This exploratory study asks how Europeans view EU democracy and how satisfied they are with how EU democracy works. Roughly one-fifth of them do not appear to have any idea about democracy at the EU level. We create a typology of European democrats distinguishing between allegiant, delegative, assertive, and disaffected democrats, show the distribution over the types, and analyze the factors associated with its two dimensions and the types. Citizens’ opinions on EU democracy deviate most notably from their views on national democracy in that much fewer of them want to expand it. As expected, pro-Europeans demand more democracy and are more satisfied with EU democracy than Euroskeptics. Feeling represented at the EU level and trusting EU institutions most strongly enhances demand for and satisfaction with EU democracy. In general, Europeans have clearer ideas about how democracy works in the EU than about how they want it to work.

Satisfaction with democracy and confidence in political institutions are often linked to policy or ideological alignment between voters and elected officials. While policy congruence has been widely studied, less attention has been paid to process congruence—the gap between citizens’ preferences for representation and politicians’ perceptions of their duties. This paper uses data from three Portuguese election cycles (2005, 2011, and 2015) to examine how process congruence affects satisfaction with democracy. It also assesses whether political interest and educational attainment moderate this relationship, shaping the extent to which citizens respond to congruence between their own representational preferences and those of political elites. The results indicate that policy congruence is by far the strongest correlate of satisfaction with democracy. By comparison, the independent association of process congruence is small and not statistically robust: once policy and ideological congruence are accounted for, moving across the observed range of process congruence is not reliably related to satisfaction, and the estimates are inconsistent in direction across representative targets (i.e., whether congruence is measured in relation to all MPs, government MPs, or one’s preferred-party MPs). Citizens’ underlying representational preferences are nonetheless related to their satisfaction—those who favour a delegate style tend to be less satisfied than those who favour a trustee style. Contrary to expectations, this relationship is not stronger among the politically interested or the more educated; the limited moderation we detect—by education—runs opposite to expectations. Taken together, these findings caution against treating process congruence as a determinant of democratic satisfaction comparable to policy congruence, while suggesting that how citizens think representation should work is not irrelevant to how they evaluate democracy.

Citizens differ not only in how strongly they support democracy, but also in what they expect democracy to be. Yet we know less about whether these democratic expectations shape satisfaction with democracy (SwD) and, through it, political participation (PP) in established European democracies. We first develop a mechanism linking citizens’ prioritized understandings of democracy (UoD) to SwD and unconventional political participation (UPP). Satisfaction with democracy is treated as an indicator of perceived congruence between citizens’ democratic ideals and how democracy works in practice. Second, we test this mechanism systematically in Europe using ESS Round 10 data, including almost 60,000 respondents in 31 countries. We find that (a) citizens’ conceptions of democracy affect SwD and (b) that SwD is a mediator for the impact UoD have on UPP.

Rooted in concerns about losers’ consent to electoral outcomes, a vast literature documents a winner–loser gap in democratic attitudes among voters, with winners displaying systematically more positive attitudes than losers across a range of indicators. Surprisingly, we know much less about whether this gap extends to politicians. This paper addresses this question both theoretically and empirically. Theoretically, we distinguish between politicians’ reactions to electoral outcomes at the individual level – whether candidates secure a seat in parliament – and the party level – whether their party enters government, and theorise about their interaction. Empirically, we present comprehensive observational evidence from 27 elections showing that losers systematically report lower satisfaction with democracy, weaker support for representative institutions, and lower perceptions of citizens’ trust. The gap is present at both levels, but the individual-level gap is conditioned by party outcomes: it is most pronounced within winning parties and disappears within losing parties. A complementary analysis leveraging close races and administrative data from Iceland provides plausibility that these associations are, at least in part, causal. Taken together, the findings reveal that democratic attitudes among rank-and-file politicians are, like those of voters, highly malleable and responsive to electoral outcomes. While politicians maintain overall positive attitudes towards democracy, this malleability raises questions about when and how such contingency might translate into anti-democratic behaviour.

Public debate is central to most theories of democracy, yet few cross-national studies have examined its association with democratic satisfaction. This article identifies three features of national public spheres – pluralism, information, and respect – and presents annual measures of these features for 175 countries from 2000 to 2020. Among electoral democracies, pluralism remained stable, but the quality of information and the respectfulness of debate tended to decline during that period. Using data from the European Social Survey and the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, we find that higher levels of pluralism, information, and respect correlate with greater democratic satisfaction, even after controlling for other democratic institutions, various socio-economic factors, and past levels of satisfaction with democracy. Notably, respect remains associated with higher democratic satisfaction when controlling for the other features of the public sphere. These findings call for further research into the relationship between non-electoral components of democracy and political attitudes.

Voters of government parties are systematically more satisfied with democracy than supporters of opposition parties. The dynamics of this winner-loser gap are typically studied in the context of elections. However, it is not clear how changes in government composition that occur without elections midway through an electoral cycle, and that change voters’ winner/loser status, influence satisfaction with democracy. We address this question by examining an unexpected government change in Estonia in 2016, which interrupted the European Social Survey data collection (Round 8). The largest party in a three-party coalition government was replaced by the largest opposition party midway through the 2015–2019 electoral cycle while all other parties retained their government or opposition status. These circumstances enabled us to examine the effect of winning and losing without elections using fixed effects models, including a difference-in-differences design. The results provide suggestive but fragile evidence that losing government status might reduce satisfaction with democracy, whereas the effect of winning is modest at best and statistically inconclusive. Where effects emerge, they do so with a lag of approximately six weeks, coinciding with the implementation of a major tax reform – consistent with policy-based considerations rather than by immediate affective responses.

In established democracies, governing parties are expected to govern effectively. Government terminations that result from breaking the rule of law, policy blunders, or disastrous policy performances have the potential to damage voters’ perceptions of how well democracy functions in their countries. Yet, current research on coalition politics has not examined the specific consequences of scandal-based government terminations on voters’ attitudes toward politics and the quality of democracy. We analyze the attitudinal impacts of scandal-based government terminations and argue that this type of termination reduces citizens’ satisfaction with the way democracy functions in their countries and their propensity to vote for the party responsible for the scandal. We also examine whether scandal-based coalition terminations negatively impact voter perceptions of the government’s performance. We test our arguments by relying on a recent scandal that took place in Austria: the so-called Ibiza scandal, which caused the early termination of the coalition between the Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP) and the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ). At the time the scandal broke, the Austrian National Election Study was in the field. We utilize an Unexpected Event during Survey Design to test if the scandal had consequences for voters’ perceptions of the parties and their collaboration. The supporting evidence for our argument calls for the need to revive research on government termination and to initiate a new line of research on how government breakdowns affect citizens’ democratic attitudes.

The winner-loser gap in satisfaction with democracy is one of the most robust findings in political science. This relationship is particularly clear in two-party systems where only one party ends up in power. Yet in the increasingly complex multi-party systems of Europe, a lot of different coalitions are often possible, meaning that a ‘winning’ voter may not like the government coalition that the party they voted for ends up in. We argue that changes in satisfaction with democracy will be influenced by voters’ preferences for the government coalition that is formed. Relying on panel data from two German and two Austrian Federal Elections, we find that attitudes towards the coalition that is formed have a clear effect on satisfaction with democracy. We show that this effect is only present after the coalition is formed and not in post-electoral surveys held before that point. The results have important implications for understanding the mechanisms driving the winner-loser gap in satisfaction with democracy.

The European Union (EU) is facing an ongoing challenge to its institutional and political legitimacy. The 2014 European Parliament elections marked a decisive step towards bringing the EU closer to its citizens by increasing the personalization of EU politics. Under the slogan ‘this time it’s different’, the idea was that the ‘winning’ lead candidate (Spitzenkandidat) of the EP elections would become the new President of the European Commission (EC). However, the selection of von der Leyen as EC President after the 2019 EP elections neglected this process. Inspired by procedural fairness theory, we investigate the impact of the Spitzenkandidaten process on citizens’ satisfaction with democracy in the EU. In a first study, we use observational survey data to examine whether Europeans reacted negatively when the Spitzenkandidaten process was ignored in 2019. In a second study, we investigate how the Spitzenkandidaten process could be salvaged to increase citizens’ satisfaction with EU democracy. We focus on the involvement of citizens through a primary system to select potential Spitzenkandidaten and the binding nature of the results of the EP elections to determine the EC President. Our two studies show the low impact of the Spitzenkandidaten process: Member state governments are able to override the results of the Spitzenkandidaten process without having to fear a (large) public backlash. Increasing citizen participation through a European primary does not affect this conclusion. In summary, we find very little evidence for the relevance of procedural fairness for citizens’ evaluation of the EU and the Spitzenkandidaten process.

When activists act as unelected representatives by voicing political demands on behalf of various constituencies, does this affect citizens’ satisfaction with democracy? We theorize that this may be the case if and when such individuals constitute an effective channel of representation, meaning that (1) activists substantively represent individuals and (2) they are included in politics. Furthermore, we theorize that marginalized individuals become more satisfied with the way democracy works when they witness activists with whom they agree. We test this through a preregistered vignette experiment in Sweden, Germany, Italy, and Romania (N = 8196). Our findings are mixed. Unelected representatives can sway citizens’ satisfaction with democracy in some instances. Specifically, the electoral winner–loser gap can be narrowed through substantive representation from unelected representatives. This presents an invitation for further research on the role activists play in shaping the legitimacy of liberal representative democracies.

In this article it is argued that citizens take into account the degree of a government's political autonomy to implement particular policies when expressing their views on satisfaction with democracy (SWD) but, in order to do so, they need to perceive it. When citizens directly observe the external constraints that reduce their government's autonomy, then variations in levels of regime satisfaction may no longer be exclusively about government performance – as widely argued by political economists – but also about democratic choice. The argument develops after comparing the existing scenarios in the Eurozone before and after the Great Recession. Citizens only began to perceive their own lack of choice to decide between policy alternatives when the sovereign debt crisis broke out in May 2010, the date of the first Greek bail‐out. It is then when citizens started to update their beliefs about the functioning of democracy as a system in which alternative policies can be adopted as bail‐out deals were signed between national governments from the Euro periphery and the Troika. This updating process towards the way democracy works explains the increasing gap in the levels of SWD between bailed‐out economies and the rest of the countries in the Eurozone. Empirical confirmation for this claim is found after analysing Eurobarometer surveys from 2002 to 2014 and using a two‐step difference‐in‐difference analysis that combines individual and aggregate data.

This study presents the results from a series of conjoint experiments evaluating how the various components of political systems affect citizens’ satisfaction with democracy (SWD). Compared to earlier studies, our approach is unique in that we were able to disentangle the effects of otherwise highly collinear variables corresponding to three defining features of any political system, namely (1) access to power, (2) the policy‐making process and (3) performance. We fielded identical conjoint experiments in countries with significant variations across the key independent variables: France, Hungary and Italy. Overall, our study supports the view that citizens are more satisfied with democracy in consensus systems than in majoritarian democracies, while it also contributes to identifying the respective weight of the specific components of political systems. Respondents across all countries recognize that proportionality and party system fragmentation magnify their voices by creating a more representative political climate. With regard to output legitimacy, we find that respondents identify good economic performance and public probity as important features of a well‐performing democracy. The positive effect of the legislators’ constituency orientation on SWD is a particularly noteworthy result that is currently understudied in the literature. Moreover, the state of the economy has by far the biggest impact on SWD, which indicates a highly materialistic view of democracy in all three countries.

Modern democracies are dependent on regular elections and citizens’ legitimacy beliefs. Studies have shown that repeated electoral defeats are associated with lower levels of satisfaction with democracy and political trust. However, previous studies have only considered one type of legitimacy belief at a time, never in comparison. What is more, all previous work is based on observational studies and has not been able to identify any causal effects of losing repeatedly. Building on previous work and classic theories of political legitimacy beliefs, we argue that repeatedly losing in elections represents a form of long‐term exclusion from democratic power that has additional negative effects on people's legitimacy beliefs because they lose faith in the system and start questioning its evenhandedness. We support our predictions using six‐wave panel data and test our hypothesis a total of 16 times within the same context. The findings show that repeated losers are never less satisfied with democracy but that an additional electoral loss leads to lower levels of political trust. The findings have important implications for the meaning of different indicators of legitimacy beliefs but also for electoral research and the underpinnings of stable democracies.

In the first comparative study of multidimensional government‐citizen policy congruence, this article shows that citizens are less satisfied with democracy when their views differ from that of the government on policy dimensions beyond the general left‐right axis. Satisfaction is reduced by a government that deviates on European integration and redistribution and partly also on social lifestyle, immigration and environmental protection. Furthermore, this analysis identifies the level of political interest as central moderator of this relationship. Satisfaction of citizens with stronger interest in politics suffers more when there is a politically distant government. Combining data from the 2010 Chapel Hill Expert Survey and two waves of the European Social Survey, the analysis builds on information on citizen‐government policy congruence of some 45,000 citizens and 31 governments in 15 Western and Central Eastern European countries. The article brings a multidimensional perspective to the study of policy congruence between citizens and governments in a time when the preference structure of parties and citizens has become increasingly complex.

Citizen satisfaction with democracy is greater when parties offer choices that are congruent with voter preferences. But are citizens content with simply having a party that represents their views or does their satisfaction depend on whether that party can also be instrumental in implementing policies? We argue that instrumentality moderates the effect of ideological congruence on democratic satisfaction. Combining an analysis of cross‐national survey data with an experimental conjoint design, we find that citizens able to vote for a congruent party with a chance of entering government are more satisfied with democracy, whereas congruence without instrumentality has no such effect.

Does economic inequality dampen support for the political system? This question has been answered in the affirmative in prior work studying the relationship between economic inequality and various manifestations of political system support across countries or US states. However, recent work challenges the premise underlying such analyses by showing that citizens are generally ignorant about national-level inequality. Relatedly, work on contextual effects finds that economic and social phenomena are particularly consequential for political attitudes when they reflect palpable everyday experiences. Combining these insights, we suggest that a more theoretically and methodologically appropriate test of the proposition that economic inequality reduces political system support should focus on local, neighbourhood-level economic inequality, which citizens encounter on a daily basis. By linking multiple geo-referenced surveys – both cross-sectional and longitudinal – with Danish registry data, we create micro-contextual measures of local economic inequality and relate them to a range of indicators of political system support. We find no evidence indicating that local inequality reduces political system support.

This paper argues that issue salience divergence – the extent to which parties in a party system diverge in their allocation of salience across issues – is a key characteristic of party system decidability. Elections do not only matter in that politicians and parties with different policy positions may come to power. They can also matter if competing elites emphasize different issues. Using data from the MARPOR project and the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, I demonstrate that voters perceive greater differences between parties when parties propose agendas that diverge with respect to issue salience. Furthermore, I demonstrate that perceptions of differences between parties mediate the effect of issue salience divergence on respondents’ satisfaction with democracy and self‐reported voter turnout. These findings indicate that salience‐based differentiation influences the quality of party systems alongside the traditional party system characteristics with important implications for public opinion and political behavior.

It is well known that individuals who voted for the winning party in an election tend to be more satisfied with democracy than those who did not. However, many winners deviate from their first choice when voting. It is argued in this article that the mechanisms that engender satisfaction operate less forcefully among such winners, thereby lessening the impact of victory on satisfaction. Results show that the gap in satisfaction over electoral losers among these ‘non‐optimal winners’ is, in fact, much smaller than that of ‘optimal winners’, who voted in line with their expressed preferences. A win matters more for those who have a bigger stake in victory. The article further explores how the effect of optimal victory on satisfaction varies across electoral systems.

Previous research has shown that citizens tend to be more satisfied with the functioning of democracy when their ideological positions are more proximate to representatives'. This article argues that congruence in policy priorities between citizens and political elites should have a similar effect: citizens whose concerns are shared by elites should perceive them to be more attentive and responsive to public concerns and societal needs. Yet, the relationship might vary with differences in expectations towards democracy and representation. Specifically, it should be stronger in more democratic countries and older democracies. The hypotheses are empirically tested in a multilevel regression framework, where voter survey data from the 2009 European Election Study is linked with candidate survey data. The results indicate that citizens are indeed more satisfied with democracy if elites share their concerns, and the effect increases with democratic experience.