Tomasello contends that our sense of obligation is instantiated through “agreement-like” social interactions. For example, if I promise a co-worker that I will attend her birthday party, I commit myself to do so; and I would need to apologize or justify myself if I failed to attend the birthday festivities. Tomasello further argues that, from a developmental perspective, this understanding of obligation is first evident in children “inside, but not outside, of collaborative activities structured by joint agency with a partner.”
I agree that obligations are often established through mutual cooperative agreements. But, I disagree that (1) obligations arise exclusively out of such arrangements and that (2) children first feel the demand of an obligation only in the context of activities structured by joint agency. Instead, it seems that some obligations are inherent in certain types of social relationships – namely, our kinship relationships – and, importantly, that children recognize this from a young age.
Consider a father with a sick baby girl. The way he feels toward his daughter fits into Tomasello's conception of obligation in some ways but not in others. He likely feels a demanding and coercive force to care for his sick daughter, and he would be judged harshly if he decided to leave his daughter and go on a vacation (Bloom Reference Bloom2011; Reference Bloom2013; Gopnik Reference Gopnik2009). Importantly though, a baby is not a cooperative partner with her father in any meaningful sense; they are not attempting to accomplish a joint goal. Instead, the parent is obligated to their child because the parent-child relationship inherently requires care and love. And, this holds true even when the baby grows up. Consider the case where a child grows up severely brain damaged, which renders them unable to presume the role of collaborative partner; a parent is still obligated to care for their child. Furthermore, extreme cases aside: Most parent-child relationships also purposefully lack a joint collaborative element and are instead fundamentally grounded in unconditional care and love (Clark & Mills Reference Clark and Mills1993).
Social psychological and developmental research reveals that children and adults understand that obligations exist not only between collaborative partners but also between kin. For one, adults evaluate unhelpful parents more harshly than unhelpful friends followed by unhelpful strangers (Haidt & Baron Reference Haidt and Baron1996), as do older children and adults (Marshall et al., Reference Marshall, Wynn and Bloomin press). These effects emerge presumably because parents are more obligated to their children and are, in turn, evaluated more negatively for failing to help them. In line with this interpretation, cross-cultural work reveals that children at 7 years of age and older in both the United States and India as well as adults in both countries consider parents as obligated to their children (Miller et al. Reference Miller, Bersoff and Harwood1990) – parents have to help their children even if they do not want to and even if no law existed requiring parents to take care of their children.
I along with my collaborators investigated how children even younger than 7 reason about parent-child obligations. In these studies (Marshall et al., Reference Marshall, Mermin-Bunnell, Gollwitzer, Shinomiya, Retelsdorf and Bloomin preparation), we were interested in whether younger children – like adults and older children – consider parents to be obligated to their children. We tested children not only in the United States but also in India, Germany, Japan, and Uganda to assess whether children vary in their sense of obligation across different cultures. We presented children as young as 5 and as old as 10 with scenarios wherein a child needs help, either because they were very hungry and did not have food or because they fell and hurt themselves at a park. Importantly, these scenarios did not involve any joint collaboration or commitment; neither the parent nor the child were working toward a shared goal and had not agreed to work together to accomplish a collaborative aim.
Consequently, we asked participants to determine whether the parent of the child in need has to help the needy child. We measured obligations in this way because researchers have established that asking children about what people have to do captures children's sense of deontological obligation as distinct from children's sense of what usually occurs (i.e., frequency) or of what people want to occur (i.e., preference; Kalish & Lawson Reference Kalish and Lawson2008). The results of these studies rendered a clear pattern: Children and adults alike, regardless of age and culture, recognize that parents are obligated to their kin. That is, all participants indicated that a parent has to help their child. These studies, to us, demonstrate that children as young as 5 do not think obligations are restricted to contexts involving joint collaboration, but rather that obligations are present within the parent-child relationship even absent a mutual goal.
Nonetheless, these studies only involved children as young as 5; Tomasello notes that even toddlers – children around the age of 3 – recognize the normative force of joint commitments. Whether children younger than 5 also recognize the normative force of kinship relationships is unknown. We suspect that toddlers would, but it remains an open question for future research. Regardless, the research discussed here, to us, provides compelling evidence that children at least around the early elementary school years appreciate the demanding quality of certain types of relationships. This is not because children consider parents and children as cooperative partners but because obligations are instantiated within certain relational dynamics.
Tomasello contends that our sense of obligation is instantiated through “agreement-like” social interactions. For example, if I promise a co-worker that I will attend her birthday party, I commit myself to do so; and I would need to apologize or justify myself if I failed to attend the birthday festivities. Tomasello further argues that, from a developmental perspective, this understanding of obligation is first evident in children “inside, but not outside, of collaborative activities structured by joint agency with a partner.”
I agree that obligations are often established through mutual cooperative agreements. But, I disagree that (1) obligations arise exclusively out of such arrangements and that (2) children first feel the demand of an obligation only in the context of activities structured by joint agency. Instead, it seems that some obligations are inherent in certain types of social relationships – namely, our kinship relationships – and, importantly, that children recognize this from a young age.
Consider a father with a sick baby girl. The way he feels toward his daughter fits into Tomasello's conception of obligation in some ways but not in others. He likely feels a demanding and coercive force to care for his sick daughter, and he would be judged harshly if he decided to leave his daughter and go on a vacation (Bloom Reference Bloom2011; Reference Bloom2013; Gopnik Reference Gopnik2009). Importantly though, a baby is not a cooperative partner with her father in any meaningful sense; they are not attempting to accomplish a joint goal. Instead, the parent is obligated to their child because the parent-child relationship inherently requires care and love. And, this holds true even when the baby grows up. Consider the case where a child grows up severely brain damaged, which renders them unable to presume the role of collaborative partner; a parent is still obligated to care for their child. Furthermore, extreme cases aside: Most parent-child relationships also purposefully lack a joint collaborative element and are instead fundamentally grounded in unconditional care and love (Clark & Mills Reference Clark and Mills1993).
Social psychological and developmental research reveals that children and adults understand that obligations exist not only between collaborative partners but also between kin. For one, adults evaluate unhelpful parents more harshly than unhelpful friends followed by unhelpful strangers (Haidt & Baron Reference Haidt and Baron1996), as do older children and adults (Marshall et al., Reference Marshall, Wynn and Bloomin press). These effects emerge presumably because parents are more obligated to their children and are, in turn, evaluated more negatively for failing to help them. In line with this interpretation, cross-cultural work reveals that children at 7 years of age and older in both the United States and India as well as adults in both countries consider parents as obligated to their children (Miller et al. Reference Miller, Bersoff and Harwood1990) – parents have to help their children even if they do not want to and even if no law existed requiring parents to take care of their children.
I along with my collaborators investigated how children even younger than 7 reason about parent-child obligations. In these studies (Marshall et al., Reference Marshall, Mermin-Bunnell, Gollwitzer, Shinomiya, Retelsdorf and Bloomin preparation), we were interested in whether younger children – like adults and older children – consider parents to be obligated to their children. We tested children not only in the United States but also in India, Germany, Japan, and Uganda to assess whether children vary in their sense of obligation across different cultures. We presented children as young as 5 and as old as 10 with scenarios wherein a child needs help, either because they were very hungry and did not have food or because they fell and hurt themselves at a park. Importantly, these scenarios did not involve any joint collaboration or commitment; neither the parent nor the child were working toward a shared goal and had not agreed to work together to accomplish a collaborative aim.
Consequently, we asked participants to determine whether the parent of the child in need has to help the needy child. We measured obligations in this way because researchers have established that asking children about what people have to do captures children's sense of deontological obligation as distinct from children's sense of what usually occurs (i.e., frequency) or of what people want to occur (i.e., preference; Kalish & Lawson Reference Kalish and Lawson2008). The results of these studies rendered a clear pattern: Children and adults alike, regardless of age and culture, recognize that parents are obligated to their kin. That is, all participants indicated that a parent has to help their child. These studies, to us, demonstrate that children as young as 5 do not think obligations are restricted to contexts involving joint collaboration, but rather that obligations are present within the parent-child relationship even absent a mutual goal.
Nonetheless, these studies only involved children as young as 5; Tomasello notes that even toddlers – children around the age of 3 – recognize the normative force of joint commitments. Whether children younger than 5 also recognize the normative force of kinship relationships is unknown. We suspect that toddlers would, but it remains an open question for future research. Regardless, the research discussed here, to us, provides compelling evidence that children at least around the early elementary school years appreciate the demanding quality of certain types of relationships. This is not because children consider parents and children as cooperative partners but because obligations are instantiated within certain relational dynamics.