Chapter 8 examines how early Cold War grand strategy reshaped the constitutional system governing war powers – and how institutional redesign in turn entrenched that strategy. Breaking from the prewar pattern of demobilization, President Truman and Congress built a permanently mobilized national security state, defined by large standing forces, sustained appropriations, and the framework created by the National Security Act. These choices gave presidents ready means of action abroad while weakening one of Congress’s traditional checks: control over whether forces existed to be used. The chapter then turns to two formative tests. In Korea, Truman’s decision to deploy major ground forces without prior authorization extended historical practice to a new scale, even as congressional funding and draft extensions complicate claims of unilateralism. At home, Truman’s attempt to seize the steel industry prompted a rare judicial rebuke, though the Supreme Court’s fractured Steel Seizure opinions expose persistent uncertainty about emergency power within the separation of powers. Finally, the chapter shows that an equally consequential precedent emerged in peacetime through debates over stationing U.S. forces in Western Europe, as forward deployments and alliance commitments blurred war and peace and normalized global readiness through budgets, basing, and treaties – often without combat.

Chapter 9 examines how nuclear strategy and covert action reshaped constitutional war powers during the mid–1950s and early–1960s – a period without large-scale wars but marked by major constitutional change. It argues that the most consequential adaptations arose from peacetime strategy rather than battlefield necessity. Nuclear weapons shifted constitutional attention from the authority to wage war to the authority to threaten it. Deterrence, built on speed, secrecy, and existential risk, favored rapid presidential decision-making, broad congressional delegations, and new assumptions about executive control of escalation. These developments were not technologically inevitable; they reflected strategic choices about how nuclear weapons would be used and restrained, with Congress enabling new arrangements through funding and advance authorizations. At the same time, the chapter traces a parallel constitutional track for covert warfare, as CIA paramilitary operations and proxy conflicts managed rivalry below open hostilities but with thinner legal foundations. Together, these developments reveal how war powers evolved through sustained congressional–presidential cooperation to manage escalation without major war.

Winning an occupation is difficult, particularly when victory requires regime change in the conquered nation. The US post-World War II occupation of Germany offers a rare success in this regard. Although it does not provide an easily transportable model for other occupations, it offers several important lessons. The occupation succeeded in Germany (1) in spite of (not because of) planning done prior to the occupation and in spite of (not because of) US foreign policy just after the war; (2) because it functioned as a quasi-independent maker of American foreign policy when it came to occupation policy; (3) because it willingly utilized the expertise of the people it supervised; (4) because it acted unilaterally and opportunistically when necessary; (5) because it got lucky at a critical juncture; and (6) because the occupied Germans themselves ultimately embraced reforms once it became clear these reforms worked as hoped.

When the Korean War exploded in 1950, few Americans felt a strong commitment to South Korea (ROK). By the end of the Cold War, however, the US–ROK alliance had emerged as one of the closest relationships in the American diplomatic portfolio. This essay examines the post-Korean War diplomacy between the two nations to suggest that the strong contemporary relationship is rooted in the immediate post-Korean War years, when skillful political maneuvering by ROK leaders, along with increasing cultural and economic connections between the two nations and the presence of a competing developmental model immediately across the 38th parallel, drove the two sides together despite the reluctance of American leaders.

This chapter explores how the American Federation of Labor (AFL) used humanitarian aid as an instrument of postwar diplomacy in occupied Germany. Through thousands of Cooperative for American Remittances to Europe (CARE) packages sent to German trade unionists between 1945 and 1949, the AFL sought to promote liberal-democratic labor ideals and counter Soviet influence during the early Cold War. These packages, nominally gifts of solidarity, functioned as vehicles of ideological persuasion and channels of transatlantic communication, allowing the AFL to bypass official state diplomacy while shaping the reemergence of German unionism in an “American image.” Central to this effort was Jay Lovestone and the Free Trade Union Committee, whose anticommunist agenda intertwined humanitarianism with propaganda and intelligence-gathering. The chapter demonstrates how material relief became a form of “humanitarian diplomacy,” blurring the boundaries between altruism, ideology, and power in the reconstruction of Europe’s labor movements after World War II.

This chapter examines how US post-conflict diplomacy toward Italy evolved from the final phase of World War II to the early Cold War. Initially shaped by the need for wartime stabilization, the American “good occupiers” gradually shifted from providing tentative support for antifascist moderates to adopting a proactive strategy of anticommunist containment. The chapter demonstrates how the Italian case fits the broader pattern of American post-conflict diplomacy, which involves transforming former adversaries into partners. However, it also highlights the essential role of Italian agency in this process. As the Truman administration came to view Italian stability as vital for Western security, Italian pro-Western moderates, in turn, used US aid and political support to secure reconstruction and international rehabilitation. Finally, the chapter highlights the contribution of official and unofficial diplomatic networks, including labor and cultural exchanges, to shaping US–Italian relations during this process.

Chapter 6 explores revolutionary world-making projects in the Global South during the Cold War, focusing on anti-imperialist movements. It begins with Fidel Castro’s 1966 call to arms against imperialism, highlighting struggles against colonialism and racism. The chapter examines the Soviet Union’s challenge to capitalism and its interaction with anti-colonial projects in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, arguing these movements were distinct and sought to repurpose legal sovereignty for Third World assertion. It contrasts socialist and liberal internationalisms, particularly in approaches to self-determination and revolutionary violence, noting the Soviet support for anti-colonial forces. The chapter discusses the influence of Marxist-Leninist thought on revolutionary movements, highlighting projects like Pan-Africanism and Cuban interventionism. It examines national self-determination’s role in reshaping global politics and the challenges new states faced in achieving true independence. The chapter concludes by calling for a re-examination of revolutionary internationalism’s impact on international law, recognising the diverse movements that sought to disrupt the Cold War order.

Chapter 8 explores how the atomic dimension of the Cold War reshaped global politics and international law. The Cuban Missile Crisis serves as a focal point, illustrating the juridical patterning of the Amero-Soviet Cold War and the integration of nuclear weapons into geopolitical strategies. The chapter traces the evolution of anti-nuclear movements, from initial peace initiatives to the emergence of non-proliferation policies. It examines how the threat of nuclear annihilation created a new global consciousness, transcending traditional notions of sovereignty and national interests. The development of satellite surveillance systems is highlighted as a key factor in producing new forms of ‘planetary’ knowledge, contributing to advancements in earth sciences and environmental awareness. The chapter also discusses the paradoxical split between ‘peaceful’ and ‘aggressive’ uses of nuclear technology, as exemplified by the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the International Atomic Energy Agency. Ultimately, the atomic dimension of the Cold War is shown to have globalised the conflict, creating a "global civil war" that eroded distinctions between combatants and civilians. This new reality challenged existing legal frameworks and fostered the emergence of new global subjects, knowledge systems, and technologies that would shape the post–Cold War world.

The chapter examines the role of the UN Charter in shaping the Cold War’s ideological and legal landscape. The chapter begins with Winston Churchill’s 1946 ‘Sinews of Peace’ speech, which highlighted the duality of the post-war world: the creation of the United Nations and the emerging division between East and West. The UN Charter, while promoting sovereign statehood and universality, also formalised the Amero-Soviet rivalry, embedding ambiguities that allowed ideological contestation within a lawful framework. The Charter’s emphasis on sovereign statehood and the nation-state form provided a template for decolonisation, yet left space for rival interpretations and political agendas, particularly from Latin American, African and Asian states. The chapter explores how the Charter’s ambiguities facilitated US–Soviet competition, focusing on representation, intervention and self-determination. It highlights the Charter’s role in enabling covert US–Soviet rivalry and its impact on global order, decolonisation and the stabilisation of property ownership. The chapter concludes by setting the stage for the next chapter, which will explore the Amero-Soviet project of world-making through the UN Charter and its broader geopolitical implications.

This chapter introduces Rival Legalities: Practices of International Law in the Cold War, exploring international law’s practices during the Cold War. The authors aim to redescribe Cold War international law, revealing a rich plurality of legal forms and practices. Contrary to the narrative of the Cold War as an interruption in international law’s development, the authors propose viewing it as a period of rivalrous yet mutually constitutive accounts of the ‘international’. This perspective highlights diverse world-making projects beyond the East-West dichotomy, including anti-colonial and anti-anti-colonial efforts. Recognising the plurality of rival world-making projects demands a different conceptual frame than one focused solely on American-Soviet rivalry. The authors argue that international law during the Cold War was not a settled body of norms but a set of practices emerging from the period’s unique conditions. By examining these practices, the book offers a new lens on the Cold War’s impact on international law, highlighting the creative and strategic uses of law by various actors, particularly from the Global South, in their struggles for decolonisation and new international legal orders.