We agree with Gowdy & Krall (G&K) that human economic behaviors and group structures can be informed by comparative analyses; however, we also believe that several of their specific assertions do not converge with conventional biological and economic perspectives, limitations that may be better explained by individual optimization models. From a biological perspective, it is unclear which convergent evolutionary selection forces would have resulted in both complex human behaviors and behaviors found in a select handful of insect species. For one, insects evolved in the context of competition with external forces in nature (e.g., climatic changes, predator–prey interactions, geography), potentially supporting G&K's proposition that ultrasocial insects are inherently motivated to increase the size of their population. By comparison, the types of adaptations (e.g., abstract cognitive representations, theory of mind, mental time travel, psychosomatic illness, emotional expression) that characterize humans are instead believed to have arisen from intra-species selection pressures and hence competition among humans (Alexander Reference Alexander, Stringer and Mellars1989; Vigil Reference Vigil2009). Under these circumstances, where unrelated conspecifics pose the greatest selection forces to the individual, increasing one's number of competitors does not appear to offer a discernible fitness advantage. Likewise, because population size is related to the extent of societal stratification (class hierarchies, disparate access to resources) within the population, it is difficult to imagine how individuals who may reap very little from the broader economic system (and may even be compromised by the efficiency of its structure) would be incentivized to contribute to such a system – for example, via labor specialization – at the cost of individual fitness losses.
Further, the insects that G&K discuss (e.g., ants, bees) tend to share high degrees of genetic relatedness and engage in reproductive patterns (e.g., monogamous mating) that limit genetic variability (Andersson Reference Andersson1984; Hughes et al. Reference Hughes, Oldroyd, Beekman and Ratnieks2008). Therefore, the expression of eusociality in these species can best be explained by the concept of inclusive fitness, or the maximization of collective (genetic) fitness via the propagation of shared genes (Hamilton Reference Hamilton1964). Unlike any known insect species, humans also engage in selective acts of reciprocal altruism with non-kin in order to maximize the individual's personal competitiveness and genetic fitness (Trivers Reference Trivers1971; Vigil Reference Vigil2007; Reference Vigil2009). Lastly, it is unclear why economic behaviors may be best informed by observations of non-human species viewed as “ultrasocial,” rather than, for example, (a) less social species (e.g., crickets) or (b) more social species (e.g., primates), which could, respectively, offer either a broader behavioral framework or more precision in predicting specific economic structuring.
From an economic perspective, the transition from fragmented groups of hunters and gatherers to large agricultural societies is also not explained well by ultrasociality, and the characteristics of ultrasociality do not manifest consistently across humans and ants. The authors state that ultrasociality (which leads to labor specialization, economies of scale, and ecological dominance) arises from the competitive advantage associated with producing one's own food and leads to greater economic surplus. However, comparative advantage suggests that specialization by groups leads to greater economic surplus than one group managing the entire process of food production. The benefits of labor specialization also arise from comparative advantage. In the case of ants, phenotypes determine which types of ants have the lowest opportunity costs for different roles in the colony, and, with only one food source, there is little benefit in trading across colonies. In humans, culture and social prejudice continue to prohibit optimal division of labor, especially across genders and racial/ethnic groups, with women and minority races assigned to lesser positions regardless of the actual opportunity cost associated with their labor in a particular role. In addition, the wide range of food sources consumed by humans supports increasing specialization at the group level with trade among groups, rather than high levels of specialization within the group. Finally, diseconomies of scale exist as much as do economies of scale, and particular complications associated with larger-scale economies would appear to disincentivize individual investment in communal goals, including free-riding and instability, especially as goals become more diverse and numerous.
A fundamental question also remains as to what are human and ant societies maximizing that cannot be better explained by individual (level 1) utility maximization theories? The target article assumes a variety of success measures – population size, ecosystem dominance, and economic surplus – without clear definitions or consideration of their construct validity. Although perhaps correlated with “success,” all three measures are problematic as direct measures of success. Human societies do not maximize population size, as evidenced by public policies (e.g., China's one-child policy) or the decrease in birth rates associated with development. Measuring ecosystem dominance with population weight or dry biomass suggests that maximizing obesity would result in more successful societies. As for economic surplus, ants likely do maximize productive output (e.g., “economic surplus”). In human societies, however, religion, social mores, and political systems ensure that productive output maximization is constrained by factors not exhibited in ant societies, such as the desire to limit inequity or avoid taboo activities, for example, usury or organ sales. In other words, human social welfare maximization includes factors not adjusted for in total productive output and may take on ordinal rather than cardinal properties, as do underlying individual utility functions.
In conclusion, we are not convinced that the concept of ultrasociality adds to our understanding of the similarities between human and ant societies, nor that ultrasociality characterized the transition from hunting and gathering to agricultural societies. We believe that biological differences and the distinct goals pursued by humans and ants could not have plausibly allowed convergent evolutionary process to occur beyond basic (e.g., approach/withdrawal) motivational systems and expressive gesturing (Vigil Reference Vigil2009). As for the transition from hunting and gathering to agriculture, we assert that the benefits of agriculture were not so much in the economic benefits to the group as in the opportunity for consolidation of power by powerful utility-maximizing individuals. This thesis also offers corresponding explanations for various characteristics of group-level economic structures, including large size, division of labor, dominance hierarchies, and loss of autonomy among the lower ranked individuals.
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We agree with Gowdy & Krall (G&K) that human economic behaviors and group structures can be informed by comparative analyses; however, we also believe that several of their specific assertions do not converge with conventional biological and economic perspectives, limitations that may be better explained by individual optimization models. From a biological perspective, it is unclear which convergent evolutionary selection forces would have resulted in both complex human behaviors and behaviors found in a select handful of insect species. For one, insects evolved in the context of competition with external forces in nature (e.g., climatic changes, predator–prey interactions, geography), potentially supporting G&K's proposition that ultrasocial insects are inherently motivated to increase the size of their population. By comparison, the types of adaptations (e.g., abstract cognitive representations, theory of mind, mental time travel, psychosomatic illness, emotional expression) that characterize humans are instead believed to have arisen from intra-species selection pressures and hence competition among humans (Alexander Reference Alexander, Stringer and Mellars1989; Vigil Reference Vigil2009). Under these circumstances, where unrelated conspecifics pose the greatest selection forces to the individual, increasing one's number of competitors does not appear to offer a discernible fitness advantage. Likewise, because population size is related to the extent of societal stratification (class hierarchies, disparate access to resources) within the population, it is difficult to imagine how individuals who may reap very little from the broader economic system (and may even be compromised by the efficiency of its structure) would be incentivized to contribute to such a system – for example, via labor specialization – at the cost of individual fitness losses.
Further, the insects that G&K discuss (e.g., ants, bees) tend to share high degrees of genetic relatedness and engage in reproductive patterns (e.g., monogamous mating) that limit genetic variability (Andersson Reference Andersson1984; Hughes et al. Reference Hughes, Oldroyd, Beekman and Ratnieks2008). Therefore, the expression of eusociality in these species can best be explained by the concept of inclusive fitness, or the maximization of collective (genetic) fitness via the propagation of shared genes (Hamilton Reference Hamilton1964). Unlike any known insect species, humans also engage in selective acts of reciprocal altruism with non-kin in order to maximize the individual's personal competitiveness and genetic fitness (Trivers Reference Trivers1971; Vigil Reference Vigil2007; Reference Vigil2009). Lastly, it is unclear why economic behaviors may be best informed by observations of non-human species viewed as “ultrasocial,” rather than, for example, (a) less social species (e.g., crickets) or (b) more social species (e.g., primates), which could, respectively, offer either a broader behavioral framework or more precision in predicting specific economic structuring.
From an economic perspective, the transition from fragmented groups of hunters and gatherers to large agricultural societies is also not explained well by ultrasociality, and the characteristics of ultrasociality do not manifest consistently across humans and ants. The authors state that ultrasociality (which leads to labor specialization, economies of scale, and ecological dominance) arises from the competitive advantage associated with producing one's own food and leads to greater economic surplus. However, comparative advantage suggests that specialization by groups leads to greater economic surplus than one group managing the entire process of food production. The benefits of labor specialization also arise from comparative advantage. In the case of ants, phenotypes determine which types of ants have the lowest opportunity costs for different roles in the colony, and, with only one food source, there is little benefit in trading across colonies. In humans, culture and social prejudice continue to prohibit optimal division of labor, especially across genders and racial/ethnic groups, with women and minority races assigned to lesser positions regardless of the actual opportunity cost associated with their labor in a particular role. In addition, the wide range of food sources consumed by humans supports increasing specialization at the group level with trade among groups, rather than high levels of specialization within the group. Finally, diseconomies of scale exist as much as do economies of scale, and particular complications associated with larger-scale economies would appear to disincentivize individual investment in communal goals, including free-riding and instability, especially as goals become more diverse and numerous.
A fundamental question also remains as to what are human and ant societies maximizing that cannot be better explained by individual (level 1) utility maximization theories? The target article assumes a variety of success measures – population size, ecosystem dominance, and economic surplus – without clear definitions or consideration of their construct validity. Although perhaps correlated with “success,” all three measures are problematic as direct measures of success. Human societies do not maximize population size, as evidenced by public policies (e.g., China's one-child policy) or the decrease in birth rates associated with development. Measuring ecosystem dominance with population weight or dry biomass suggests that maximizing obesity would result in more successful societies. As for economic surplus, ants likely do maximize productive output (e.g., “economic surplus”). In human societies, however, religion, social mores, and political systems ensure that productive output maximization is constrained by factors not exhibited in ant societies, such as the desire to limit inequity or avoid taboo activities, for example, usury or organ sales. In other words, human social welfare maximization includes factors not adjusted for in total productive output and may take on ordinal rather than cardinal properties, as do underlying individual utility functions.
In conclusion, we are not convinced that the concept of ultrasociality adds to our understanding of the similarities between human and ant societies, nor that ultrasociality characterized the transition from hunting and gathering to agricultural societies. We believe that biological differences and the distinct goals pursued by humans and ants could not have plausibly allowed convergent evolutionary process to occur beyond basic (e.g., approach/withdrawal) motivational systems and expressive gesturing (Vigil Reference Vigil2009). As for the transition from hunting and gathering to agriculture, we assert that the benefits of agriculture were not so much in the economic benefits to the group as in the opportunity for consolidation of power by powerful utility-maximizing individuals. This thesis also offers corresponding explanations for various characteristics of group-level economic structures, including large size, division of labor, dominance hierarchies, and loss of autonomy among the lower ranked individuals.