Why do we fall in love? That seems to be the core question motivating Kruglanski et al.’s “significance quest” model of romantic love. Their answer to the question is: to feel significant.
A model of some feature of human psychology is useful if it explains that feature. These explanations can be proximate – addressing the “how” questions regarding mechanisms and development of the feature (Tinbergen, Reference Tinbergen1963; Scott-Phillips, Dickins, & West, Reference Scott-Phillips, Dickins and West2011). For romantic love, answers to these questions can involve brain processes and hormones, for example (Bode & Kushnick, Reference Bode and Kushnick2021). Other explanations can be ultimate – addressing the “why” questions regarding the feature’s evolution and potential adaptive functions (Tinbergen, Reference Tinbergen1963; Scott-Phillips et al., Reference Scott-Phillips, Dickins and West2011), on which there is a rich literature in regard to to romantic love (Bode & Kushnick, Reference Bode and Kushnick2021). The notion of love as a means to an end positions the target article as addressing a question about function, or “why” romantic love occurs, and accordingly, the authors describe their model as “functionalist.”
It is curious, then, that evolution is barely mentioned in the target article. In contrast, Kruglanski et al.’s earlier general proposal of “significance quest theory” features evolution prominently. For example:
We assume that the quest for significance plays a key role in human affairs and hence has been selected for in the course of human evolution: Significance “questors” were likely to contribute to the welfare of their group and were therefore accorded status and prestige …. In turn, the group’s gratitude and admiration likely contributed to individuals’ survival and reproductive success…, explaining the prevalence of the significance quest in our species.
Later, there is a whole section on evolution in relation to the “significance quest.” Why, then, does evolution disappear from the same authors’ significance quest model of romantic love? My best guess is that the authors believe that humans evolved to strive for significance and that romantic love is merely a means to achieve that more fundamental goal (or “end”). But this perspective raises a question: why is significance (and the associated feeling) considered a more fundamental end than a romantic partnership (and the feeling associated with it, i.e., romantic love)? Romantic love is intimately tied to pair-bonding, mate retention, reproduction, and biparental care, which are of fundamental evolutionary importance (Bode & Kushnick, Reference Bode and Kushnick2021) – more fundamental, seemingly, than the vague notion of “significance.” And many other species reproduce within pair bonds, including many that do not live in social groups. Clearly, pair-bonding has evolved in many species with no goal of feeling socially significant. Furthermore, human romantic love shares neurobiological underpinnings with animal pair-bonding (Blumenthal & Young, Reference Blumenthal and Young2023). The obvious conclusion is that romantic love in humans is a subjective feeling associated with the evolved drive to form and maintain pair bonds (which does not mean that the subjective feeling itself drives this behavior; Zietsch, Reference Zietsch2024). In this context, it does not seem likely, or even plausible, that this drive and associated feelings are subordinate to striving to feel socially significant. Why would a deep evolutionary drive observed in many other species have been, in humans, evolutionarily rerouted to be merely one of various ways to feel socially significant? What selection history would bring this process about? Without answers to these questions, the model appears evolutionarily implausible.
The authors might say that their functionalist model is not functional in an evolutionary sense but in some other sense. But it is difficult to see what this other sense might be. The significance quest model posits that one positive emotion (romantic love) has the function of causing another positive emotion (feeling of significance). Feeling significant is not an end unto itself – it is not inherently good or bad – so creating that feeling is not functional, without further explanation of why we should understand feeling socially significant as the ultimate purpose.
Even taken as a purely descriptive exercise, the significance quest model of love is strongly discordant with common sense. The target of the model is the actor’s falling in (or out of) love with someone else. It is not obvious why falling in love (as opposed to being fallen in love with) should make one feel significant. For instance, why would a person (the actor) who falls unrequitedly in love with someone feel more significant than they would have otherwise? On the contrary, they may feel less significant. It is easier to believe an effect in the opposite direction: that having others fall in love with you could give you a feeling significance – but this observation is trivial, given that their loving you necessarily involves you being significant to them. It is no more informative than saying that having people find you significant increases your feelings of significance. Kruglanski et al. say that “The actor falls in love to be loved” – but falling in love is neither necessary nor sufficient to being loved. Altogether, none of this is consistent with the notion that falling in love per se is a means to feel significant, even just as a description of the way the feelings seem to relate to each other.
Kruglanski et al.’s hypothesis also leads to predictions that seem obviously false. As they say, “There is in principle no upper bound on one’s possible significance, so a person who already had a given level of significance might be tempted to gain even more.” Wouldn’t we then expect individuals to fall in love with as many meritorious people as possible, if falling in love is a way to achieve significance? Why, instead, do they generally fall in love with only one person at a time? Similarly, why do most people fall in love with only members of the opposite gender instead of both, since the latter course could presumably maximize their significance? Such observations are straightforwardly predicted if romantic love is rooted in a deep evolutionary drive to form pair bonds, but they seem inexplicable if romantic love is merely a means to feel significant.
Overall, the significance quest model of love seems conceptually muddled and poorly motivated.
Arie W. Kruglanski
[Opens in a new window]Arie W. Kruglanski
, Edward P. Lemay
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Why do we fall in love? That seems to be the core question motivating Kruglanski et al.’s “significance quest” model of romantic love. Their answer to the question is: to feel significant.
A model of some feature of human psychology is useful if it explains that feature. These explanations can be proximate – addressing the “how” questions regarding mechanisms and development of the feature (Tinbergen, Reference Tinbergen1963; Scott-Phillips, Dickins, & West, Reference Scott-Phillips, Dickins and West2011). For romantic love, answers to these questions can involve brain processes and hormones, for example (Bode & Kushnick, Reference Bode and Kushnick2021). Other explanations can be ultimate – addressing the “why” questions regarding the feature’s evolution and potential adaptive functions (Tinbergen, Reference Tinbergen1963; Scott-Phillips et al., Reference Scott-Phillips, Dickins and West2011), on which there is a rich literature in regard to to romantic love (Bode & Kushnick, Reference Bode and Kushnick2021). The notion of love as a means to an end positions the target article as addressing a question about function, or “why” romantic love occurs, and accordingly, the authors describe their model as “functionalist.”
It is curious, then, that evolution is barely mentioned in the target article. In contrast, Kruglanski et al.’s earlier general proposal of “significance quest theory” features evolution prominently. For example:
We assume that the quest for significance plays a key role in human affairs and hence has been selected for in the course of human evolution: Significance “questors” were likely to contribute to the welfare of their group and were therefore accorded status and prestige …. In turn, the group’s gratitude and admiration likely contributed to individuals’ survival and reproductive success…, explaining the prevalence of the significance quest in our species.
Later, there is a whole section on evolution in relation to the “significance quest.” Why, then, does evolution disappear from the same authors’ significance quest model of romantic love? My best guess is that the authors believe that humans evolved to strive for significance and that romantic love is merely a means to achieve that more fundamental goal (or “end”). But this perspective raises a question: why is significance (and the associated feeling) considered a more fundamental end than a romantic partnership (and the feeling associated with it, i.e., romantic love)? Romantic love is intimately tied to pair-bonding, mate retention, reproduction, and biparental care, which are of fundamental evolutionary importance (Bode & Kushnick, Reference Bode and Kushnick2021) – more fundamental, seemingly, than the vague notion of “significance.” And many other species reproduce within pair bonds, including many that do not live in social groups. Clearly, pair-bonding has evolved in many species with no goal of feeling socially significant. Furthermore, human romantic love shares neurobiological underpinnings with animal pair-bonding (Blumenthal & Young, Reference Blumenthal and Young2023). The obvious conclusion is that romantic love in humans is a subjective feeling associated with the evolved drive to form and maintain pair bonds (which does not mean that the subjective feeling itself drives this behavior; Zietsch, Reference Zietsch2024). In this context, it does not seem likely, or even plausible, that this drive and associated feelings are subordinate to striving to feel socially significant. Why would a deep evolutionary drive observed in many other species have been, in humans, evolutionarily rerouted to be merely one of various ways to feel socially significant? What selection history would bring this process about? Without answers to these questions, the model appears evolutionarily implausible.
The authors might say that their functionalist model is not functional in an evolutionary sense but in some other sense. But it is difficult to see what this other sense might be. The significance quest model posits that one positive emotion (romantic love) has the function of causing another positive emotion (feeling of significance). Feeling significant is not an end unto itself – it is not inherently good or bad – so creating that feeling is not functional, without further explanation of why we should understand feeling socially significant as the ultimate purpose.
Even taken as a purely descriptive exercise, the significance quest model of love is strongly discordant with common sense. The target of the model is the actor’s falling in (or out of) love with someone else. It is not obvious why falling in love (as opposed to being fallen in love with) should make one feel significant. For instance, why would a person (the actor) who falls unrequitedly in love with someone feel more significant than they would have otherwise? On the contrary, they may feel less significant. It is easier to believe an effect in the opposite direction: that having others fall in love with you could give you a feeling significance – but this observation is trivial, given that their loving you necessarily involves you being significant to them. It is no more informative than saying that having people find you significant increases your feelings of significance. Kruglanski et al. say that “The actor falls in love to be loved” – but falling in love is neither necessary nor sufficient to being loved. Altogether, none of this is consistent with the notion that falling in love per se is a means to feel significant, even just as a description of the way the feelings seem to relate to each other.
Kruglanski et al.’s hypothesis also leads to predictions that seem obviously false. As they say, “There is in principle no upper bound on one’s possible significance, so a person who already had a given level of significance might be tempted to gain even more.” Wouldn’t we then expect individuals to fall in love with as many meritorious people as possible, if falling in love is a way to achieve significance? Why, instead, do they generally fall in love with only one person at a time? Similarly, why do most people fall in love with only members of the opposite gender instead of both, since the latter course could presumably maximize their significance? Such observations are straightforwardly predicted if romantic love is rooted in a deep evolutionary drive to form pair bonds, but they seem inexplicable if romantic love is merely a means to feel significant.
Overall, the significance quest model of love seems conceptually muddled and poorly motivated.
Financial support
This research received no specific grant from any funding agency, commercial, or not-for-profit sectors.
Competing interests
None.