised these dynamics, the paper argues that existing accounts of political learning understate its relational and contextual character. Political learning emerges through positioned interactions within institutional and epistemic communities, rather than from individual strategic calculation alone, and from alignment with shifting background political conditions that determine what knowledge becomes actionable. Recognising this relational dimension has implications for institutional design aimed at fostering democratic accountability and integrating expertise more effectively into policy making.

This article examines the evolving role of expertise in democratic policy making amid growing political contestation and institutional strain. Drawing on insights from the annual roundtable convened by European Political Science, it explores how the legitimacy of expert knowledge is being challenged through crises of trust and rising populism. The article analyses how evidence is shaped and contested through challenges of literacy, capacity, and politics. It argues that democratising expertise requires greater inclusion alongside structural safeguards for academic independence. By reframing the use of evidence as fundamentally political rather than purely technical, the article calls for a more reflexive and accountable knowledge-policy interface.

In an era of globalization, incumbents face strong incentives to attribute poor economic performance to external actors. While motivated reasoning explains how partisans update blame toward domestic incumbents, it remains unclear whether such blame is genuinely redirected to external actors beyond voters’ political control. Moreover, externalizing blame may signal limits to democratic accountability, with potential consequences for democratic belief. This article advances an asymmetric blame-shifting argument and tests it with two pre-registered survey experiments conducted on Amazon MTurk following the 2022 US midterm elections (n = 802; n = 999). Exploiting President Joe Biden’s attribution of rising inflation to Vladimir Putin, the experiments show that blame-shifting cues polarize partisan evaluations of the domestic incumbent: Democrats reduce blame toward Biden, while Republicans intensify it. In contrast, blame attribution toward the external actor remains largely unchanged across both studies. Study 2 further provides limited but suggestive evidence that exposure to external blame narratives may weaken democratic belief among opposition partisans. Together, the findings indicate that elite blame-shifting operates asymmetrically, which intensifies domestic partisan polarization without redistributing blame across borders, and such asymmetry may further erode democratic legitimacy.

The U.S. Supreme Court’s ambiguous institutional position—insulated from external pressures yet retaining important linkages with elected officials—complicates how the public assigns responsibility for its decisions. Using a survey experiment that shows respondents information about Dobbs, we explore how messages that politicize or depoliticize the Court affect responsibility attribution for Court decisions. We find that politicizing the Court increases responsibility attribution towards President Trump, and that this effect is conditioned by party cues. We explore downstream effects on evaluations of political actors, but do not find conclusive evidence. We argue that these findings have important implications for democratic accountability.

The decision whether to index government benefits can have significant economic and political implications. It can affect whether or to what extent benefits maintain their real value over time, affect the policy levers available to fight inflation, and shape discretionary budget priorities. Most of the attention in the literature has focused on understanding the economic pros and cons of indexing and the politics and political use of indexation in the context of welfare state reform and retrenchment. Less attention has been paid to what indexation means for democratic accountability. This paper seeks to rectify this by investigating the democratic stakes of indexing government benefits. It argues that there are, other things being equal, strong democratic reasons to index government benefits in a way (or according to metric) that preserves their publicly articulated purpose. However, concerns about lack of discretion and ownership suggest indexation rules should be designed to provide governments with some discretionary power over the size and perhaps timing of automatic adjustments—though accompanied by requirements that the exercise of this discretionary power be justified publicly.

Researchers applying evolutionary theory to political psychology discover that in democracies, most citizens struggle to select political leaders based on their ideologies. Rather, they tend to concentrate on procedural fairness during public decision-making when evaluating their leaders. We re-examine such evolutionary propositions in China using eight Wason selection experiments. In autocracies, where accountability systems are weak or absent, little is known about how citizens judge politicians’ ideologies and their cheating behaviors. Our findings show that Chinese citizens are incapable of identifying political leaders’ ideological orientations; instead, they rely on a cheater-detection mechanism, evaluating leaders based on their adherence to procedural fairness. These results contribute to our understanding of democratic competence and the cognitive mechanisms of political judgment in autocratic contexts.

Previous research has examined whether voters will punish candidates who engage in sexual harassment in national-level elections, revealing partisanship as a strong predictor of electoral punishment. Using original survey data, we evaluate whether the public supports a broader range of sanctions (e.g. apologies, training, and removal from office) that legislatures can impose upon politicians who perpetrate sexual harassment in Canada’s municipalities, a non-partisan context. In the absence of partisan-based motivated reasoning, we find that women are more likely than men to support the removal from office of a councillor who engages in sexual harassment. Respondents who do not believe that sexism is a problem and are skeptical about claims of gender-based violence are also less likely to support punishment in these cases. These findings have relevance for democratic institutions, revealing that sanctions imposed on politicians who perpetrate sexual harassment can help maintain political accountability and restore public trust.

Faced with a changing geopolitical environment, the European Union has embarked on a legislative program to upgrade its unilateral trade instruments toolbox. By reforming existing instruments—for example, anti-dumping—and by adding new instruments to the European Commission’s toolbox (foreign subsidies instrument, international procurement instrument, anti-coercion instrument, and others), the EU legislature is significantly strengthening the position of the Commission in the governance of unilateral trade policy in the EU. This development raises accountability questions. By means of a comparative analysis of democratic accountability in unilateral trade policy in the United States and the EU, I describe this transformation of executive power in the EU and I argue that a further strengthening of democratic accountability mechanisms is needed to match the Commission’s growing responsibilities in this underexamined corner of EU trade policy.

Contrary to conventional wisdom, globalization strengthens the linkage between the economy (across-border benchmarked measures) and vote choice, thereby facilitating electoral accountability by enriching the information available to the public. In the pre-globalization era, ordinary citizens had difficulty assessing domestic economic conditions in a comparative setting, in part because they were less exposed to information concerning other countries’ economic performance. However, globalization has provided citizens with excellent sources for comparisons in the form of media coverage. Moreover, openness results in a reduction in relative variance of exogenous rather than competence shocks. Using media-guided comparisons from 29 countries since the 1980s, this study finds that relative economic performance significantly affects citizens’ vote choices when their economy is highly integrated into the world market.

Democratic accountability relies on voters to punish their representatives for policies they dislike. Yet, a separation-of-powers system can make it hard to know who is to blame, and partisan biases further distort voters’ evaluations. During the COVID-19 pandemic, precautionary policies were put into place sometimes by governors, sometimes by mayors, and sometimes by no one at all, allowing us to identify when voters hold out-party versus in-party politicians responsible for policies. With a survey spanning 48 states, we test our theory that attitudes toward policies and parties intersect to determine when selective attribution takes place. We find that as individuals increasingly oppose a policy, they are more likely to blame whichever level of government is led by the out-party. This is most pronounced among partisans with strong in-party biases. We provide important insight into the mechanisms that drive selective attribution and the conditions under which democratic accountability is at risk.