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The epilogue, written in late 2025 during the opening year of Donald Trump’s second term, reflects the unease of finishing a book on war powers as presidential authority is asserted aggressively at home and abroad. Trump’s use of military force, emergency statutes, and National Guard deployments tests constitutional boundaries and revives fears – familiar to the Framers – that war powers can erode democratic self-government. Yet the epilogue resists both normalization and panic. By situating Trump’s actions alongside earlier episodes from Washington to Biden, it shows that many controversial uses of military power have precedents or precursors, even as red lines remain uncrossed. It emphasizes that constitutional checks often reemerge slowly – through legislation, litigation, and political pressure – and that their effects are often felt through the strategic environments created by the exercise of war powers.
Addresses and rejects the contention that presidents may pardon themselves, employing arguments from etymology, British practice before the American founding, the constitutional structure and text, statements of the Framers and ratifiers, original public meaning, American practice since 1788, and fact that a president with a power of self-pardon would be a monarchical figure immune from the rule of law.
Recounts the events of Donald Trump’s first term, including the Mueller investigation of Russian interference in the 2016 election and Trump’s two impeachments. The focus is on Trump’s use of the pardon power as a tool in obstructing investigation into his own wrongdoing as well as a means of protecting the corrupt politicians and white-collar criminals who supported him. Attention is also given to Trump’s transformation of the pardon application process from a formal standardized procedure into a game of connections and private access.
The literature on Christian nationalism has expanded and matured quickly. Nonetheless, few pieces have documented the measurement properties of its namesake concept, and those that have trumpet conclusions that vary from “the most common measure is flawed” to “Christian nationalism is highly robust to measurement variance.” To address this emerging measurement controversy, we start by exploring the factor structure of 10 datasets containing the 6 original Baylor Religion Survey items. We then investigate the factor structure and estimated relationships supported by both these items and a range of additional Christian nationalism questions. Our overwhelming conclusion is that Christian nationalism is a multifaceted concept and a small number of items are capable of effectively tapping it.
This is the second of two chapters that will take a closer look at the national level, or the bottom-up approach, to security dynamics in the Arctic. All states are not equal. There is obviously a difference between a global superpower of almost 350 million people and Norway, with the population of 5.5 million people. Still, both are states, both are in the Arctic, and both face geographically determined security issues in their immediate Arctic domain. It is thus both highly relevant and instructive to compare how these two states have approached their respective Arctic security dynamics. US interest in Arctic security affairs over the last two decades has been a conundrum, going from relative disinterest to making use of the Arctic in global rivalry with China.
Bureaucrats in democracies and international organizations are frequently criticized for lacking democratic accountability. Across time and countries, elected officials have expressed frustration over the challenges of controlling behavior of bureaucrats. How do political leaders attempt to exert control over bureaucrats, and how do bureaucrats respond in turn? More importantly, what do these responses mean for the implementation of foreign policy and global governance programs? Taming the Careerists addresses these questions within the context of US foreign policy, emphasizing how job protections embedded in bureaucrats’ employment contracts shape behavior of bureaucrats in foreign affairs. This introductory chapter presents the book’s central argument, explains its significance, and provides an overview of its structure.
In the social media era, people and organizations increasingly fight over the public's attention. This competition is especially intense in American presidential campaigns. As someone who used attention-grabbing strategies throughout his career, Donald Trump's communication skills were well suited to this environment. His campaigns illustrate the power and limits of attention-grabbing campaign tactics. While he successfully dominated the public's attention in his presidential campaigns, people consistently consumed more negative than positive information about him. Additionally, in this era, the campaign media system and the public continue to focus on incumbent performance, resisting efforts to change the subject. Finally, the editorial decisions that prestigious news outlets make about what to cover still seem to shape which stories people hear about in the crucial final weeks of the campaign. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.
The Conclusion summarizes the main themes of the book, noting how they have special salience as the second administration of Donald Trump unfolds and as we near the 250th anniversary.
The epilogue to this book is a brief reflection on the relevance of Arendt’s moral philosophy to the current slide toward autocracy in many countries, including my own. Unlike the other chapters of this book, the epilogue is “time-stamped” to the moment of its writing: the first year of a US administration that openly aims to dismantle liberal institutions and inflate the president’s prerogative powers. It describes a set of events that poses moral problems resembling those that preoccupied Arendt in her “emergency ethics.”
Originalism, the notion that judges should interpret the Constitution according to the meaning it had at the time it was ratified, is usually associated with expanding executive power. I suggest, however, that the opposite is true: originalism means limiting executive power. If we interpret the Constitution as understood at the time it was created, the question is: What was in the collective mind of the Colonists when they wrote and ratified the Constitution? To answer that question, I return to “the most famous sermon preached in pre-Revolutionary America”—Jonathan Mayhew’s 1750 A Discourse Concerning Unlimited Submission and Non-Resistance to the Higher Powers: with some reflections on the resistance made to King Charles. In this sermon, read as John Adams says, “by everybody,” Mayhew, thoroughly schooled in Republican thought and English constitutionalism, proposed that “unlimited submission” does not exist, and that the monarch’s powers are always limited. I conclude by drawing parallels between Mayhew’s descriptions of Charles I’s crimes and President Donald Trump’s actions since his second election.
The book opens with an overview of the tensions that increasingly define hip-hop’s role in contemporary culture, namely the way that the music continually shifts between complicity and critique in its assessment of capitalism and racialized inequality. This ambivalence is related back to the currents of pleasure and pain that run through the work of such rappers as Nicki Minaj and Megan Thee Stallion, and to the usage of hip-hop in a recent film soundtrack. After briefly discussing the editor’s own position in relation to the culture, the introduction moves on to an overview of the collection’s general aims. These include the attempt to reflect both the diverse styles and regions of contemporary hip-hop, and the political commitments of the contributors. A short discussion of editorial conventions follows, as well as an account of the book’s approach to hate speech. The section ends with a brief overview of each of the nineteen chapters.
The rise of community capitalism since the mid-2010s is reflected in the return of protectionism, authoritarianism, nativism, and violent conflict. European capitalism was forced to adapt by being more assertive. Europeans have embraced solutions that were previously refused as too protectionist, such as European preference, free trade contingent on adhering to social and environmental norms, subsidies to industry for strategic reasons, and competition policy decisions based on reciprocity. Some of these ideas were long defended by France. Germany previously criticised them, but has embraced some in trade since 2016, and others in foreign policy since 2022. The management of Brexit has reaffirmed the basis of European soft power, which depends on the unity of the Single Market. The Covid-19 pandemic (2020–21) forced the Union to adopt protectionist and interventionist measures. The Russo-Ukrainian War has led to very strong sanctions packages, as well as the Union’s foray into military matters. But the Europeans still remain heavily dependent on the US for defence. Donald Trump’s return to power in 2025 has forced Europe to think harder about organising community capitalism.
At first glance, Hans Kelsen (1881–1973) remains a marginal figure within US political discourse. However, this chapter argues that revisiting Kelsen is crucial if we are to understand present-day intellectual tendencies supportive of autocratic threats to US democracy. A neglected, yet pivotal, anti-Kelsenian moment proves decisive among influential right wing intellectuals, so-called ‘west coast’ Straussians based at California’s Claremont Institute, who enthusiastically supported Donald Trump and embraced his authoritarianism. The lawyer and Claremont affiliate John Eastman, for example, worked to prevent a peaceful transfer of power to then President-elect Joe Biden in 2020 to keep Trump in power. Trump’s Claremont Institute defenders have absorbed crucial facets of Leo Strauss’s critical rejoinder to Kelsen: Strauss’ longstanding anti-Kelsenianism has morphed into their subterranean anti-Kelsenianism. To validate this claim, the chapter revisits Strauss’ complicated theoretical dialogue with Kelsen, while also highlighting crucial moments in the arcane history of postwar American Straussianism. What is gained theoretically, and not just historically or politically, by doing so? The Claremont Institute’s apologetics for Trump corroborate Kelsen’s worries that attempts to revive natural law under contemporary conditions invite autocracy.
This chapter examines early decisions made by the Trump Administration that could have an impact on the financing of terrorism. The chapter also ties together the previous chapters – specifically looking at overlaps, regulatory, technological, or other in the area of terrorist financing and the countering of it.
Chapter 4 shifts the focus from why the US fears the ICC to when it opposes the ICC. The basic idea underpinning this portion of the book is that even though America’s fear that the ICC might someday target its troops is a constant, US policy toward the Court is a variable. I start by generating a typology of three broad strategies that the US might pursue in response to ICC investigations: opposition, assistance, and neglect. I describe what makes each strategy conceptually distinct and highlight the specific tactics associated with them. I then explain why the US might pick one strategy over the others. My theoretical framework calls attention to the interaction of two key variables: (a) whether the ICC investigation threatens US troops and (b) whether the ICC investigation advances broader American foreign policy goals. An analysis of each US presidential administration’s policies toward the ICC provides strong support for the theoretical framework.
Racism and xenophobia are no longer isolated issues affecting only small portions of a society. Rather, these issues are now at the forefront of debate and have assumed a position on the frontlines of political warfare. In 2016, both the UK and the USA found themselves embroiled in bitter battle, a battle wherein the citizens themselves became their own worst enemies. The Leave/Stay campaigns in the UK and the 2016 US presidential campaign precipitated a rebirth of nationalism, reinvigorating entire populations and charming even the casual observer into political action and discourse. Yet in both cases, what began as an endeavour to serve the needs of the citizenry morphed into a battleground of derision and division. As this article reveals, the parallels between campaigns are not merely provocative they are disarming.
Public ambivalence towards democracy has come under increasing scrutiny. It is a mood registered perhaps most clearly in the fact populist figures, from Trump to Orbàn to Duterte, appear to carry strong appeal despite the fact, or perhaps because of the fact, they pose a threat to democratic institutions and processes of governance. Are ambivalent citizens the grave threat to democracy they are often portrayed to be in media and academic discourse on populism? In this article, I contend that citizens’ ambivalence about democracy is a more complex, spirited and volitional idea than is acknowledged in the current discussion of populism. Drawing on psychoanalysis and critical social thought, I embrace a conception of citizens’ ambivalence in a democracy as both immanent and desirable. I argue ambivalence can be a form of participation in democracy that is crucial to safeguarding its future.
Self-placement measures of masculinity and femininity have been gaining popularity in political science research, but questions remain about their long-term stability and the extent to which political views may impact gender identities. Taking advantage of two waves of measures of masculinity and femininity self-placement in an online panel, a categorical measure of masculinity and femininity (making use of a six-point scale, anchored scale) is found to be both highly stable and more stable than a scalar measure (making use of a 0 to 100 scale). The scalar measure is also found to be responsive to political views, such that men who report support for Donald Trump in the US Presidential elections identify as more masculine in the follow-up study. Overall, both measures are found to be relatively stable, bolstering the case that they are measuring a stable underlying construct.
Chapter 1 introduces President Donald Trump’s all-out assaults on the validity of the law of war. It argues that his behavior differs from other Western leaders in that Trump has been willing to openly challenge international humanitarian law (IHL) not “in the shadows” but “in the daylight.” Section 1.1 explains why the topic matters for political scientists and legal scholars. Section 1.2 discusses the significance of Trump’s impunity agenda for policy and governance. Section 1.3 argues that, regardless of whether Trump has technically violated the law of war in the past, his brazen attacks on the need for IHL distinguish him from other Western leaders. Section 1.4 claims that the constraints in Western democracies that largely prevent democratic leaders from publicly flouting IHL may be more perceived than actual. Section 1.5 justifies the case selection of Trump, explaining how Trump was presented with the “means, motive, and opportunity” to overtly defy the law of war. Section 1.6 previews the puzzles and arguments that guide the rest of the book.
In February 2025, US President Trump signed an executive order blocking the initiation of any new investigations or enforcement actions under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), which had made it unlawful for US companies to bribe foreign public officials. We analyze market valuations of publicly traded multinationals on US financial markets before and after the announcement. On the day of the executive order, former FCPA targets whose stocks are publicly traded experienced returns on equity markets that were about 0.69 percentage points higher than what would have been expected from stock market trends. The effects cumulated substantively, resulting in capitalization gains for the portfolio of past targets of corporate corruption cases of about USD 39 billion and outsized returns to shareholders. These results allow us to contribute to long-standing debates about how much of the costs multinationals experience from corruption are due to legal enforcement versus the inefficiency and uncertainty it generates for firm operations. When legal enforcement is removed, valuations of firms at risk of corruption rise dramatically, indicating that investors perceive the legal costs as an important threat to investment in corrupt firms. Suspending FCPA enforcement is thus likely to induce market confidence in risky investments.