Lankford's book makes the important point that analyses of suicide terrorists often commit the error of overestimating the importance of situational causes of behavior and underestimating dispositional causes, such as underlying pathology. Personality and individual differences are important; suicide terrorists are not ordinary people driven by situational pressures. However, citation of empirical evidence is haphazard; the scholarly argument is not well-developed.

Contradicting new dual-pathway models of language evolution, cortico-striatal-thalamic circuitry disambiguate uncertainties in affective prosody and propositional linguistic content of language production and comprehension, predictably setting limits on useful complexity of articulate phonic and/or signed speech. Such limits likely evolved to ensure public information is discriminated by intended communicants and safeguarded against the ecological pressures of social eavesdropping within and across phylogenetic boundaries.

Lankford's essential empirical argument, which is based on evidence such as psychological autopsies, is that suicide attacks are caused by suicidality. By operationalizing this causal claim in a hypothetical experiment, I show the claim to be provable, and I contend that its truth is supported by Lankford's data. However, I question his ensuing arguments about beauty and goodness, and thereby the practical value of his work in counterterrorist propaganda.

Smaldino argues that evolutionary theories of social behavior do not adequately explain the emergence of group-level traits, including differentiation of roles and organized interactions among individuals. We find Smaldino's account to be commendable but incomplete. Our commentary focuses on a simple question that has not been adequately addressed: What is a group?

We present two arguments why physical adaptations for vocalization may be as important as neural adaptations. First, fine control over vocalization is not easy for physical reasons, and modern humans may be exceptional. Second, we present an example of a gorilla that shows rudimentary voluntary control over vocalization, indicating that some neural control is already shared with great apes.

It may be useful to consider the application of Huang & Bargh's (H&B's) theory of unconscious motivational processes to psychopathology. In disorders of compulsivity and impulsivity, an unconscious habit system may play a key role in explaining ego-dystonic or self-destructive behaviour. H&B's theory may provide some insights into understanding conditions such as obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) and drug addiction; however, additional work is needed to address the neurocircuitry and neurochemistry mediating their abnormal underlying motivational processes.

Inherence is not a distinct construct from psychological essentialism; it is one of several underlying beliefs. I propose that inherence is only one entry point to the perception of an essence and posit that context may influence which aspects of essentialist reasoning precede inferring an essence. I also discuss how psychological essentialism can uniquely account for violations of category-based expectancies.

Newell & Shanks (N&S) criticize theories on decision making that include unconscious processes. To the extent that their own perspective becomes apparent, however, it is dated, implausible, and at odds with the major developments of the past decades. Their conclusions are, at least for research areas we feel entitled to evaluate, based on a biased sampling of the literature.

Smaldino proposes a conceptual extension to the theory of cultural evolution to include emergent group-level traits as a unit of selection. It is important to recognize the role that group-level traits have played in the evolution of human culture. However, the emergent group-level trait of division of labor provides an illustrative example that is implementable within the existing framework of cMLS theory and may not even need a departure from the standard model.

The inherence heuristic (a) offers modest insights into the complex nature of both the is–ought tension in moral reasoning and moral reasoning per se, and (b) does not reflect the complexity of domain-specific moral heuristics. Formal and general in nature, we contextualize the process described as “inherence heuristic” in a web of domain-specific heuristics (e.g., agent specific; action specific; consequences specific).

Recent evidence from very young human infants' responses to human and nonhuman primate vocalizations offers new insights – and brings new questions – to the forefront for those who seek to integrate primate-general and human-specific mechanisms of acoustic communication with theories of language acquisition.

Lankford claims that suicide terrorists are suicidal, but that their suicidal tendencies are often frustrated by injunctive social norms. Martyrdom represents a solution, and terrorist organizations exploit this. In this commentary, we claim that this argument has not been fully made and that such ideation in itself does not explain a willingness to engage in punitive actions against an enemy. We suggest the psychology of kinship as a possible missing factor.

We argue that it is possible to go beyond the “selfish goal” metaphor and make an even stronger case for the role of unconscious motivation in cognition and action. Through the relevance of a representation (ROAR) framework, we describe how not only value motivation, which relates to “selfish goals,” but also truth motivation and control motivation impact cognition and action.

Throughout this article the authors presume – without justification – that decision making must be a conscious process unless proved otherwise, and they place an unreasonably strict burden of proof on anyone wishing to claim a role for unconscious processing. In addition, I show that their arguments do not, as implied here, impact upon contemporary dual-process theories of reasoning and decision making.

It is clear that people often make unwarranted inherence-based explanations, but it is less clear that explaining this fact requires the inherence heuristic. Instead, it can be explained by a more general explanatory apparatus operating on the most readily available information, which, depending on the nature of that information, outputs both inherent and noninherent explanations.

We question Smaldino's argument that culture plays the active role of maintaining and transmitting social organizations of differentiated individuals. Culture is an aggregate of individual differences in psychological variables within and between groups; it was not designed by group-level selection to maintain the structured organization of individuals. We conclude that Smaldino fails to present the crucial mechanism by which group-level traits are maintained, transmitted, and evolve.

Neuroimaging studies have verified the important integrative role of the basal ganglia during affective vocalizations. They, however, also point to additional regions supporting vocal monitoring, auditory–motor feedback processing, and online adjustments of vocal motor responses. For the case of affective vocalizations, we suggest partly extending the model to fully consider the link between primate-general and human-specific neural components.

Newell & Shanks (N&S) appeal to well-known problems in establishing subliminality to argue that there is little convincing evidence that subliminally presented stimuli can affect decision making. We discuss how recent studies have successfully addressed these well-known problems and, in turn, have revealed clear evidence that subliminally presented stimuli can affect decision making.

Lankford criticizes the notion that suicide terrorists are “normal” and argues that they are suicidal. We have two misgivings about this. First, he puts sole focus on the personal side of suicidality and ignores the individual's context. Second, he fails to elaborate on the intent to harm others, which must also include the cultural, political, religious/ideological, and social-organizational factors of suicide terrorism.

Our conscious abilities are learned in environments that have evolved to support them. This insight provides an alternative way of framing Huang & Bargh's (H&B's) provocative hypothesis. To understand the conflict between unconscious goals and consciousness, we can study the emergence of conscious thought and control in childhood. These developmental processes are also central to the best available current evolutionary theories.