Tomasello in the target article explores four interrelated phenomena:
1. joint intentional collaboration
2. joint commitment
3. “self-regulative pressure from ‘we’” (sect. 2.1.3, para. 3)
4. sense of interpersonal obligation
His “shared intentionality hypothesis” aims to “undergird” (4) “with the psychological foundation of shared intentionality.”
Tomasello sometimes suggests that (4) “arises” from (1). However, he notes that a child can be “just playing with the adult spontaneously, in the absence of a joint commitment” (sect. 2.1.2.1, para. 5) But “playing with [an] adult” – even if spontaneous – is not merely playing alongside an adult. If the child is playing with the adult then there is a kind of joint intentional collaboration, and both the child and the adult may well think: “we are playing together.” There is a “we.” But, Tomasello notes, there is not yet “joint commitment”; and, as I understand Tomasello, there is not yet (4).
This complexity arises within the “interim hypothesis … that participation in joint intentional collaboration, especially as initiated by a joint commitment, is the earliest source of children's … feeling of obligation.” (sect. 2.1.3, para. 5) This seems to say that (1) is the “source” of (4), and (2) is just a special case of (1). But this does not fit with the recognition of the possibility of (1) in the absence of (2) and (4). So I think the best reading of Tomasello's hypothesis is that the “source” of the sense of obligation is (2), not simply (1).
What is joint commitment? Elsewhere Tomasello has said that joint commitment consists in “collaborative activity … initiated by an overt and explicit act of cooperative communication” (Engelmann & Tomasello Reference Engelmann, Tomasello, Jankovic and Ludwig2018, p. 440). But, first, I take it that the relevant overt acts will be, more specifically, forms of assurance. And, second, if it is a joint commitment, it is necessary that all parties assure. So, I take the view to be that jointly intentional collaborative activity that is initiated by such a web of assurances is the source of the sense of obligation.
Further, Tomasello's proposal is that (2) is the source of (4) because (2) is the source of (3), and (3) in turn ensures (4). When he writes that “the sense of obligation … is nothing more or less … than the motivational force that accompanies the creation of a joint or collective agent ‘we’…” (sect. 3, para. 6) he is seeing “a joint or collective agent ‘we’” as involving “the sense of obligation,” and, I take it, supposing that this “we” arises from joint commitment.
We need to distinguish two versions of (3). Suppose the child plays spontaneously with the adult in the absence of joint commitment. Why is this a case of joint intentional collaboration, not just a case of each merely playing alongside the other? In (Bratman Reference Bratman2014), I propose (roughly) that in shared intentional activity each publicly and interdependently intends the joint activity and that it go by way of relevant intentions of each, mutual responsiveness, and meshing subplans. This structure of intentions of each constitutes their joint/shared intention so to act. Applied to our present case, this explains a kind of “self-regulative pressure from” the “we,” since both the child and the adult can reason instrumentally concerning what is needed for their jointly intended playing together. For example, the child can reason: “As one of the interdependent elements of our shared intention, I intend that we play together; for us to play together, I need to give him the ball; so I will.” In this sense, (1) ensures a version of (3). But this weak version of (3) simply involves instrumental reasoning concerning the jointly intended end of playing together; it need not involve a sense of obligation to the other. The child can reason instrumentally concerning this jointly intended end of playing together without thinking that she owes it to the adult to give him the ball.
In contrast, in a strong version of (3) the self-regulation involves a sense of obligation to the other. And Tomasello's thought is that joint commitment ensures this strong version of (3), and so thereby (4).
Given that joint commitment involves joint intentional collaboration, joint commitment ensures the weak version of (3). But why does adding the cited web of assurances ensure the strong version of (3), one that is not ensured simply by joint intentional collaboration?
Perhaps Tomasello's view is simply that it is a feature of our human psychology that joint intentional collaboration that is initiated by such a web of assurances does in fact induce a sense of obligation; so, when such a web precedes and initiates joint intentional collaboration, it transforms the weak “we” of joint intentional collaboration into the strong, sense-of-obligation-loaded “we.” This would change the order of explanation and appeal directly to a connection between (2) and (4), and then thereby explain the connection between (2) and the strong version of (3). More importantly, it raises a further question. Does the structure of joint intentional collaboration that is initiated by such a web of assurances induce a sense of obligation by virtue of the role of shared intentionality in that structure? Well, it does not do this solely by virtue of the role of intentional joint collaboration: that only ensures a weak “we.” Instead, it does this in part by virtue of the web of assurances. It is that web of assurances that is doing the work in going from a weak to a strong “we.” But such assurances need not themselves be jointly intentional activities; and they can occur in the absence of relevant jointly intentional activities (think of a case of insincere assurances). So, what is undergirding (4) involves a crucial element that is separable from intentional collaborative activity. Is this compatible with the idea underlying the shared intentionality hypothesis?
Tomasello in the target article explores four interrelated phenomena:
1. joint intentional collaboration
2. joint commitment
3. “self-regulative pressure from ‘we’” (sect. 2.1.3, para. 3)
4. sense of interpersonal obligation
His “shared intentionality hypothesis” aims to “undergird” (4) “with the psychological foundation of shared intentionality.”
Tomasello sometimes suggests that (4) “arises” from (1). However, he notes that a child can be “just playing with the adult spontaneously, in the absence of a joint commitment” (sect. 2.1.2.1, para. 5) But “playing with [an] adult” – even if spontaneous – is not merely playing alongside an adult. If the child is playing with the adult then there is a kind of joint intentional collaboration, and both the child and the adult may well think: “we are playing together.” There is a “we.” But, Tomasello notes, there is not yet “joint commitment”; and, as I understand Tomasello, there is not yet (4).
This complexity arises within the “interim hypothesis … that participation in joint intentional collaboration, especially as initiated by a joint commitment, is the earliest source of children's … feeling of obligation.” (sect. 2.1.3, para. 5) This seems to say that (1) is the “source” of (4), and (2) is just a special case of (1). But this does not fit with the recognition of the possibility of (1) in the absence of (2) and (4). So I think the best reading of Tomasello's hypothesis is that the “source” of the sense of obligation is (2), not simply (1).
What is joint commitment? Elsewhere Tomasello has said that joint commitment consists in “collaborative activity … initiated by an overt and explicit act of cooperative communication” (Engelmann & Tomasello Reference Engelmann, Tomasello, Jankovic and Ludwig2018, p. 440). But, first, I take it that the relevant overt acts will be, more specifically, forms of assurance. And, second, if it is a joint commitment, it is necessary that all parties assure. So, I take the view to be that jointly intentional collaborative activity that is initiated by such a web of assurances is the source of the sense of obligation.
Further, Tomasello's proposal is that (2) is the source of (4) because (2) is the source of (3), and (3) in turn ensures (4). When he writes that “the sense of obligation … is nothing more or less … than the motivational force that accompanies the creation of a joint or collective agent ‘we’…” (sect. 3, para. 6) he is seeing “a joint or collective agent ‘we’” as involving “the sense of obligation,” and, I take it, supposing that this “we” arises from joint commitment.
We need to distinguish two versions of (3). Suppose the child plays spontaneously with the adult in the absence of joint commitment. Why is this a case of joint intentional collaboration, not just a case of each merely playing alongside the other? In (Bratman Reference Bratman2014), I propose (roughly) that in shared intentional activity each publicly and interdependently intends the joint activity and that it go by way of relevant intentions of each, mutual responsiveness, and meshing subplans. This structure of intentions of each constitutes their joint/shared intention so to act. Applied to our present case, this explains a kind of “self-regulative pressure from” the “we,” since both the child and the adult can reason instrumentally concerning what is needed for their jointly intended playing together. For example, the child can reason: “As one of the interdependent elements of our shared intention, I intend that we play together; for us to play together, I need to give him the ball; so I will.” In this sense, (1) ensures a version of (3). But this weak version of (3) simply involves instrumental reasoning concerning the jointly intended end of playing together; it need not involve a sense of obligation to the other. The child can reason instrumentally concerning this jointly intended end of playing together without thinking that she owes it to the adult to give him the ball.
In contrast, in a strong version of (3) the self-regulation involves a sense of obligation to the other. And Tomasello's thought is that joint commitment ensures this strong version of (3), and so thereby (4).
Given that joint commitment involves joint intentional collaboration, joint commitment ensures the weak version of (3). But why does adding the cited web of assurances ensure the strong version of (3), one that is not ensured simply by joint intentional collaboration?
Perhaps Tomasello's view is simply that it is a feature of our human psychology that joint intentional collaboration that is initiated by such a web of assurances does in fact induce a sense of obligation; so, when such a web precedes and initiates joint intentional collaboration, it transforms the weak “we” of joint intentional collaboration into the strong, sense-of-obligation-loaded “we.” This would change the order of explanation and appeal directly to a connection between (2) and (4), and then thereby explain the connection between (2) and the strong version of (3). More importantly, it raises a further question. Does the structure of joint intentional collaboration that is initiated by such a web of assurances induce a sense of obligation by virtue of the role of shared intentionality in that structure? Well, it does not do this solely by virtue of the role of intentional joint collaboration: that only ensures a weak “we.” Instead, it does this in part by virtue of the web of assurances. It is that web of assurances that is doing the work in going from a weak to a strong “we.” But such assurances need not themselves be jointly intentional activities; and they can occur in the absence of relevant jointly intentional activities (think of a case of insincere assurances). So, what is undergirding (4) involves a crucial element that is separable from intentional collaborative activity. Is this compatible with the idea underlying the shared intentionality hypothesis?