Tehran Auction, established in 2012, rose to prominence during a period of severe international sanctions, economic instability, and institutional fragility in Iran. The auction represents a turning point in the evolution of Iranian art, in which its value increasingly aligns with luxury goods, a change that reflects a broader semi-neoliberal transformation in Iranian cultural policy. To analyze this shift, this article draws on concepts such as symbolic capital (Bourdieu), institutional theory (Dickie), and aesthetic politics (Rancière) to trace how market pricing mechanisms shape artistic legitimacy in Iran. Particular reference is made to paintings by Sohrab Sepehri, which have achieved the highest sales in the history of Tehran Auction. It is argued that his paintings function as markers of status, enhancing collectors’ cultural capital. This phenomenon mirrors the role of luxury brands in Tehran, where material possessions signal social distinction.

The war of 1578–1590 marked a turning point in Ottoman-Safavid relations. It followed thirty-three years of peace and ushered in over half a century of nearly continuous crisis and bloodshed. Militarily, the conflict was centered primarily in the Caucasus, where the Ottomans achieved significant territorial gains, formalized in the Treaty of Constantinople (1590). This war is among the better documented of the Ottoman-Safavid conflicts thanks to a wealth of contemporary sources, particularly from the Ottoman side. However, the lack of contemporary Safavid sources, as well as the neglect of local and global perspectives, has led to a biased and partial understanding, which the present special section seeks to address. Two of this section’s articles focus on the Caucasus campaign of 1578–1579, emphasizing Ottoman interactions with local populations and the daily experiences of ordinary soldiers (Alsancakli and Stevens). Two other articles examine Safavid relations with Russia and the Italian states in the context of a potential anti-Ottoman alliance (Rybar and Trentacoste). All four contributions are based on the presentation and publication or translation of previously unknown or overlooked primary sources.

Iran is one of the most stigmatised countries of the twenty-first century: having been sanctioned by the US since 1979, the Islamic Republic was declared part of the ‘axis of evil’ by President George W. Bush in 2002, and from 2006 onwards, it has been subject to multilateral, comprehensive and wide-reaching economic sanctions. In June 2025, this discursive and economic attack on Iran transitioned to direct military bombardment. For the United States and its allies, Iran is a pariah state. This stigmatisation of Iran is an example of the kinds of practices that contribute to the social construction of the international order, whereby some countries are designated as ‘inside’ and others as ‘outside’ the community of established states. Needless to say, Iran has been placed firmly in the ‘outside’ category ever since 1979. At the same time as accepting and even at times embracing this ‘outsider’ status, however, Iran has also sought to raise its own international standing and to be accepted as an ‘insider’.

This article examines social representations and hierarchies among Iranian migrants in Dubai through an analysis of the diversity of the Iranian diaspora and the ways in which different segments of this diaspora engage with the policies and politics of belonging in the national contexts of both Iran and the United Arab Emirates. I focus on the legacy of stereotypical representations inherited from processes of nation-building, and on how individuals navigate, negotiate, and at times challenge these representations through everyday interactions and relations of alterity. Dubai constitutes a particularly revealing case in this respect, because the Iranian presence there has been shaped simultaneously by regional mobilities rooted in the history of the Persian Gulf and by broader transnational movements, while also reflecting the effects of globalization over recent decades. The analysis further explores how social hierarchies originating in Iranian society are reproduced, reworked, or contested in the migratory context through the study of social interactions between different groups and cultural initiatives undertaken by migrants. The article sheds light on the formation of cosmopolitan subjectivities and practices of cultural distinction within a heterogeneous diasporic space.1

The Ottoman-Safavid war of 1578–1590 marked the first time the Caucasus emerged as a primary battleground in the struggle between the Ottomans, Iran, and Russia. The war’s first campaign, led by Lala Muṣṭafā Paşa in Shirvan, also saw the rise of Özdemiroġlu ʿOs̱mān Paşa, commander of the Ottoman troops that wintered in Daghestan in 1578–1579. This campaign has been extensively recounted in contemporary chronicles, particularly in ġazavātnāme such as Muṣṭafā ʿĀlī’s Nuṣretnāme (c. 1584) and Āṣafī Dāl Meḥmed Çelebi’s Şecāʿatnāme (c. 1586–1587), both authored by high-ranking officials who took part in the campaign. However, a different perspective emerges when one considers the experiences of rank-and-file soldiers, voiceless yet central actors in the events chronicled in these narratives. This study focuses on the so-called Tārīḫ-i ʿOs̱mān Paşa, a war memoir composed in Turkish between 1580–1584 by Ebūbekir b. ʿAbdullāh, a cavalryman in the Ottoman army.

In addition to adopting a more prosaic tone than his prestigious contemporaries, Ebūbekir also gives prominence to his personal experiences and observations, particularly when recounting his one-year stay in the region of Derbent. In this passage, he describes the peoples of Daghestan and briefly discusses their history, sociopolitical organization, beliefs, and customs. In this article, I present a translation and analysis of this passage of the book. In introducing this text to an English-speaking audience, this work contributes to our historical understanding of Daghestan and the Caucasus and provides valuable material for studying Ottoman mentalities, moving beyond the authorized narratives of state-employed chroniclers.

Relying on in-depth and semistructured interviews in Spanish and Farsi, this paper delves into (post)migration processes and social and cultural relations of thirty-nine first-generation and second-generation Iranians in Spain. The article initially focuses on the formation of the Iranian diaspora in Spain, and subsequently centers on social and cultural connections of hospitality and public social interactions, language and expressive culture, and gastronomy. The article shows that despite the short history of Spain as a democracy in Europe and perception of it as a transit country, it has eventually become a new home for many Iranians.

The past few years have seen a steady flow of articles, reports, and media commentary on China and the Middle East. In both popular and academic discourse, there is a growing debate about whether or when China will play a larger role in the region, and what the implications are for regional and global politics.1 With some exceptions, most of these discussions remain within a framework of US economic, foreign policy, and national security concerns, under the assumption that China’s overriding goal is to replicate or counter American influence. In doing so, the conversations often rely upon the narrow view from Washington and reproduce the underlying logic of US foreign policy. Read through this lens, all Chinese initiatives are either a successful or failed attempt to counter US dominance, and without reference to the Chinese and local perspective, critical details are often lost or misread. This is especially pronounced in media coverage of Sino–Iranian relations, which are often framed as a threat to American interests and global security (often conflated), or as part of a multipolar alternative to a hegemonic world order. Although the political, military, and economic implications of China’s relationship with Iran and the wider region are unquestionably important, closer attention to local sources and perspectives can provide an alternative view that both enriches our understanding and tempers our expectations of China’s role in Iran and in the wider region. This dynamic is clearly visible in the discourse surrounding the Iran–China 25-year cooperation agreement, signed on March 27, 2021.

This article examines MS Török O. 176 from the Hungarian Academy of Sciences Vambery Collection, Tevārīḫ-i Futuḥ-i Şirvan, an anonymously authored manuscript of the Ottoman campaign in the Caucasus in 1578. The text under study emphasizes the importance of leadership and memorializes the commanders of the campaign, showing how an Ottoman author presented proper military leadership, with an emphasis on rigid adherence to authority. The factional context of the chronicle also is analyzed, as the author indirectly criticizes the campaign leaders’ rivals. Finally, consideration is given to the reason the text was copied in 1722–23, at a time when the Ottoman Empire was competing with Russia in the Caucasus shortly after the collapse of the Safavid dynasty.

This study investigates the transnational mobility of Iranian women pursuing higher education in South Korea, focusing on their motivations, adaptation, and postgraduation trajectories. Drawing on the influence of the Korean Wave since the 2000s, it examines how popular culture, gender constraints in Iran, and migration aspirations intersect. Despite their initial attraction to Korea’s global image, many face cultural barriers, discrimination, and restrictive visa systems that limit settlement opportunities. Consequently, some seek “onward migration” to third countries such as Canada or Germany. By situating these experiences within broader Iranian migration dynamics, the study highlights gendered dimensions of educational migration and the policy limitations shaping Iranian students’ transnational mobility.

In contrast to Turkey’s “bridge between Europe and Asia” image, Iran is rarely conceived of as an interregional junction. Yet the Iranian plateau is at the crossroads between the Middle East and Central and South Asia. This remains underappreciated in part due to the Islamic Republic of Iran’s ongoing intraregional geopolitical entanglement with, and adventurism in, the Middle East making frequent headlines. Tehran’s relations with other geographically adjacent (sub)regions, such post-Soviet South Caucasus and Central Asia (“Central Eurasia” hereafter) as well as South Asia, are noticeably less turbulent.1

This study explores diplomatic negotiations that took place between the Safavids, Rurikids, and Habsburgs during the last years of the Ottoman-Safavid War (1578–1590). The primary objective of these negotiations was to establish an anti-Ottoman alliance, with each participating party pursuing its own foreign policy interests. Drawing on various documents, it can be argued that the initiative for this new round of Safavid-Rurikids-Habsburg diplomacy originated from Shāh Muḥammad Khudābanda. In 1586, the shah dispatched envoy Hādī Beg to Moscow, seeking Russia’s assistance in countering the Ottomans. Subsequently, diplomatic negotiations between the three parties ensued. Through a comprehensive analysis of both archival and published documents, this article aims to uncover and examine the goals and attitudes of all negotiating parties around the formation of an anti-Ottoman alliance by the late 1580s.

This roundtable opens a small window onto current debates regarding the historiography of Iranian architecture, highlighting the work of a new generation of scholars whose academic formation is rooted in intellectual discussions within Iran. Although postcolonial critiques have challenged colonial and nationalist narratives, such critiques are still largely theorized and circulated through academic institutions in the Global North. Against this backdrop, the roundtable foregrounds the intellectual agency of scholars working at the “margin,” whose attention to local specificities offers perspectives that can enrich broader historiographical debates. By creating a platform for these voices, the roundtable highlights the epistemological value of perspectives grounded in local intellectual contexts and encourages further initiatives that may help balance the geography of knowledge production in architectural historiography.

Since 1979, the Islamic Republic has framed itself as a revolutionary anti-imperialist state that advocates for the oppressed, with the Palestinian cause as a central pillar of its ideological framework. No other country has been so consistently supported in words and deeds. To understand the significance of the Palestinian cause in the Islamic Republic’s vision of regional order requires placing Palestine within the Islamic Republic’s foundational narrative of resistance, anti-imperialism, and independence. True to its nature as a revolutionary state, the Islamic Republic challenges the existing regional and global order, advocating for change and resistance to great power politics while presenting itself as a steadfast defender of the oppressed. This revolutionary narrative established Palestine as a symbol of the Islamic Republic’s commitment to anti-imperialism and resistance. In contrast, Israel is framed as an illegitimate colonial entity imposed by Western imperialists, with Israel’s existence seen as but an extension of U.S. dominance in the Middle East.1 The hostility toward Israel, which became a defining feature of Tehran’s foreign policy after 1979, stems from both ideological convictions and strategic considerations.

The October 2023 Hamas attack on Israel entailed a disproportional military counterattack by Israel on Gaza, and on Iranian strongholds in the Middle East. Iran’s evident failure to fully protect its allies and military assets pointed to a receding regional influence. The US-Israel Twelve-Day War against Iran’s military, industrial, nuclear, and civilian targets in June 2025 exposed the scale of Iranian defense vulnerability. On the diplomatic front, Iran failed to work with Saudi Arabia to prevent bloodshed in Gaza or the Twelve-Day War, despite joint appeals to reduce violence and condemn the Israeli aggression. Saudi Arabia encouraged a ceasefire in Gaza, but it discouraged Tehran and its ally Hamas from regrouping against Israel.1 The Saudi response to the Twelve-Day War arrived belatedly, after other Muslim countries first condemned the attacks. Both conflicts revealed Iran’s frequent resort to niche diplomacy: seeking limited diplomatic goals without garnering momentum to resolve conflicts.2 Its triangular diplomacy to mobilize resources with Saudi Arabia to preempt Israeli aggression only served to sustain Tel Aviv’s hostility and cautious ties with Riyadh.3

This article examines previously overlooked Italian archival sources concerning the Ottoman-Safavid wars, thereby broadening the study of European knowledge of Safavid Iran beyond the well-known Venetian and Roman context. Focusing on documents preserved in the State Archives of Florence and Mantua, it analyses a Tuscan report on the origin of the 1578-90 conflict and a Mantuan account of the Battle of Sufiyan (1605). These records, compared with modern historiography, reveal the remarkable accuracy and scope of Italian ‘intelligence’ networks. The study highlights the significance of Italian diplomatic, mercantile, and informational infrastructures in shaping early modern Europe’s understanding of Safavid Iran.

The architectural history of Iran began in the early 1900s with the orientalist approaches prevalent at that time and continued for a long time, with minor changes, under the influence of these approaches. From the mid-1990s, the situation changed slowly, and between 1995 and 2005, also known as the “reform era,” a profound transformation took place in this field. The holding of the first Congress on the History of Architecture and Urban Planning of Iran (1995) was the starting point of this transformation. Then, a series of events, including changes in existing institutions, the establishment of new institutions, the establishment of specialized journals, the holding of related conferences and scientific events, and finally the establishment of the field of Iranian architectural studies, were the milestones that led to the transformation of this field. The article examines the general aspects of this development.

Over the past two decades, architectural historiography in Iran has undergone a significant disciplinary transformation. This article examines the effect of the Iranian architectural studies (IAS) MA program establishment at Shahid Beheshti University (est. 2005) in this process. It reconstructs the historical context of architectural education in Iran since the mid-twentieth century, when architectural history occupied a marginal position, and then examines the establishment of the IAS program as a turning point in this trajectory through an analysis of its curriculum, pedagogical strategies, and scholarly output. The article argues that the program has institutionalized architectural historiography, cultivated new generations of scholars and educators, and encouraged greater attention within Iranian schools of architecture to the social, cultural, and contextual dimensions of architecture, bringing them closer to comprehensive schools of the built environment.