Gowdy & Krall (G&K) propose that the interplay between managing food production, developing a complex division of labor, and increased production scale and group size in a species transitioning to an agricultural lifestyle creates selections pressures that favor ultrasociality. Ultrasociality, in turn, provides these species with benefits that allow them to dominate their ecosystems, but not without serious costs to individual group members. We find the general narrative – that shifts in lifestyle and exposure to economic pressures provoke ultrasociality – to be very compelling. However, it is unclear if the path charted by G&K represents a unique, and required, path for the development of ultrasocial species.
Did ants, humans, and termites develop ultrasociality because they serendipitously stumbled on exactly the right path to ecological domination, or are there multiple paths that lead to the same destination for some species? We propose that G&K's path is sufficient to provoke ultrasociality, but that the positioning of the adaptations that support ultrasociality may not be necessarily tied to the agricultural transition. Indeed, G&K provide some tacit support for this position when they acknowledge that “the division of labor is both a characteristic of ultrasocial systems and a preadaptation that enabled ultrasociality” (sect. 3). Here, we discuss one such preadaptation: the division of cognitive labor.
One of the central claims presented by G&K is that sharp “evolutionary” departures were necessary for the emergence of ultrasociality in both humans and social insects. In ants and termites, this process resulted in selection pressures that dramatically transformed the biology and behaviors of individuals, but it is not clear that the agricultural transition influenced humans in the same way through the same mechanism. According to G&K, characteristics of agricultural transition modify selection pressures to favor individuals and groups that best adapt to the task of resource management, identifying the critical mechanism for successfully navigating this task as the “expansion and sharpening of the division of labor” (sect. 3.2, para. 1). In ants and termites, this process results in selection pressures that can dramatically transform the biology and behaviors of individuals. However, unlike ultrasocial insect species, humans exhibit relatively little polymorphism. Thus, the primary driver for the division of labor in humans may be cognitive, rather than physical.
Although a particularly strong body may grant one hunter or farmer or worker an advantage over another, we propose that human knowledge and expertise are more indicative of fitness than most physical attributes. Indeed, the term “hunter-gatherer” references a social organization and distribution of knowledge, skills, and expertise that may represent the seeds of human ultrasociality. Thus, although humans exhibit many of the same tendencies as social insects, and our ultrasociality may have similar characteristics and consequences for long-term survival, it is not clear that our path to ultrasociality is the same as that traversed by ants and termites. Whereas other species may require special circumstances to develop a division of labor, individual humans exhibit an early emerging division of cognitive labor, which we propose provides an explanation for human behavior in large, agrarian groups.
Both adults and children recognize that knowledge is not equally distributed among individuals, but rather it clusters according to distinct areas of expertise that can be organized in a number of ways (Keil et al. Reference Keil, Stein, Webb, Billings and Rozenblit2008). This understanding is early emerging. Children as young as age 4 demonstrate an understanding that knowledge pools unequally across individuals (Lutz & Keil Reference Lutz and Keil2002), and by age 5, they can conceptualize expertise in terms of disciplines, goals, and even narrow topics (Danovitch & Keil Reference Danovitch and Keil2004). Through exposure, children can also sharpen or expand these representations, and there is evidence that children readily comprehend even very specific or unusual areas of expertise (Koenig & Jaswal Reference Koenig and Jaswal2011; Landrum & Mills Reference Landrum and Mills2015). Thus, in terms of the division of cognitive labor, even the youngest humans appear to be prepared for shifts in population density and lifestyle.
We propose that the division of cognitive labor is a preadaptation that provides an avenue for a species to arrive at ultrasociality. Pre-agricultural humans might reasonably possess this competency, and critically, it represents a mechanism for addressing the challenges species face when transitioning from foraging to agriculture lifestyles. If humans already possessed the ability to represent expanded divisions of labor, then those complexities may be addressed by shifts in their mental representations without requiring the kinds of dramatic evolutionary and morphological shifts experienced by social insects. Thus, ultrasociality in humans may represent a quantitative change – a preadaptation scaled up to address a shift in living conditions – as opposed to a qualitative, evolutionary change in the human species.
In conclusion, we believe that the proposal outlined by G&K is important. It integrates modern considerations of economics with evolutionary theories about the development of complex social groups, highlighting how expertise from multiple disciplines may be employed to understand the development of complex behaviors in species. Although we find the narrative presented by G&K to be compelling and informative, we challenge G&K's suggestion that all species must traverse the same path to ultrasociality by proposing that humans may have possessed a preadaptation allowing them to navigate the challenges of agricultural transition in a manner that, while arriving at the same destination, diverges from the adaptation of social insects. Although the theory outlined by G&K might benefit from additional discussion and refinement, we believe that the species-general linkage between transitions in living and social structures proposed here is particularly critical, as it identifies several areas for future theoretical and empirical consideration.
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Gowdy & Krall (G&K) propose that the interplay between managing food production, developing a complex division of labor, and increased production scale and group size in a species transitioning to an agricultural lifestyle creates selections pressures that favor ultrasociality. Ultrasociality, in turn, provides these species with benefits that allow them to dominate their ecosystems, but not without serious costs to individual group members. We find the general narrative – that shifts in lifestyle and exposure to economic pressures provoke ultrasociality – to be very compelling. However, it is unclear if the path charted by G&K represents a unique, and required, path for the development of ultrasocial species.
Did ants, humans, and termites develop ultrasociality because they serendipitously stumbled on exactly the right path to ecological domination, or are there multiple paths that lead to the same destination for some species? We propose that G&K's path is sufficient to provoke ultrasociality, but that the positioning of the adaptations that support ultrasociality may not be necessarily tied to the agricultural transition. Indeed, G&K provide some tacit support for this position when they acknowledge that “the division of labor is both a characteristic of ultrasocial systems and a preadaptation that enabled ultrasociality” (sect. 3). Here, we discuss one such preadaptation: the division of cognitive labor.
One of the central claims presented by G&K is that sharp “evolutionary” departures were necessary for the emergence of ultrasociality in both humans and social insects. In ants and termites, this process resulted in selection pressures that dramatically transformed the biology and behaviors of individuals, but it is not clear that the agricultural transition influenced humans in the same way through the same mechanism. According to G&K, characteristics of agricultural transition modify selection pressures to favor individuals and groups that best adapt to the task of resource management, identifying the critical mechanism for successfully navigating this task as the “expansion and sharpening of the division of labor” (sect. 3.2, para. 1). In ants and termites, this process results in selection pressures that can dramatically transform the biology and behaviors of individuals. However, unlike ultrasocial insect species, humans exhibit relatively little polymorphism. Thus, the primary driver for the division of labor in humans may be cognitive, rather than physical.
Although a particularly strong body may grant one hunter or farmer or worker an advantage over another, we propose that human knowledge and expertise are more indicative of fitness than most physical attributes. Indeed, the term “hunter-gatherer” references a social organization and distribution of knowledge, skills, and expertise that may represent the seeds of human ultrasociality. Thus, although humans exhibit many of the same tendencies as social insects, and our ultrasociality may have similar characteristics and consequences for long-term survival, it is not clear that our path to ultrasociality is the same as that traversed by ants and termites. Whereas other species may require special circumstances to develop a division of labor, individual humans exhibit an early emerging division of cognitive labor, which we propose provides an explanation for human behavior in large, agrarian groups.
Both adults and children recognize that knowledge is not equally distributed among individuals, but rather it clusters according to distinct areas of expertise that can be organized in a number of ways (Keil et al. Reference Keil, Stein, Webb, Billings and Rozenblit2008). This understanding is early emerging. Children as young as age 4 demonstrate an understanding that knowledge pools unequally across individuals (Lutz & Keil Reference Lutz and Keil2002), and by age 5, they can conceptualize expertise in terms of disciplines, goals, and even narrow topics (Danovitch & Keil Reference Danovitch and Keil2004). Through exposure, children can also sharpen or expand these representations, and there is evidence that children readily comprehend even very specific or unusual areas of expertise (Koenig & Jaswal Reference Koenig and Jaswal2011; Landrum & Mills Reference Landrum and Mills2015). Thus, in terms of the division of cognitive labor, even the youngest humans appear to be prepared for shifts in population density and lifestyle.
We propose that the division of cognitive labor is a preadaptation that provides an avenue for a species to arrive at ultrasociality. Pre-agricultural humans might reasonably possess this competency, and critically, it represents a mechanism for addressing the challenges species face when transitioning from foraging to agriculture lifestyles. If humans already possessed the ability to represent expanded divisions of labor, then those complexities may be addressed by shifts in their mental representations without requiring the kinds of dramatic evolutionary and morphological shifts experienced by social insects. Thus, ultrasociality in humans may represent a quantitative change – a preadaptation scaled up to address a shift in living conditions – as opposed to a qualitative, evolutionary change in the human species.
In conclusion, we believe that the proposal outlined by G&K is important. It integrates modern considerations of economics with evolutionary theories about the development of complex social groups, highlighting how expertise from multiple disciplines may be employed to understand the development of complex behaviors in species. Although we find the narrative presented by G&K to be compelling and informative, we challenge G&K's suggestion that all species must traverse the same path to ultrasociality by proposing that humans may have possessed a preadaptation allowing them to navigate the challenges of agricultural transition in a manner that, while arriving at the same destination, diverges from the adaptation of social insects. Although the theory outlined by G&K might benefit from additional discussion and refinement, we believe that the species-general linkage between transitions in living and social structures proposed here is particularly critical, as it identifies several areas for future theoretical and empirical consideration.