As legislatures approach gender parity in different parts of the world, questions remain about whether institutional cultures support equal epistemic authority for women. In the French National Assembly, modern republicanism promotes depersonalized representation: deputies are expected to embody the universal citizen, with gender embedded but not defining. Drawing on 24 interviews with deputies elected before and after the 2017 elections, this article develops a feminist institutionalist framework to show how women navigate tensions between republican expectations that demand conformity to masculinized neutrality and pluralist norms that confine authority to “women’s issues.” We introduce the concept of epistemic double bind to theorize this dilemma and present a typology of role expectations and strategic responses that captures how deputies negotiate it. Our findings show that even in more gender-balanced legislatures, women face enduring constraints on epistemic authority. France serves as a critical case for understanding the practical demands of depersonalized representation and how actors reconfigure its contradictions in institutions shaped by parity laws.

This article examines the dynamics of inquiry under conditions of oppression. It presents an account of unjust zetetic exclusion, which arises when prejudice limits access to inquiry and the epistemic goods it yields. Unlike other forms of epistemic injustice, unjust zetetic exclusion need not result from a prejudicial credibility attribution. Instead, it may manifest even if one is perceived to be a highly competent and trustworthy inquirer, or even if one makes no judgment whatsoever regarding one’s zetetic capabilities. Unjust zetetic exclusion may result from prejudicial evaluations concerning who belongs within specific communities of inquiry and who should have access to, or possess knowledge about, a particular domain. Theories of epistemic injustice must account not only for how prejudice impacts credibility attributions but also how it regulates access to inquiry and shapes the conditions under which knowledge and other epistemic goods are acquired in the first place.

Virtue epistemology has richly theorized the traits that regulate belief, inquiry, and epistemic responsibility, but it has largely neglected a more basic condition of epistemic life: how agents come to count as epistemic participants at all. This paper argues that recognition constitutes a distinctive intellectual virtue that governs this condition. I develop an account of intellectual recognition as a threshold-governing virtue concerned with epistemic standing, understood as an agent’s intelligibility as a reason-giver, visibility as having epistemic needs and capacities, and eligibility for uptake within shared epistemic practices. Failures of recognition help explain why epistemic injustice, exclusion, and epistemic oppression persist even in contexts oriented toward truth and fairness, since some agents are never fully taken up as participants in inquiry in the first place. Recognition is not reducible to epistemic justice or to familiar intellectual virtues such as open-mindedness or intellectual autonomy. Rather, it plays an architectural role by regulating entry into epistemic participation and thereby conditioning the successful exercise of other intellectual virtues. Treating recognition as an intellectual virtue clarifies how epistemic communities are sustained and why epistemic failure so often begins not with error, but with epistemic invisibility under conditions of structural distortion.

Digital mental health surveillance promises to guide resource allocation and policy in low-and middle-income countries, yet its architectures can systematically exclude entire regions, rendering populations invisible. This Perspective introduces cyber-epidemiology as a critical framework for examining how digital surveillance systems shape population visibility and produce structural inequities. Using the WHO World Mental Health International College Student (WMH-ICS) Initiative as a sentinel case, we identify the absence of West African countries from published participation reports despite more than 100,000 students being surveyed globally. This exclusion is not merely a data gap but generates what we term the Surveillance Exclusion Triad: epidemiological distortion (biased global prevalence estimates), resource allocation distortion (funding flows that reinforce existing infrastructure) and policy translation distortion (interventions lacking contextual validity). These distortions create self-reinforcing cycles of invisibility, underfunding and neglect. We argue that cyber-epidemiology must treat absence as data, interrogate platform architectures for exclusionary design and triangulate multiple data sources to make invisible populations visible. The implications extend beyond surveillance into Population Health Intelligence; the systematic conversion of population-level data into actionable health system intelligence, where representational inequities propagate into prediction, prioritisation and policy decisions. Without deliberate attention to who is counted and who is excluded, digital transformation risks deepening the very health inequities it aims to address. We propose five principles and an operational framework to advance more equitable global mental health surveillance.

Adopting English‑medium instruction (EMI) has become a norm for many higher education institutions in non‑English‑speaking countries as part of their efforts to position themselves as attractive study‑abroad destinations. South Korea is no exception in this regard. While this trend has drawn international student enrollment and fostered a more globalized student body, the experiences and perspectives of international students – also key stakeholders of EMI – remain relatively underexplored. Drawing upon a multi‑layered analytical framework grounded in language policy, the study brings to the fore the voices of degree‑seeking international students from diverse linguistic and disciplinary backgrounds and examines what shaped their perceptions of being integrated into or marginalized from their academic environment in relation to EMI. The findings reveal both shared challenges and context‑specific differences in their experiences, indicating a discrepancy between EMI policy and its implementation in practice and highlighting institutional issues that warrant attention. The importance of the study lies in its timely retrospection upon the evolving discourse on EMI within South Korea’s higher education. It also offers insights into fostering a more inclusive and equitable learning environment for international students from diverse backgrounds.

The American Psychiatric Association is now designing the process that will produce the next iteration of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM). Recent work on epistemic injustice in psychiatry converges on a shared diagnosis. The exclusion of psychopathologized perspectives undermines the social objectivity of psychiatric classification, and the literature leaves open how psychiatric science can engage with alternative interpretations of its domain without reducing them to the dominant framework. I propose four institutional conditions that inclusion must satisfy if it is to produce epistemic engagement and avoid tokenism. They are constitutive participation in agenda-setting and evidence evaluation, structural reproduction of participatory mechanisms across revision cycles, procedurally differentiated translation interfaces that preserve the critical content of non-standard perspectives, and bidirectional uptake with epistemic attitude and documented accountability. The conditions operate on the epistemic process that produces diagnostic categories without modifying the operational form those categories take, and are compatible with the functional requirements of the DSM and with the professional identity of psychiatry. They are designed to make inclusion structurally reproducible, where it has so far been contingently achievable, and they supply evaluative criteria for the design decisions the revision now confronts.

Cross-cultural supervision (CCS) in mental health and psychosocial support (MHPSS) services occurs when supervisors and supervisees are from different cultures or contexts. In CCS, cultural differences intersect with supervisory power asymmetries, making supervisees vulnerable to culturally unsafe supervision practices. Despite CCS becoming more common in MHPSS, there remains limited understanding of how to practice culturally safe supervision. Further, this growing literature has not been synthesised. This scoping review explores how and by whom CCS is framed, what processes are involved, and how CCS may support MHPSS services, guided by an epistemic injustice framework. The search of academic and grey literature identified 45 papers on CCS in MHPSS. Most CCS studies were based in Western Educated Industrial Rich and Democratic (WEIRD) countries and used WEIRD paradigms, raising questions about generalisability and culturally safe application of CCS in non-WEIRD contexts. Studies in WEIRD countries often framed CCS using ethnocentric language, and inconsistent terminology when discussing culture. There was also a wide range of types of cross-cultural supervisory relationships, which we conceptualised as a broad spectrum whereby supervisory relationships differ in the extent of cultural difference between supervisors and supervisees. Common factors addressed in CCS literature were supportive relational processes, challenges in communication, culturally responsive practices and power dynamics. Culturally responsive supervision occurs through supervisor cultural humility, self-reflection on power, reciprocal learning attitudes and supervisors encouraging multicultural discussions. Culturally safe supervision benefits MHPSS services through enhanced supervisee clinical skills, increasing disclosures of client case information, increasing cultural humility and adapting Western models of therapy to suit clients. Based on these findings, we recommend that researchers and practitioners: acknowledge WEIRD paradigm dominance and White normativity; seek definitional clarity of CCS concepts; initiate supervisor-led multicultural discussions that recognise power dynamics; practice cultural humility; proactively seek peer and supervisor support; prioritise locally-led supervision and education research in non-WEIRD and humanitarian settings; and develop new models of CCS processes and configurations. This review has implications for CCS practice and research, raising questions about the underrepresentation of non-WEIRD scholarship and privileging of WEIRD paradigms, and highlighting a need for development of epistemically just and culturally safe CCS models.

In this article, I propose an expanded conceptualization of epistemic appropriation. I argue that epistemic appropriation can be either wrongful or non-wrongful, and that it can occur in all directions – from marginalized to dominant communities, but also from dominant to marginalized communities. Furthermore, I argue that epistemic appropriation can take place both inter- and intra-communally. Lastly, I argue that the epistemic resources that are appropriated do not have to originate in the community they are appropriated from to be considered appropriation, as this can also take place when a community has a stake in a certain use of these resources. In doing so, I come to the following, stripped-down, definition: epistemic appropriation is the uptake of epistemic resources that obscures something about the resources.

This paper argues for three main claims: (i) belonging can play an important role for epistemic self-trust; (ii) epistemic self-trust can be construed plurally so as to include not only its intellectual or propositional dimensions but also its experiential (practical, tacit, embodied, and affective) dimensions; and (iii) self-trust, plurally construed, can serve as a mechanism of epistemic repair to counteract various forms of epistemic injustice that undermine epistemic agency along these propositional and experiential dimensions. To make this threefold argument, I turn to the context of neurodiversity and neuronormativity, which helpfully illustrates the plural dimensions of epistemic agency, epistemic self-trust, and epistemic repair.

This article makes a case for creative methods in legal research that is both analytical and moral. Beginning with an information-theoretical account of legal evolution, I propose a shift from ‘law as language’ and ‘law as communication’ to the more foundational unit of information coded by legal language. I conceptually clarify ‘legal coding’ as the process by which legal meanings get constructed and conceptualised, and position the legal academy as an active site of legal coding. Critically examining the information that is excluded from legal codes (because of ignorance, irrelevance, or illegibility) opens pathways to reveal, challenge, and shift the selective and patterned tendencies of legal coding processes to reinforce epistemic injustice. Positioning the legal academy as a site of legal coding further helps in understanding legal research as a practice of legal coding. I argue that expanding our methodological toolkits can enable a more holistic coding of social reality. By expanding the form of legal codes, creative methods equip us to capture new (or previously excluded) information about lived realities that remain on the margins of meanings. The analytical case for coding social reality more holistically, by including new forms of information through a creative praxis, is complemented by a moral case to include alternative perspectives and hermeneutically misunderstood lives. I demonstrate these arguments through a self-produced short film ‘(IN)VISIBLE’ that captures the working lives of Indian women legal experts, towards a grounded theory of legal evolution from the south. The film combines embodied, poetic, sonic, and visual analyses to capture and analyse legal coding from the point of view of my research participants. My discussions on the process and output of the film show how a phenomenological analysis can help reveal the structural, allowing for a more complete and just coding of social reality, from within the academy.

Epistemic injustice happens when a subject is wronged in their “capacity as a knower.” This paper argues that speakers/writers and hearers/readers suffer epistemic injustice under two scenarios: idea appropriation and bullshitting. Epistemic injustice happens when a speaker or writer suffers idea appropriation, where they are deprived of the credit and benefits of their cognitive labor, or when epistemic agents consume bullshit that exploits their limited access to the institutional resources required to interrogate and resist it, treating them as a mere means to an end, e.g., when a politician bullshits voters to secure their vote at election time. These unsavory practices are incentivized by reputational boosts and other social goods with the risk of reputational damage if detected. This paper ends by reviewing how widespread epistemic injustice hampers the epistemic marketplace.

Can predictable impairments of epistemic performance constitute injustice in the absence of harassment, manipulation, or prejudicial credibility deflation? I use this question to examine a case drawn from ordinary intellectual exchange: in mixed-sex settings, some male speakers may be distracted by the perceived attractiveness of a female interlocutor, with consequences for how their arguments are received. I argue that, in the stipulated case, the man has not suffered an injustice and the woman has not wronged him. The philosophical puzzle is why that verdict is correct, given a tempting inferential pattern in recent work on epistemic injustice from patterned epistemic disadvantage, especially when identity-linked, to an injustice verdict. I argue that injustice ascriptions require epistemic harm, wrong-making features, and accountability. The resulting framework distinguishes epistemic misfortune and thin unfairness from genuine epistemic injustice and helps assess contemporary disputes about the scope of the concept.

Consciousness-raising groups were an integral feature of the second wave feminist movement in the 1960s and 70s, and they are credited with finding a way to break through the epistemic barriers to a robust understanding of gender-based oppression. Consciousness-raising is therefore often used by feminist philosophers to explain how it is possible to arrive at knowledge about injustice and oppression in light of a variety of epistemic barriers. However, the process itself is rarely properly explored in its own right. It is therefore often unclear what it consists of and how it is meant to work. In this article, I seek to establish a philosophically rigorous account of consciousness-raising. I first unpack what consciousness-raising consisted in, as described and analysed by second-wave feminists. I then isolate what I take to be its core tenets and the mechanisms that render it a powerful epistemic tool. Then, I respond to two objections, namely the ‘intersectionality objection’ and the ‘bad company objection’, in order to further clarify what this method consists in and what its epistemic potential might be.

Fred Schauer’s work on probability and evidence exposes a persistent problem for criminal law: credible allegations of sexual assault routinely fall short of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, leaving serious wrongdoing unaddressed. Schauer highlights this failure through cases involving probabilistic aggregation, but ultimately locates the payoff of his analysis outside criminal adjudication. This Article returns the argument to where it belongs – within the criminal law. Deploying Schauer’s own analytical toolkit, it examines three potential levers – the burden of proof, the construction of criminal offenses, and evidentiary rules – that could be used to respond to the injustice of sexual violence. For each, it details the difficult trade-offs between protecting defendants and vindicating victims. There is no clear winner.