Tomasello presents a compelling account of how the human sense of obligation arises from shared intentionality and interdependent collaboration. Developing this concrete, collaboration-dependent obligation into a generalized support of one's cultural group (“obligation period”), he argues, turns humans into a highly cooperative species. Although cultural variability in this second step is acknowledged, its profound impact appears to be underestimated.
Obligation is one of the four deontic modalities, along with ban, permission, and release from obligation (often expressed by way of modal verbs: “must,” “must not,” “may,” and “need not”). These modalities are systematically interrelated in a “square of opposition,” constituting the structure of the deontic system (Beller Reference Beller, Beziau and Payette2012). People are highly competent in drawing inferences based on these interrelations, which must remain in place to preserve the system's consistency and operability, such as that obligation entails permission, or that something forbidden cannot simultaneously be prescribed (Beller Reference Beller2008; Reference Beller2010). Due to these logical exigencies, deontic systems are invariable on an abstract level. What does vary across cultures is their content: the concrete things that are forbidden, prescribed, or permitted.
Promises are a textbook example at the intersection of the human sense of obligation and cooperation. Promises create a social contract between the two parties involved, cutting across five psychologically relevant levels: (1) As an attempt to induce a behavioral change in the addressee, promises reflect a specific motivation, the wish to initiate cooperation, and (2) they are formulated in a specific linguistic manner. (3) Promises entail deontic implications, generating an obligation for the speaker, contingent on a cooperative act of the addressee in the case of a conditional promise. For promises to work, it is essential that the ensuing obligation is perceived as binding, as the addressee has only the speaker's word to go on. (4) On the behavioral level, the involved parties decide whether or not to cooperate, with either outcome then (5) eliciting distinct affective responses (Beller et al. Reference Beller, Bender and Kuhnmünch2005).
Some core characteristics are implicated in the very concept of promises and hence should be universal. Their structure is determined by actions, goals, and expectations; they entail asymmetries in terms of ensuing obligations and the temporal sequence of decisions to be made; and their binding force should be independent of how close the relationship between the parties is. Still, a study with participants from Germany, China, and Tonga revealed cultural variation on almost all levels (Beller et al. Reference Beller, Bender and Song2009). For instance, the linguistic formulation considered most appropriate varied with culture-specific communication styles, and affective responses to a kept or broken promise depended on display rules for emotions. Crucially, even the deontic implications were modulated by cultural conventions. In Tonga, a Polynesian archipelago in the Western Pacific, the very utterance of a conditional promise was found to exert pressure on the addressee – that is, an obligation to be responsive to the promise – hence coercing an act of cooperation not necessarily volunteered otherwise. Interestingly, this was accompanied by a reduced obligation for the speaker to actually keep the promise. It is as if conditional promises were simply understood as a request for a favor (“I want you to do this for me”). Since the addressee is obligated to fulfill this wish, the promised return-favor may be discounted.
In other words, obligations originate not only from the deontic structure of promises, but also load on external rules arising from the cultural value system. In Tonga, this includes the prime virtue of reciprocal help (fetokoni'aki), which is grounded in respect and concern for others, is reflected in and reinforced by a strong orientation towards the group, and obligates people to provide mutual support and to share food and other resources (Bender Reference Bender2007). Although this solidarity network incurs economic costs for the individual, it also generates an informal insurance system for all (Bender et al. Reference Bender, Kägi and Mohr2002). Similar patterns have been observed more widely both within and across the small island communities of the Pacific (e.g., Hage & Harary Reference Hage and Harary1996; Petersen Reference Petersen2000). And yet, this is only one possible outcome of the cultural patterning of cooperation and obligation.
Two large-scale studies by Henrich et al. (Reference Henrich, Boyd, Bowles, Camerer, Fehr, Gintis, McElreath, Alvard, Barr, Ensminger, Henrich, Hill, Gil-White, Gurven, Marlowe, Patton and Tracer2005; Reference Henrich, Ensminger, McElreath, Barr, Barrett, Bolyanatz, Cardenas, Gurven, Gwako, Henrich, Lesorogol, Marlowe, Tracer and Ziker2010) demonstrated astounding variability in what different cultural groups hold to be cooperative and fair. Using economic games to assess the willingness to share with anonymous members of one's group, participants were found to differ substantially in the share they were willing to offer, in the size of offers they were willing to accept, or in the expenses they were willing to invest in the punishment of those who violated norms of cooperation. In some groups, much lower shares were both offered and accepted than is typical for WEIRD (Western, educated, industrialized, rich, and democratic) populations, whereas other groups rejected even highly generous offers. Respective tendencies co-varied systematically with characteristics of the group (such as community size) and its cultural institutions, including economic organization, the structuring of social interactions, or the type of religion. Especially in small groups – the default state in large parts of human history – the concern with fairness appeared to be lower in situations lacking relationship information, suggesting that “modern prosociality is not solely the product of an innate psychology, but also reflects norms and institutions that have emerged over the course of human history” (Henrich et al. Reference Henrich, Ensminger, McElreath, Barr, Barrett, Bolyanatz, Cardenas, Gurven, Gwako, Henrich, Lesorogol, Marlowe, Tracer and Ziker2010, p. 1480).
In a nutshell, obligation period is modulated by cultural conventions and practices along several dimensions: by shaping the conceptualization of self-declared commitments, the kinds of obligations perceived as arising from them, and even the emotional responses linked to them. This impacts on the extent to which the sense of obligation is generalized to in-group strangers and on the scope of cooperation deemed appropriate, rendering culture one of the most powerful forces in forming human cognition (Bender & Beller Reference Bender and Beller2019) and social behavior (Henrich et al. Reference Henrich, Boyd, Bowles, Camerer, Fehr, Gintis, McElreath, Alvard, Barr, Ensminger, Henrich, Hill, Gil-White, Gurven, Marlowe, Patton and Tracer2005). Considering this profound impact enables the surprising insight that culture itself evolved to stabilize and generalize the predisposition for cooperative relationships in our species by fostering and molding the sense of obligation, even if in culture-specific ways.
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Tomasello presents a compelling account of how the human sense of obligation arises from shared intentionality and interdependent collaboration. Developing this concrete, collaboration-dependent obligation into a generalized support of one's cultural group (“obligation period”), he argues, turns humans into a highly cooperative species. Although cultural variability in this second step is acknowledged, its profound impact appears to be underestimated.
Obligation is one of the four deontic modalities, along with ban, permission, and release from obligation (often expressed by way of modal verbs: “must,” “must not,” “may,” and “need not”). These modalities are systematically interrelated in a “square of opposition,” constituting the structure of the deontic system (Beller Reference Beller, Beziau and Payette2012). People are highly competent in drawing inferences based on these interrelations, which must remain in place to preserve the system's consistency and operability, such as that obligation entails permission, or that something forbidden cannot simultaneously be prescribed (Beller Reference Beller2008; Reference Beller2010). Due to these logical exigencies, deontic systems are invariable on an abstract level. What does vary across cultures is their content: the concrete things that are forbidden, prescribed, or permitted.
Promises are a textbook example at the intersection of the human sense of obligation and cooperation. Promises create a social contract between the two parties involved, cutting across five psychologically relevant levels: (1) As an attempt to induce a behavioral change in the addressee, promises reflect a specific motivation, the wish to initiate cooperation, and (2) they are formulated in a specific linguistic manner. (3) Promises entail deontic implications, generating an obligation for the speaker, contingent on a cooperative act of the addressee in the case of a conditional promise. For promises to work, it is essential that the ensuing obligation is perceived as binding, as the addressee has only the speaker's word to go on. (4) On the behavioral level, the involved parties decide whether or not to cooperate, with either outcome then (5) eliciting distinct affective responses (Beller et al. Reference Beller, Bender and Kuhnmünch2005).
Some core characteristics are implicated in the very concept of promises and hence should be universal. Their structure is determined by actions, goals, and expectations; they entail asymmetries in terms of ensuing obligations and the temporal sequence of decisions to be made; and their binding force should be independent of how close the relationship between the parties is. Still, a study with participants from Germany, China, and Tonga revealed cultural variation on almost all levels (Beller et al. Reference Beller, Bender and Song2009). For instance, the linguistic formulation considered most appropriate varied with culture-specific communication styles, and affective responses to a kept or broken promise depended on display rules for emotions. Crucially, even the deontic implications were modulated by cultural conventions. In Tonga, a Polynesian archipelago in the Western Pacific, the very utterance of a conditional promise was found to exert pressure on the addressee – that is, an obligation to be responsive to the promise – hence coercing an act of cooperation not necessarily volunteered otherwise. Interestingly, this was accompanied by a reduced obligation for the speaker to actually keep the promise. It is as if conditional promises were simply understood as a request for a favor (“I want you to do this for me”). Since the addressee is obligated to fulfill this wish, the promised return-favor may be discounted.
In other words, obligations originate not only from the deontic structure of promises, but also load on external rules arising from the cultural value system. In Tonga, this includes the prime virtue of reciprocal help (fetokoni'aki), which is grounded in respect and concern for others, is reflected in and reinforced by a strong orientation towards the group, and obligates people to provide mutual support and to share food and other resources (Bender Reference Bender2007). Although this solidarity network incurs economic costs for the individual, it also generates an informal insurance system for all (Bender et al. Reference Bender, Kägi and Mohr2002). Similar patterns have been observed more widely both within and across the small island communities of the Pacific (e.g., Hage & Harary Reference Hage and Harary1996; Petersen Reference Petersen2000). And yet, this is only one possible outcome of the cultural patterning of cooperation and obligation.
Two large-scale studies by Henrich et al. (Reference Henrich, Boyd, Bowles, Camerer, Fehr, Gintis, McElreath, Alvard, Barr, Ensminger, Henrich, Hill, Gil-White, Gurven, Marlowe, Patton and Tracer2005; Reference Henrich, Ensminger, McElreath, Barr, Barrett, Bolyanatz, Cardenas, Gurven, Gwako, Henrich, Lesorogol, Marlowe, Tracer and Ziker2010) demonstrated astounding variability in what different cultural groups hold to be cooperative and fair. Using economic games to assess the willingness to share with anonymous members of one's group, participants were found to differ substantially in the share they were willing to offer, in the size of offers they were willing to accept, or in the expenses they were willing to invest in the punishment of those who violated norms of cooperation. In some groups, much lower shares were both offered and accepted than is typical for WEIRD (Western, educated, industrialized, rich, and democratic) populations, whereas other groups rejected even highly generous offers. Respective tendencies co-varied systematically with characteristics of the group (such as community size) and its cultural institutions, including economic organization, the structuring of social interactions, or the type of religion. Especially in small groups – the default state in large parts of human history – the concern with fairness appeared to be lower in situations lacking relationship information, suggesting that “modern prosociality is not solely the product of an innate psychology, but also reflects norms and institutions that have emerged over the course of human history” (Henrich et al. Reference Henrich, Ensminger, McElreath, Barr, Barrett, Bolyanatz, Cardenas, Gurven, Gwako, Henrich, Lesorogol, Marlowe, Tracer and Ziker2010, p. 1480).
In a nutshell, obligation period is modulated by cultural conventions and practices along several dimensions: by shaping the conceptualization of self-declared commitments, the kinds of obligations perceived as arising from them, and even the emotional responses linked to them. This impacts on the extent to which the sense of obligation is generalized to in-group strangers and on the scope of cooperation deemed appropriate, rendering culture one of the most powerful forces in forming human cognition (Bender & Beller Reference Bender and Beller2019) and social behavior (Henrich et al. Reference Henrich, Boyd, Bowles, Camerer, Fehr, Gintis, McElreath, Alvard, Barr, Ensminger, Henrich, Hill, Gil-White, Gurven, Marlowe, Patton and Tracer2005). Considering this profound impact enables the surprising insight that culture itself evolved to stabilize and generalize the predisposition for cooperative relationships in our species by fostering and molding the sense of obligation, even if in culture-specific ways.