We suggest that people privilege explanations relying on inherent rather than contingent factors not only because of an innate cognitive tendency to monitor reality, but because doing so satisfies the desire to perceive the societal status quo as legitimate. In support, we describe experimental studies linking the activation of system justification motivation to the endorsement of inherence-based (essentialist) explanations.

We elucidate the epistemological futility of using concepts such as unconscious thinking in research. Focusing on Newell & Shanks' (N&S's) use of the lens model as a framework, we clarify issues with regard to unconscious-thought theory (UTT) and self-insight studies. We examine these key points: Brunswikian psychology is absent in UTT; research on self-insight did not emerge to explore the unconscious; the accuracy of judgments does not necessitate the unconscious; and the prescriptive claim of UTT is unfounded.

We support Ackermann et al.'s proposal that the cortico-basal ganglia circuits may play essential roles in the evolution of spoken language. Here we discuss further evidence indicating that the cortico-basal ganglia circuits may contribute to various aspects of spoken language including planning, learning, and controlling of speech in adulthood.

The idea that structured organization of differentiated individuals influences group behavior is not new to evolutionary approaches. An adequate theory of groups needs to incorporate explicit processing, which is central to means-end reasoning involved in leadership and to the construction of ideologies that rationalize group structure. Explicit processing is also central to knowledge of others' reputations, thus enabling altruistic cooperation.

I present evidence in favor of an overarching motivational self: a mental function that regulates expression of multiple goals. Goals often conflict with each other, and the role of a motivational self is to consciously or unconsciously prioritize pursuit of these goals. When observing inconsistency in expression of goals, it is therefore useful to consider whether the motivational self is attempting to balance between conflicting goals or if such inconsistency results from temporary self-control weakness.

Despite Lankford's descriptions of escapist suicide victims as being unstable, they were making rational decisions, based on their current knowledge and values. Similarly, those who are allegedly indirectly suicidal are not different from other risk-takers. The psychological differences between those who engage in suicidal attacks and those who do not are less than most of us would prefer.

The theoretical concepts developed in the target article, in which the author proposes a new paradigm of cultural evolution based not on the individuals' characteristics, but rather on more global collective properties described as “group-traits” (which emerge when a group of individuals exhibit both differentiation and organization), may have a broader scientific impact that transcend the boundaries of social and evolutionary psychology, paving the way for the emergence of macro-neuroeconomics and social evolutionary game theory.

Ackermann et al.'s phylogenetic account of speech argues that the basal ganglia imbue speech with emotive content. However, a body of work on auditory/emotive processing is inconsistent with attributing this function exclusively to these structures. The account further overlooks the possibility that the emotion-integration function may be at least in part mediated by the cortico-ponto-cerebellar system.

Following Lankford's persuasive argument that suicide bombers are indeed suicidal, the next question to ask is why individuals choose one form of suicidal protest over others. Why choose suicide bombing rather than a hunger strike or self-immolation? Some suggestions are provided.

We extend Newell & Shanks' (N&S's) arguments to the question of whether implicit evaluations reflect unconscious attitudes. We argue that correspondence to explicit evaluations fails to meet the criteria of relevance and sensitivity. When awareness is measured adequately and in line with N&S's criteria, there is compelling evidence that people are consciously aware of their implicit evaluations.

Cimpian & Salomon (C&S) provide evidence that psychological essentialism rests on a domain-general attention to inherent causes. We suggest that the inherence heuristic may itself be undergirded by a more foundational cognitive bias, namely, a realist assumption about environmental regularities. In contrast, when considering specific representations, people may be more likely to activate attention to non-inherent, contingent, and historical links.

By situating goals at the heart of human cognitive function, Huang & Bargh (H&B) provide a useful platform for understanding the process of personality integration as the gradual mapping of implicit motives into a coherently organized self-system. This integrative process is a critical feature of human development that must be accounted for by any complete goal theory.

This commentary suggests (1) that there are precedents for Smaldino's “collaboration” in the history of economic thought before 1900 and (2) that the distinction of collaboration from what is thought of as cooperation in game theory is less clear than Smaldino suggests.

The gradual audiomotor evolution hypothesis is proposed as an alternative interpretation to the auditory timing mechanisms discussed in Ackermann et al.'s article. This hypothesis accommodates the fact that the performance of nonhuman primates is comparable to humans in single-interval tasks (such as interval reproduction, categorization, and interception), but shows differences in multiple-interval tasks (such as entrainment, synchronization, and continuation).

The inherence heuristic is too broad as a theoretical notion. The authors are at risk of applying their own heuristic in supporting itself. Nonetheless the article provides useful insight into the ways in which people overestimate the coherence and completeness of their understanding of the world.

We critically consider the default view of consciousness and decision making, and we explore the implications of this view to the authors' argument. We therefore call for rigorous collection of data regarding the role of consciousness in decisions. We also propose that the section on subliminal effects significantly underestimates existing data and succinctly review relevant findings.

Lankford challenges two popular views of suicide terrorists: first, that they are psychologically normal and, second, that they are heroic, not unlike professional soldiers. I augment Lankford's critique by tracing these views to a simplistic situationist narrative and to a careless form of moral relativism to which many scholars adhere. Conceptual weaknesses of these positions are briefly discussed.

The language of conscious and unconscious goals is rooted in a folk-taxonomy that is likely to inhibit progress in cognitive science. Severing the commitment to this taxonomy would allow Huang & Bargh (H&B) to consider a wider variety of representational forms with motivational force and to entertain the intriguing possibility that variations in the number of active-but-redundant representations account for variance in social behavior.

As an account of the cognitive processes that support psychological essentialism, the inherence heuristic clarifies the basis of individual differences in essentialist thinking, and how they are associated with prejudice. It also illuminates the contextual variability of social essentialism, and where its conceptual boundaries should be drawn.

Psychological research on social influence illuminates many mechanisms through which role differentiation and collaborative interdependence may affect cultural evolution. We focus here on psychological processes that produce specific patterns of asymmetric influence, which in turn can have predictable consequences for the emergence and transmission of group-level traits.