Ackermann et al. treat both genetic and paleoanthropological data too superficially to support their conclusions. The case of FOXP2 and Neanderthals is a prime example, which I will comment on in some detail; the issues are much more complex than they appear in Ackermann et al.

Even if people are experts at understanding how various input cues landed them at a particular decision (something the authors refer to as cue utilization), they may still fail to appreciate how context influences the weight given to those input variables. We review evidence suggesting that people are unaware of contextual influences on their decisions.

Suicide terrorists in recent decades total approximately 3,500. Lankford finds risk factors for suicide for about 40 of these cases. Given that many with risk factors for suicide never attempt suicide, a reasonable estimate might be that one percent of suicide terrorists are suicidal.

Recognizing that there is a multiplicity of motives – and that the accessibility and strength of each one varies chronically and temporarily – is essential if motivational scientists are to achieve genuine theoretical and empirical integration. We agree that system justification is a case of nonconscious goal pursuit and discuss implications of the fact that it conflicts with many other psychological goals.

Ackermann et al. provide an informative neurological road-map to primate call communication. However, the proposed model for speech evolution inadequately integrates comparative primate evidence. Critically, great ape voiceless calls are explicitly rendered unimportant, leaving the proposed model deprived of behavioral feedstock and proximate selective drivers capable of triggering the neurological transformations described by the authors in the primate brain.

The selfish goal metaphor is interesting and intriguing. It accounts for the idiosyncrasies and inconsistencies in peoples' goal pursuits without invoking free will, self-regulatory, or self-control failures. However, people pursue multiple goals, sometimes simultaneously. We argue that the model proposed in the target article may gain significant theoretical and practical value if the principles underlying goal selection and/or balancing on a moment-to-moment basis are clearly specified and integrated with the notion of the selfish goal.

Terror organizations tend to rely on a limited number of practices to reinforce commitment to suicide on the part of recruits. Therefore, given the many difficulties associated with identifying individuals willing to become suicide terrorists, understanding the organizational contexts in which most suicide terrorism takes place is likely to be more useful than psychological profiling for predicting future attacks.

Psychological essentialism operates in two realms that have consequences for our attitudes towards groups and individuals. Although essentialism is more familiar in the context of biological group membership, it can also be evoked when considering unique artefacts, especially when they are emotionally significant items.

Smaldino proposes emergent properties of human groups, arising when individuals display both differentiation and organization, constitute a novel unit of cultural selection not addressed by current evolutionary theory. We propose existing theoretical frameworks for maintenance of genetic diversity – social heterosis and social genomes – can similarly explain the appearance and maintenance of human cultural diversity (i.e., group-level traits) and collaborative interdependence.

Newell & Shanks (N&S) provide a welcome examination of many claims about unconscious influences on decision making. I emphasize two issues that they do not consider fully: the roles of automatic processes and emotions. I further raise an important conceptual problem in assigning causes to potential unconscious influences. Which “causal field” is relevant: that of the investigator or the experimental participants?

While primarily identifying similarities between suicide terrorists and other suicidal individuals, Lankford also notes differences in how their actions are morally evaluated. Specifically, “conventional” suicide is stigmatized in a way that suicide terrorism is not. We identify the root of this condemnation, showing that suicide is intuitively considered impure and disgusting, and discuss implications of this purity-based stigma.

The evolved psychological process for producing social norms is both needed to facilitate emergent group-level traits and capable of delivering such a process. I discuss how this process can work to generate group-level traits and how specific mechanisms established to buttress social norms similarly can explain how group-level traits are supported.

Building a theory on extant species, as Ackermann et al. do, is a useful contribution to the field of language evolution. Here, I add another living model that might be of interest: human language ontogeny in the first year of life. A better knowledge of this phase might help in understanding two more topics among the “several building blocks of a comprehensive theory of the evolution of spoken language” indicated in their conclusion by Ackermann et al., that is, the foundation of the co-evolution of linguistic motor skills with the auditory skills underlying speech perception, and the possible phylogenetic interactions of protospeech production with referential capabilities.

Newell & Shanks (N&S) show that there is no convincing evidence that processes assumed to be unconscious and superior are indeed unconscious. We take their argument one step further by showing that there is also no convincing evidence that these processes are superior. We review alternative paradigms that may provide more convincing tests of the superiority of (presumed) unconscious processes.

Although the proposed Selfish Goal Theory constitutes a major theoretical tour de force for addressing the issue of inconsistencies in human actions and the role of motivational goals in behavior, as it is based on an unproven biological paradigm (Dawkins's selfish gene theory) and overemphasizes the role of unconscious processes in decision making, it provides a questionable model of the underlying psychological structure of human agency.

There are two problems with Cimpian & Salomon's (C&S's) claim that an innate inherence heuristic is part of our cognitive makeup. First, some of their examples of inherent features do not seem to accord with the authors' own definition of inherence. Second, rather than posit an inherence heuristic to explain why humans rely more heavily on inherent features, it may be more parsimonious to do so on the basis of aspects of the world itself and our relationship to it.

Both internal and external states can cause inconsistencies in decision behavior. I present examples from behavioral decision-making literature and review neuroscientific knowledge on two contextual influences: framing effects and social conformity. The brain mechanisms underlying these behavioral adjustments comply with the dual-process account and simple learning mechanisms, and are weak indicators for unintentionality in decision-making processes.

Lankford asserts that suicide terrorism is attributable to suicidality. We argue in this commentary that this assertion is not well supported theoretically or empirically. In addition, we suggest that failure to acknowledge religious beliefs as motivationally causal for suicide terrorism may place innocent people at risk of murder in the service of political correctness and multiculturalism.

Huang & Bargh's (H&B's) general picture might underestimate the role played by conscious self and overestimate the behavioral inconsistencies at the personal level. This follows from how they delimit the goals under consideration: Their theses that goals are not consciously selected and that the conscious self is involved just in post hoc rationalization should also be tested against concrete and long-term goals.

Ackermann et al. disregard attested knowledge concerning aphasia, Parkinson disease, cortical-to-striatal circuits, basal ganglia, laryngeal phonation, and other matters. Their dual-pathway model cannot account for “what is special about the human brain.” Their human cortical-to-laryngeal neural circuit does not exist. Basal ganglia operations, enhanced by mutations on FOXP2, confer human motor-control, linguistic, and cognitive capabilities.