Pepper & Nettle elegantly elucidate how deprivation reduces personal control through individuals' (in)ability to “purchase” reduced hazard exposure. Here, we emphasize the importance of relative (versus absolute) deprivation in the etiology of the behavioral constellation of deprivation (BCD). We argue that decision making is necessarily sensitive to relative state, and that emotional social comparison reactions to comparative disadvantage – namely, personal relative deprivation and envy – may be key proximate mechanisms that serve as “barometers” of individuals' relative (dis)advantage, in turn motivating behaviors in the BCD.
Like all other organisms, humans do not make explicit and conscious biological fitness calculations to guide behavior. Rather, judgment and decision making (and cognition more generally) likely involve the use of a toolbox of ecologically rational implicit heuristics (Todd & Gigerenzer Reference Todd and Gigerenzer2012). These “fast and frugal” heuristics are in large part motivated by the acquisition of “proxies of fitness”: mates, resources, and social status that increase the probability of individuals surviving and producing viable offspring (i.e., enhancing inclusive fitness; Mishra Reference Mishra2014).
Mishra et al.'s (Reference Mishra, Barclay and Sparks2017) relative state model proposes that decision makers are particularly sensitive to cues of relative (dis)advantage (i.e., decision makers are sensitive to their relative states) arising from embodied and situational factors. In turn, relative state informs decision making around proxies of fitness. The logic of the relative state model is simple. Fitness is necessarily a product of reproductive outcomes relative to others (Hamilton Reference Hamilton1964). Individuals who fail to notice (or do not counteract) disadvantaged access to proxies of fitness are less likely to have their genes represented in future generations (Garay & Móri Reference Garay and Móri2011). Consequently, natural selection likely gave rise to cognitive and emotional mechanisms calibrated to be sensitive to relative state.
Feelings of personal relative deprivation and envy may serve as proximate “barometer” measures of one's own relative state, consequently guiding behavior (including those in the BCD). Personal relative deprivation describes feelings of angry resentment in reaction to perceptions of unfair disadvantage (Smith et al. Reference Smith, Pettigrew, Pippin and Bialosiewicz2012). Recent empirical work has linked personal relative deprivation with several outcomes implicated in the BCD. For example, personal relative deprivation has been linked with such present-oriented behaviors as gambling, delay discounting, antisocial risk taking, criminality, and reduced cooperation (e.g., Callan et al. Reference Callan, Shead and Olson2011; Mishra & Novakowski Reference Mishra and Novakowski2016). Personal relative deprivation has also been associated with poorer mental and physical health, even after controlling for indices of absolute socioeconomic status (SES; e.g., Callan et al. Reference Callan, Kim and Matthews2015; Mishra & Carleton Reference Mishra and Carleton2015).
Envy is another proximate emotional consequence of relative (dis)advantage. “Envy” is defined as a feeling of inferiority, hostility, and resentment when another person or group has a desired advantage (Smith & Kim Reference Smith and Kim2007). Malicious envy and benign envy are different ways that people react to disadvantages. “Malicious envy” encompasses feelings of injustice, the motivation to harm the envied individual, and perceptions of low control. “Benign envy” encompasses the motivation to strive upward and to exercise greater perceived control over future outcomes (van de Ven et al. Reference van de Ven, Zeelenberg and Pieters2009). Because malicious envy and the BCD stem in part from low perceived control, malicious envy may represent an important proximate emotional mechanism involved in the BCD. In contrast, the existence of benign envy suggests the presence of an alternative to the BCD among the disadvantaged.
Perceived disadvantage may be initially met with a reaction of benign envy, with individuals feeling control over their situations and feeling able and motivated to strive upward (thus not exhibiting the deleterious behaviors implicated in the BCD). However, if individuals' efforts are routinely unsuccessful (as they often are in environments with low upward mobility), they may lose a sense of control over their situations. In turn, individuals may see their relative disadvantages as undeserved (“I've worked hard and nothing has come of it. It's wrong that other people have it so easy!”) and come to experience personal relative deprivation and/or malicious envy, eventually resulting in behaviors and outcomes characterized by the BCD.
The psychology of relative state has important bearing on such contemporary societal issues as inequality. Victimization by inequality, like extrinsic mortality risk, decreases an individual's control over his or her situation and impedes the ability to capitalize on deferred rewards. Given low rates of social mobility in human populations (Clark Reference Clark2014), inequality tends to be experienced persistently across the life span. Those who are born disadvantaged (regardless of whether this disadvantage is a product of embodied or situational influences) likely learn through experience and observation that they have little control over their relative states. Consequently, victims of inequality allocate their limited time, resources, and energy to immediate, often riskier, strategies (reviewed in Daly Reference Daly2016).
Importantly, relative state is relevant even among individuals who are not in situations of absolute deprivation. Consider the example of the workplace. Employees are stratified by income, occupational status, benefits, and reputation. Although many employees may be comfortably insulated from extrinsic mortality threats, perceived disadvantage in the workplace may motivate such present-oriented behaviors as reduced cooperation, embezzlement, and absenteeism. Objectively privileged individuals may still experience negative social comparison reactions and act in consequence (e.g., “white-collar” crime; Agnew et al. Reference Agnew, Piquero, Cullen, Simpson and Weisburd2009).
Taken together, the findings reviewed above (and in the target manuscript) suggest that absolute deprivation (e.g., poverty), and relative deprivation (e.g., inequality) are importantly associated with the BCD. Both are important inputs into the psychology of relative state. We further suggest that proximate social comparison reactions (personal relative deprivation and envy) are emotional “barometer” measures of one's own relative state that partly motivate the BCD. Future research should examine whether perceived inequality and perceptions of low control over social mobility predict (a) greater feelings of malicious envy and personal relative deprivation and (b) lesser feelings of benign envy, and whether these reactions can explain additional variance in the BCD beyond early mortality exposure, perceived control over mortality risks, and other indices of absolute deprivation.
Pepper & Nettle elegantly elucidate how deprivation reduces personal control through individuals' (in)ability to “purchase” reduced hazard exposure. Here, we emphasize the importance of relative (versus absolute) deprivation in the etiology of the behavioral constellation of deprivation (BCD). We argue that decision making is necessarily sensitive to relative state, and that emotional social comparison reactions to comparative disadvantage – namely, personal relative deprivation and envy – may be key proximate mechanisms that serve as “barometers” of individuals' relative (dis)advantage, in turn motivating behaviors in the BCD.
Like all other organisms, humans do not make explicit and conscious biological fitness calculations to guide behavior. Rather, judgment and decision making (and cognition more generally) likely involve the use of a toolbox of ecologically rational implicit heuristics (Todd & Gigerenzer Reference Todd and Gigerenzer2012). These “fast and frugal” heuristics are in large part motivated by the acquisition of “proxies of fitness”: mates, resources, and social status that increase the probability of individuals surviving and producing viable offspring (i.e., enhancing inclusive fitness; Mishra Reference Mishra2014).
Mishra et al.'s (Reference Mishra, Barclay and Sparks2017) relative state model proposes that decision makers are particularly sensitive to cues of relative (dis)advantage (i.e., decision makers are sensitive to their relative states) arising from embodied and situational factors. In turn, relative state informs decision making around proxies of fitness. The logic of the relative state model is simple. Fitness is necessarily a product of reproductive outcomes relative to others (Hamilton Reference Hamilton1964). Individuals who fail to notice (or do not counteract) disadvantaged access to proxies of fitness are less likely to have their genes represented in future generations (Garay & Móri Reference Garay and Móri2011). Consequently, natural selection likely gave rise to cognitive and emotional mechanisms calibrated to be sensitive to relative state.
Feelings of personal relative deprivation and envy may serve as proximate “barometer” measures of one's own relative state, consequently guiding behavior (including those in the BCD). Personal relative deprivation describes feelings of angry resentment in reaction to perceptions of unfair disadvantage (Smith et al. Reference Smith, Pettigrew, Pippin and Bialosiewicz2012). Recent empirical work has linked personal relative deprivation with several outcomes implicated in the BCD. For example, personal relative deprivation has been linked with such present-oriented behaviors as gambling, delay discounting, antisocial risk taking, criminality, and reduced cooperation (e.g., Callan et al. Reference Callan, Shead and Olson2011; Mishra & Novakowski Reference Mishra and Novakowski2016). Personal relative deprivation has also been associated with poorer mental and physical health, even after controlling for indices of absolute socioeconomic status (SES; e.g., Callan et al. Reference Callan, Kim and Matthews2015; Mishra & Carleton Reference Mishra and Carleton2015).
Envy is another proximate emotional consequence of relative (dis)advantage. “Envy” is defined as a feeling of inferiority, hostility, and resentment when another person or group has a desired advantage (Smith & Kim Reference Smith and Kim2007). Malicious envy and benign envy are different ways that people react to disadvantages. “Malicious envy” encompasses feelings of injustice, the motivation to harm the envied individual, and perceptions of low control. “Benign envy” encompasses the motivation to strive upward and to exercise greater perceived control over future outcomes (van de Ven et al. Reference van de Ven, Zeelenberg and Pieters2009). Because malicious envy and the BCD stem in part from low perceived control, malicious envy may represent an important proximate emotional mechanism involved in the BCD. In contrast, the existence of benign envy suggests the presence of an alternative to the BCD among the disadvantaged.
Perceived disadvantage may be initially met with a reaction of benign envy, with individuals feeling control over their situations and feeling able and motivated to strive upward (thus not exhibiting the deleterious behaviors implicated in the BCD). However, if individuals' efforts are routinely unsuccessful (as they often are in environments with low upward mobility), they may lose a sense of control over their situations. In turn, individuals may see their relative disadvantages as undeserved (“I've worked hard and nothing has come of it. It's wrong that other people have it so easy!”) and come to experience personal relative deprivation and/or malicious envy, eventually resulting in behaviors and outcomes characterized by the BCD.
The psychology of relative state has important bearing on such contemporary societal issues as inequality. Victimization by inequality, like extrinsic mortality risk, decreases an individual's control over his or her situation and impedes the ability to capitalize on deferred rewards. Given low rates of social mobility in human populations (Clark Reference Clark2014), inequality tends to be experienced persistently across the life span. Those who are born disadvantaged (regardless of whether this disadvantage is a product of embodied or situational influences) likely learn through experience and observation that they have little control over their relative states. Consequently, victims of inequality allocate their limited time, resources, and energy to immediate, often riskier, strategies (reviewed in Daly Reference Daly2016).
Importantly, relative state is relevant even among individuals who are not in situations of absolute deprivation. Consider the example of the workplace. Employees are stratified by income, occupational status, benefits, and reputation. Although many employees may be comfortably insulated from extrinsic mortality threats, perceived disadvantage in the workplace may motivate such present-oriented behaviors as reduced cooperation, embezzlement, and absenteeism. Objectively privileged individuals may still experience negative social comparison reactions and act in consequence (e.g., “white-collar” crime; Agnew et al. Reference Agnew, Piquero, Cullen, Simpson and Weisburd2009).
Taken together, the findings reviewed above (and in the target manuscript) suggest that absolute deprivation (e.g., poverty), and relative deprivation (e.g., inequality) are importantly associated with the BCD. Both are important inputs into the psychology of relative state. We further suggest that proximate social comparison reactions (personal relative deprivation and envy) are emotional “barometer” measures of one's own relative state that partly motivate the BCD. Future research should examine whether perceived inequality and perceptions of low control over social mobility predict (a) greater feelings of malicious envy and personal relative deprivation and (b) lesser feelings of benign envy, and whether these reactions can explain additional variance in the BCD beyond early mortality exposure, perceived control over mortality risks, and other indices of absolute deprivation.