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The Covid-19 pandemic entailed a historic high in public spending. Some of these resources were channeled through interest organizations, such as business groups and non-profits. In this paper, we gauge potential inefficiencies in their distribution. Funds may be distributed according to the logic of rent-seeking, whereby organizations use lobbying to extract benefits from the state, or a pluralist logic of disturbances, where funding allocation follows organizational grievances. These two logics might even interact, meaning that organizations in need ought to signal their needs through lobbying first. We use data from two survey waves in eight European polities to test these arguments. Our findings provide support for theories of rent-seeking, showing that lobbying activities are associated with increases in public funding, whereas organizations’ needs and survival fears are not. However, our exploration of interaction effects nuances this picture. Our study sheds light on important dynamics behind resource allocation when crisis-related public spending is high.
This chapter examines how terrorism can affect the public finances. The literature identifies three main ways in which terrorism can affect fiscal outcomes. First, by influencing real economic activity and, thereby, government revenues, fiscal deficits and public debt. Second, by negatively affecting both the tax base and the efficiency of the tax administration. Third, by changing the composition of government spending in favor of military outlays. We confirm the importance of these three channels through new research on the impact of major terrorism shocks on macroeconomic and fiscal variables´ dynamics using an unbalanced panel of 191 heterogeneous countries from 1970 to 2018. We find that a terrorist shock lowers a country’s real GDP as well as government tax revenues and raises the debt-to-GDP ratio. The composition of government spending shifts in favor of military spending. Low-income countries are affected more than both emerging market and advanced economies.
This chapter discusses the rationale or “why” of public sector innovation. Understanding the “why” question is vital because, without a purpose, innovations may not be successful or not worth trying. Innovations benefit nations, organizations, and employees differently, so understanding rationales for innovation is vital. This chapter provides information about rationales for innovation while summarizing the historical background and different levels of analysis. For example, innovations at the national level can increase national competitiveness, job creation, social wellbeing, economic development, and growth. Innovations in public organizations can increase the quality of public services and citizen satisfaction with these services. Innovations at the organizational level can increase employee creativity and performance. This chapter provides compelling stories about how and why public organizations must innovate.
This paper systematically examines the theoretical and quantitative interrelations between government spending and disposable income inequality in a tractable monopolistically competitive Ramsey macroeconomy. Upon an increase in government size, we analytically show that whether the long-run after-tax Gini coefficient rises or falls depends on the sign and magnitude of the wealth/capital inequality effect versus those of the adjusted-labor effect. Under (i) a mild level of productive public expenditure externalities and (ii) a sufficiently high intertemporal elasticity of consumption substitution, our calibrated model is able to generate qualitatively as well as quantitatively consistent income inequality effects of government spending vis-à-vis recent estimation results.
In Chapter 4, we continue our explanation of tradeoffs between expenditure categories by focusing on how domestic and international contextual factors can constrain or facilitate government budgetary behavior. For the domestic contexts, we consider election timing, unemployment, and economic growth. In the international realm, we focus on globalization and conflict involvement. For each of these contextual factors, we develop a set of expectations about the spending tradeoffs between policy areas if left and right governments remain ideologically consistent to their preferences versus if context overwhelms those ideological concerns. Our results and conclusions are mixed across the domestic contexts. We find almost no tradeoffs and none that are consistent with either type of expectations for election timing. For an increasing unemployment, we find a mixture of ideological and strategic tradeoff decisions, while, for positive economic growth, we find substantial evidence that governments take advantage of the circumstances to go beyond their ideological priorities. Results for international contexts are also mixed with government spending allocations lacking ideological differences in the face of increased globalization. But, for increased conflict, right and left governments reallocate expenditures in similar ways – highlighting how contexts can overwhelm governments.
In Chapter 3, we focus on explaining the tradeoffs between expenditure categories in government budgets. Rather than explain total expenditures or expenditures in specific policy areas, we argue that the competition for expenditures is in the spending allocations. Governments of varying ideological stances prefer increasing or decreasing spending for different policy areas, but we argue that their ability to do this is hindered by their government status. Governments with a majority of the seats in the lower house of parliament are better able to push through their preferred changes to spending budgets. Using a compositional methodological approach on data for 33 developed democracies across 35 years (1975–2010), we find that government ideology does influence budgetary allocations for majority governments, with left and right governments altering budgets in different, but expected, ways. For minority governments, our results suggest they too are strategic in making relative budgetary changes, but it is less about ideology and more about appeasing the necessary political parties in order to stay in power. This focus on budgetary compositions highlights the political competition for resources between policy areas that previous work has overlooked.
Economic sanctions research suggests that sanctioned countries’ overall economic costs tend to be low. This article argues that, despite this, sanction costs can force the governments of these countries to reallocate budget resources from low-priority spending categories to other categories in an effort to minimize their political costs. One such low-priority category is disaster preparedness and mitigation. The authors show that economic sanctions lead to reduced disaster preparedness spending and, as a result, increase the scale of economic and human losses generated by natural disasters in sanctioned countries.
Is public support for social welfare programs’ contingent on an individual’s exposure to risk? Prior work has examined whether tough economic times lead people to “reach out” (i.e. become more accepting of government expansion of social welfare programs) or “pull back” (i.e. become less supportive of welfare). However, these studies do not account for the conditional relationship between an individual’s exposure to risk and his or her risk orientation. Using new survey data, we find that an individual’s risk orientation moderates the relationship between risk exposure and public support for welfare spending. When individuals perceive exposure to economic risk, those who are risk averse are highly supportive of welfare expansion; those who are risk acceptant become less supportive. Broadly, these findings suggest that public support for welfare spending is contingent on whether an individual perceives exposure to risk and, if so, the individual’s propensity to tolerate that risk.
This paper examines the government spending multiplier when economic agents combine adaptive learning and knowledge about future fiscal policy to form their expectations. The analysis shows that the effects of a government spending shock substantially change when the rational expectations hypothesis is replaced by this learning mechanism. In contrast to the dynamics under rational expectations, a government spending shock in a small-scale new Keynesian DSGE model with learning crowds in private consumption and is associated with a positive comovement between real wages and hours worked. In the baseline calibration, the output multiplier under learning is above one and about twice as large as under rational expectations.
The paper revisits the literature on real rigidities in New Keynesian models in the context of an economy at the zero lower bound. It identifies strategic interaction among price- and wage-setting agents in the economy as an important determinant of both optimal policy and economic dynamics in deep recessions. In particular, labor market segmentation is shown to have a significant influence on the length of the forward commitment to keep interest rates at zero, the magnitude of the fiscal policy responses as well as inflation volatility in the economy under optimal policy.
Why have advanced democracies experienced a retreat of the interventionist state since 1980? This article provides evidence that in all relevant policy indicators (spending, subsidies, state-owned enterprises, regulation, capital taxation) government intervention has been scaled back across the OECD. An overview of the results of 130 quantitative studies analysing at least one of these indicators is provided. Focusing on five main explanatory variables – globalization, Europeanization, learning and emulation, socio-economic problems, and political parties – only limited agreement in the literature is found. The reasons for this disagreement are discussed. Ways forward are suggested for the theoretical models on which studies are based, how the dependent variable is chosen, the empirical approaches that may be applied, and how quantitative research and comparative case studies may be combined.
This paper examines the mechanisms through which government spending affects the dynamics of the real exchange rate. Using a two-sector dependent open economy model with intersectoral mobility costs for private capital, we show that public investment generates (i) a nonmonotonic U-shaped adjustment path for the real exchange rate with sharp intertemporal trade-offs and (ii) a crowding-in of private consumption, consistent with stylized facts. The effects of public consumption, however, are in sharp contrast to those of public investment. The effect of government spending on the real exchange rate depends critically on (i) the sectoral composition of public spending, (ii) the underlying financing policy, (iii) the sectoral intensity of private capital in production, (iv) the relative sectoral productivity of public infrastructure, (v) the elasticity of substitution in production, and (vi) intersectoral mobility costs for capital. In deriving these results, we identify conditions under which the predictions of the neoclassical open economy model can be reconciled with empirical regularities. Our results underscore the importance of decoupling the effects of government investment from those of government consumption in understanding the relationship between fiscal policy and the real exchange rate.
In nations where the executive has budgetary control, how are spending decisions and allocations affected? Is intraparty conflict relevant? This article sets out to show that institutional rules and leadership roles affect budgetary outcomes. It makes the following argument: if intraparty conflict exists in a one-party dominant or majority-party system, the executive reduces spending to punish the party in the legislature; if no intraparty conflict exists, then the executive increases spending to reward or cultivate loyalty to himself as the party leader. If intraparty conflict exists in a minority government or majority-coalition within a competitive multiparty system, the executive increases spending to reward or cultivate loyalty to himself as the party or coalition leader. Evidence from South Korea and Taiwan between the 1970s and 2000 supports the theory. This study advances scholarship in three ways. First, it shows that institutional rules that provide the executive with agenda control also lead to the strategic use of the budgetary process and outcomes to generate loyalty to the executive as leader. Second, it reveals that this strategy affects spending outcomes in election years; this is an important caveat to electoral spending manipulations. Third, the strategic use of the budget to control intraparty conflict occurred prior to and following democratization; this reveals that institutional changes need to include modifications in rules for policy transformations.
In dynamic general equilibrium models, private output is increased by government spending for goods and services, but decreased by government spending for employment. This paper presents the first evidence for the latter effect by studying the pre-WWII British wartime economy. Britain participated in numerous wars, increasing military employment greatly. British tax-smoothing policy and rare wartime governmental interventions reduce the difficulty of studying the effects of wartime government spending. This paper finds wartime decreases in industrial production, which can be explained by wartime government spending for military employment.
The aim and scope of this paper is to isolate the effects of population ageing in the context of potential Scottish independence. A dynamic multiregional Overlapping Generations Computable General Equilibrium (OLG-CGE) model is used to evaluate the two scenarios. The status quo scenario assumes that Scotland stays part of the UK and all government expenditures associated with its ageing population are funded on a UK-wide basis. In the independence scenario, Scotland and the rest of the UK pay for the growing demands of their ageing populations independently. The comparison suggests that Scotland is worse off in the case of independence. The effective labour income tax rate in the independence scenario has to increase further compared with the status quo scenario. The additional increase reaches its maximum in 2035 at 1.4 percentage points. The additional rise in the tax rate is non-negligible, but is much smaller than the population ageing effect (status quo scenario) which generates an increase of about 8.5 percentage points by 2060. The difference for government finances between the status quo and independence scenarios is thus relatively small.
Building on the literature on public finance, this article explores the consequences of political scale for government spending. The central argument is that the tendency for small political units to have big governments is not merely the result of economies of scale in the provision of public goods, but a reflection of the greater pressures for public spending faced by politicians in smaller and more homogeneous political units. The importance of such political pressures relative to other influences on spending is assessed on the basis of subnational data by comparing the relationship between size and spending under democracy and dictatorship. To the extent that government expansion is driven by citizen demands, the impact of size on spending may be expected to be more pronounced under democratic than authoritarian governance. Results from a time-series cross-sectional analysis of growth in government spending are consistent with this expectation. Government growth is shaped not only by the population size of political units but also by the interaction between regime and size. Analysis of spending patterns under democratic rule further indicates that size is an important determinant of spending even after controlling for variations in citizen preferences, political institutions, electoral competitiveness, and economic performance. The results have important theoretical implications for the study of fiscal policy and democratic governance around the world because they suggest that political scale conditions the linkages between citizens and the state, creating widely varying incentives for government growth across differently sized political units.
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