The target paper explores interesting terrain regarding a modern Western concept of love as an emotion. I found the relation of love to a human interest in significance, merit, and appreciation very appealing. This theory is significantly more interesting than standard communication-satisfaction approaches (Fowers, Reference Fowersin press; Fowers et al., Reference Fowers, Selim, Kiknadze and Sanabria2025). Nevertheless, two shortcomings stand out, one conceptual and one empirical.

Conceptually, instrumentalism is ubiquitous in the target paper, and it is never justified. The authors seem to simply assume that human action always has an instrumental form because they do not reflect on the wisdom of this commitment, nor do they entertain any alternatives to instrumentalism. They are, therefore, consistent with many social scientists (Fowers, Reference Fowers2010, Reference Fowers, Martin, Sugarman and Slaney2015). The authors of the target paper explicitly endorse an instrumental portrayal of love in discussing the ends of love as the benefits obtained through the instrumentality of the partner’s merit and admiration. They state very clearly “that people fall in love with a partner if this is likely to enhance their own felt significance and mattering” (Kruglanski et al.). The “quest” for meaning, significance, or mattering is the motive behind seeking love, so these authors have clearly defined the end. These authors justify the quest for mattering as a fundamental human need and clarify that the quest for mattering can be satisfied through many different means (if one is being consistent with what the individual and/or society take to be worthwhile).

The fully instrumental approach to human action includes two more features. First, the means and the end must be sharply distinguished. Second, a means is just one selectable strategy among many for obtaining the end, and it is reasonable for a particular strategy to be abandoned if it is not best for achieving the end. The authors affirm both elements of instrumentalism in stating that “The quest for significance is general and can be satisfied by means other than love (e.g., career accomplishments)” (Kruglanski et al.). If these statements were insufficient, the authors also wrote that “the means to significance are substitutable…” (Kruglanski et al.). They clarify their full allegiance to portraying love as instrumental in their general discussion: “It is plausible to assume that the quest for significance motivates one to choose the best perceived means to that end, one with the greatest expectancy to deliver the greatest value in the coin of significance” (Kruglanski et al.).

They describe merit and appreciation as “mechanisms,” as though these processes are completed like gears turning or electrons traveling through a circuit. This gives love and its bases a mechanistic construal, almost as if there were no choice, agency, or authenticity involved or as if the processes of love were entirely mechanistic and impersonal. This mechanistic portrayal is consistent with their instrumental perspective and even reinforces it, yet this portrayal does not sit well with the personal and social valuing they place at the heart of love. Presumably, these valuing processes are based on authentic and reasoned choices, but the authors do not explain how a mechanistic process can be compatible with authenticity or reasoned choice.

These authors, and many other social scientists, have so thoroughly committed themselves to an instrumental portrayal of human action that they do not know or take account of an alternative to instrumental action. I have termed one alternative constitutive action (Fowers, Reference Fowers2010). In contrast to instrumental action, the means and ends of constitutive action cannot be separated. A simple example is going for a walk. When one goes for a walk, what is valued is the walking, not some separate outcome. Although a destination is sometimes an important element of a walk, it need not be important at all. The endpoint of a walk is often the same as the point of initiation of the walk. By the same token, one could understand love as a means to obtain significance, as the target authors do, or one could understand love as simultaneously the inseparable means and end of much relational action. In the latter case, the loving just is the kind of relationship at issue, and love is seen more as an (ad)verb (i.e., one relates lovingly to a partner) than as a noun or a feeling that results in the outcome of significance. There is little doubt that significance is part of either formulation, but in the instrumental portrayal, significance is an individual outcome that justifies the relation, whereas in the constitutive formulation, significance is a concomitant of loving and being loved, inseparable from loving. The danger of an instrumental construal of love is that it allows an exploitive stance toward a partner to extract significance through dominance or abuse. Of course, few see such a relational approach as desirable or ultimately successful, but only the constitutive portrayal rules out such an approach because dominance or abuse is incompatible with relating lovingly to a partner. In a similar way, merit and appreciation can be understood as constituents of good relationships rather than as means to the end of significance. Therefore, being involved with people who are meritorious and appreciative of one’s best features is inseparable from one’s significance.

From an empirical standpoint, the authors’ evidentiary sources for their theory were somewhat underwhelming. The authors did cite many studies (78) to support the hypotheses derived from their theory. However, most of the cited research consisted of single studies, and the authors cited more studies conducted in the last century (27) than in the last decade (13). The bulk of the 78 studies cited by the authors were published from 2000 to 2015 (38). Additionally, the authors consistently relied on self-report data that frequently related to individuals’ predictions of their futures or to the “likelihood” that they would love another person with whom they were scantly acquainted. It is difficult to imagine thinner evidence or evidence that is weaker than predictions about one’s future emotions.