In discussing his important empirical findings, Tomasello often invokes joint commitment, as when he says that “children at around three years of age begin to appreciate the normative force of joint commitments to collaborate” (sect. 2.1.2.1, para. 3). He ties it to a sense that one is part of a “we” and associates it with obligations to the other parties and with the parties’ protesting actions contrary to the commitment. While linking it to the making of agreements and the like, he does not offer an account of joint commitment itself. I have developed a detailed account of joint commitment through a long list of publications (e.g., Gilbert Reference Gilbert1989; Reference Gilbert1996; Reference Gilbert2006; Reference Gilbert2014), associating it with a sense that one is part of a “we,” with obligations to the other parties, and with the parties’ rebuking one another for contrary action and demanding conformity. Of the theorists of shared intentionality to whom Tomasello briefly alludes in his preliminary discussion, I stand apart in having invoked joint commitment. Indeed, I see it as the core of human sociality (Gilbert Reference Gilbert and Schmitt2003). Given his citations of my work in his earlier writings (e.g., Tomasello Reference Tomasello2014a; Reference Tomasello2016a), it is reasonable to assume that Tomasello means to invoke joint commitment in the sense in which I intended it. This commentary summarizes my understanding of joint commitment and its relation to directed obligation.
The general notion of commitment at issue is normative rather than psychological. As I understand it, one is normatively committed to act in some way if one has reason to act in that way, in the sense that should one abstain from so acting, then, all else being equal, one has acted in error. This is not necessarily a moral error. Rather, one has not done what one ought to do, in a central sense of “ought” that does not imply a specifically moral basis for doing the thing in question. One way of becoming normatively committed is by making a personal decision.
From a normative point of view, a decision does more than create the possibility of acting in error. It excludes a number of potentially countervailing factors from consideration. Among these are the personal inclinations, desires, and self-interest of the person in question that opposes the action decided upon. In short, it has exclusionary normative force.
Whereas, with a personal decision, the decision maker commits himself (or herself), in the basic case of a joint commitment, the two or more people in question commit all of them as one. This commitment creates a possibility of error in action for each of the parties and has similar exclusionary properties. It also introduces important relations between the parties, to be discussed below. (For discussion of basic versus non-basic cases, see, e.g., Gilbert Reference Gilbert2006, pp. 140–41.) I focus on basic cases in what follows.
What is required of each party to a joint commitment is that each talk and act as would the representative of a single body or person with a particular goal, belief, or other such psychological attribute, depending on the case, aligning their respective utterances and actions with those of the others as needed. This behavior is required primarily in the context of interactions among the parties themselves.
A joint commitment is formed once the following conditions have been fulfilled: Each party has expressed to the other or others his readiness for the joint commitment of them all in the way in question, in conditions of common knowledge. That is, roughly, it is out in the open with respect to the people in question that these expressions have been made. At this point the joint commitment has been established. (See Gilbert Reference Gilbert2006 for some elaboration.)
Just as it takes two or more people to make a joint commitment, it takes the same people to rescind it. Importantly, then, no one party has a unilateral power of rescission. The conditions for rescinding a joint commitment parallel those for forming or creating one: Each must express his readiness to accede to the termination of the commitment. For a relatively nuanced discussion of how to be freed from a joint commitment, see Gilbert Reference Gilbert2006, pp. 141–44.
One reason to suppose that in a variety of circumstances, including the context of acting together, people think that a joint commitment has been made is the fact that they take themselves to have the standing to rebuke one another for acting in particular ways and to demand that they not act in those ways, where neither morality nor the self-interest of either party is clearly at issue (Gilbert Reference Gilbert1990). It can be argued that those who are jointly committed have the standing to issue demands for conformity and rebukes for non-conformity to the commitment by virtue of their co-imposition of the commitment on the parties. Further, it is hard to explain the standing to issue demands and rebukes in any other way. For an extended discussion of these two points, see Gilbert (Reference Gilbert2018b).
I have tightly connected the standing to demand and rebuke to directed obligation: For one person to be obligated to another to perform a certain action is for the latter to have the standing to demand that action of the former. I distinguish directed obligation from another kind of so-called obligation – moral requirement – and note that I can be obligated to you to perform an action that I am morally required not to do, as when two people agree together to perform a dastardly deed. See, for instance, Gilbert (Reference Gilbert2018b).
Tomasello raises the question of the relation of joint commitment thinking to moral thought, and makes several points that accord with my position. There can be joint commitments on a large scale to uphold as a body a particular moral code. In that case, the parties will have obligations to one another to act according to that code. Again, situations of joint commitment are likely to provoke a variety of moral concerns. See Gilbert (Reference Gilbert2018a, pp. 761–64), for some discussion of the relation of joint commitment to the moral concept of fairness.
In discussing his important empirical findings, Tomasello often invokes joint commitment, as when he says that “children at around three years of age begin to appreciate the normative force of joint commitments to collaborate” (sect. 2.1.2.1, para. 3). He ties it to a sense that one is part of a “we” and associates it with obligations to the other parties and with the parties’ protesting actions contrary to the commitment. While linking it to the making of agreements and the like, he does not offer an account of joint commitment itself. I have developed a detailed account of joint commitment through a long list of publications (e.g., Gilbert Reference Gilbert1989; Reference Gilbert1996; Reference Gilbert2006; Reference Gilbert2014), associating it with a sense that one is part of a “we,” with obligations to the other parties, and with the parties’ rebuking one another for contrary action and demanding conformity. Of the theorists of shared intentionality to whom Tomasello briefly alludes in his preliminary discussion, I stand apart in having invoked joint commitment. Indeed, I see it as the core of human sociality (Gilbert Reference Gilbert and Schmitt2003). Given his citations of my work in his earlier writings (e.g., Tomasello Reference Tomasello2014a; Reference Tomasello2016a), it is reasonable to assume that Tomasello means to invoke joint commitment in the sense in which I intended it. This commentary summarizes my understanding of joint commitment and its relation to directed obligation.
The general notion of commitment at issue is normative rather than psychological. As I understand it, one is normatively committed to act in some way if one has reason to act in that way, in the sense that should one abstain from so acting, then, all else being equal, one has acted in error. This is not necessarily a moral error. Rather, one has not done what one ought to do, in a central sense of “ought” that does not imply a specifically moral basis for doing the thing in question. One way of becoming normatively committed is by making a personal decision.
From a normative point of view, a decision does more than create the possibility of acting in error. It excludes a number of potentially countervailing factors from consideration. Among these are the personal inclinations, desires, and self-interest of the person in question that opposes the action decided upon. In short, it has exclusionary normative force.
Whereas, with a personal decision, the decision maker commits himself (or herself), in the basic case of a joint commitment, the two or more people in question commit all of them as one. This commitment creates a possibility of error in action for each of the parties and has similar exclusionary properties. It also introduces important relations between the parties, to be discussed below. (For discussion of basic versus non-basic cases, see, e.g., Gilbert Reference Gilbert2006, pp. 140–41.) I focus on basic cases in what follows.
What is required of each party to a joint commitment is that each talk and act as would the representative of a single body or person with a particular goal, belief, or other such psychological attribute, depending on the case, aligning their respective utterances and actions with those of the others as needed. This behavior is required primarily in the context of interactions among the parties themselves.
A joint commitment is formed once the following conditions have been fulfilled: Each party has expressed to the other or others his readiness for the joint commitment of them all in the way in question, in conditions of common knowledge. That is, roughly, it is out in the open with respect to the people in question that these expressions have been made. At this point the joint commitment has been established. (See Gilbert Reference Gilbert2006 for some elaboration.)
Just as it takes two or more people to make a joint commitment, it takes the same people to rescind it. Importantly, then, no one party has a unilateral power of rescission. The conditions for rescinding a joint commitment parallel those for forming or creating one: Each must express his readiness to accede to the termination of the commitment. For a relatively nuanced discussion of how to be freed from a joint commitment, see Gilbert Reference Gilbert2006, pp. 141–44.
One reason to suppose that in a variety of circumstances, including the context of acting together, people think that a joint commitment has been made is the fact that they take themselves to have the standing to rebuke one another for acting in particular ways and to demand that they not act in those ways, where neither morality nor the self-interest of either party is clearly at issue (Gilbert Reference Gilbert1990). It can be argued that those who are jointly committed have the standing to issue demands for conformity and rebukes for non-conformity to the commitment by virtue of their co-imposition of the commitment on the parties. Further, it is hard to explain the standing to issue demands and rebukes in any other way. For an extended discussion of these two points, see Gilbert (Reference Gilbert2018b).
I have tightly connected the standing to demand and rebuke to directed obligation: For one person to be obligated to another to perform a certain action is for the latter to have the standing to demand that action of the former. I distinguish directed obligation from another kind of so-called obligation – moral requirement – and note that I can be obligated to you to perform an action that I am morally required not to do, as when two people agree together to perform a dastardly deed. See, for instance, Gilbert (Reference Gilbert2018b).
Tomasello raises the question of the relation of joint commitment thinking to moral thought, and makes several points that accord with my position. There can be joint commitments on a large scale to uphold as a body a particular moral code. In that case, the parties will have obligations to one another to act according to that code. Again, situations of joint commitment are likely to provoke a variety of moral concerns. See Gilbert (Reference Gilbert2018a, pp. 761–64), for some discussion of the relation of joint commitment to the moral concept of fairness.