The concluding chapter by Klaus Brummer and Sumit Ganguly first summarizes the main findings of the volume with regard to its main explanatory factors for transnational repression, in the form of salience, state capacity, regime type, and host state characteristics. It then engages in a discussion of the policy implications of the volume’s country studies. After that, it highlights various avenues for future research. The chapter ends with a brief outlook, which suggests that there is no reason to expect transnational repression to disappear anytime soon. Already now, the costs of engaging in transnational repression seem limited. The country chapters have shown that most countries get away with it most of the times. The likely continued erosion of the liberal international order should further decrease both the normative and the political costs of engaging in transnational repression. This, in turn, should continue to embolden states to use various tools and tactics to repress their nationals abroad.

This concluding chapter synthesizes the volume’s findings on political discontent in Latin America, emphasizing that discontent stems not from sudden crises but from frustrated expectations born of prior social gains. The conclusion also highlights how discontent manifests through both “voice” (mobilization) and “exit” (migration, crime), and underscores the role of youth, gender, indigeneity, informality, and migration in shaping disaffection. The volume’s comparative lens, combining Sociology and Political Science, provides a nuanced framework to understand how social transformations and weak state capacity jointly fuel democratic dissatisfaction. Contrasting Latin America with the Global North, the chapter argues that discontent in the region arises from aspirations never fulfilled—not lost entitlements—and that relative deprivation will likely persist. The authors call for future research on media, the environment, and how social structures shape political agency, noting that current discontent has yet to crystallize into new political alignments.

The introductory chapter sets the scene for the following discussions. It starts with defining the phenomenon of transnational repression, suggesting that at its core, transnational repression is about extraterritorial repressive actions by states against members of their national community abroad. The discussions similarly highlight the scope and relevance of said phenomenon for international politics. More specifically, the chapter suggests that transnational repression can be approached along three dimensions. First, what are the motives for states to engage in transnational repression (the “why”)? Second, what instruments and tactics do states employ when engaging in acts of transnational repression (the “how”)? Third, what are the implications and consequences of transnational repression (the “so what”)? The chapter points to four possible answers to, or explanatory factors for, transnational repression. Those factors are: salience; state capacity; regime type; and host state characteristics. It is those factors that the country chapters contained in this volume address in their discussions of a total of fourteen states from both the global north and the global south.

This chapter examines political discontent in Bolivia, Chile, Peru, and Uruguay through citizens’ perceived access to civil, political, and social citizenship rights. We find that countries with structured political systems (Bolivia, Uruguay) exhibit lower discontent despite objective challenges, while those with fragmented systems (Chile, Peru) show higher discontent despite better objective conditions. Using multilevel analysis of survey data, we demonstrate that perceived citizenship access varies significantly across territories and social groups, driven by local state capacity and individual trajectories. The Chilean case study reveals “disjointed polarization”—elite-level polarization without mass alignment—leading to repeated electoral cycling and governmental impotence. This creates a vicious cycle where fragmented discontent prevents effective representation while weak governance fuels further alienation. Our findings suggest that political structuring of conflict, even through polarization, may be preferable to unstructured vertical discontent that undermines democratic governance and reform capacity.

Environmental politics offers a useful entry point to evaluate the stability and fragility of Russia’s post-Soviet political and economic regime. The politics of the environment in Russia intersects with a range of other issues – the state’s capacity; authoritarianism; citizens participation; sources of economic growth; and Russia’s multinational society. Russia boasts tremendous ecological diversity and significant protected natural areas, but also faces a number of environmental challenges. Today we see that Russia has strong environmental laws that are not well enforced. Russians express a high level of concern about environmental issues, but the political climate is increasingly repressive toward citizen activism. Russia is also making a big bet on the Arctic region where natural resource extraction is expected to bolster Russia’s future economic prospects and status as a great power, even as climate change and source of environmental degradation threaten Arctic inhabitants and ecosystems.

The final chapter concludes by outlining practical policy guidance implied by the theory and exploring speculative but promising pathways out of the weak-state trap from both Senegal and elsewhere. First, it considers nascent constituencies that might serve as advocates for a stronger, more programmatic state. In particular, it tells the story of Senegal’s wealthiest businessman, who built an incredibly successful corporation and whose political interests are now at odds with those of the traditional economic elite. It then traces the rise of a new, externally mobilized political party (a recipe for success suggested by the literature) that has a more credible claim to making programmatic promises than its predecessors, which have all been borne out of elites from the ruling party. Finally, it introduces two possibilities suggested by cases outside Africa: mixing strategies (clientelistic and programmatic) and compensating intermediaries. I additionally consider whether and how the book’s theory might extend beyond Africa, to Latin America in particular, and conclude with a discussion of the book’s academic contributions and policy implications.

The theory posits an indirect negative consequence of informality on economic development. I first identify the type of informality that will have this effect and then argue that embedded informality slows the development of state capacity, mediated by politics. Two distinct accountability-capacity equilibria – a non-programmatic, weak state and a programmatic, strong state – support this logic. When given the choice, voters in a weak state will discipline politicians along particularistic rather than programmatic criteria, but only the latter generates incentives for politicians to invest in state capacity. In non-programmatic elections, informality instead creates incentives not to invest in the state or even quash such investments, keeping the state weak. First, large-scale economic informality reduces expectations that the state can deliver on programmatic promises and the likelihood that a majority of voters will coordinate around programmatic claims. Second, a constituency opposed to state-building is more likely to form where contact with the state is frequently facilitated by intermediaries who benefit from their role in discretionary politics.

Chapter 7 investigates how national governments can reduce corporate exposure to climate risks through public policy. It identifies three categories of policies that potentially reassure investors: governance and planning, which encompass national climate strategies and institutional coordination, capacity building, which includes disaster preparedness and public infrastructure for resilience, and incentives and regulations, such as environmental standards and climate-related fiscal policies. The chapter examines whether these policies moderate the negative relationship between climate vulnerability and foreign direct investment identified in Chapter 4. Using cross-national empirical analysis, it finds that in countries where these policy areas are relatively strong, investors’ concerns about climate risk are significantly mitigated. These results suggest that government-led adaptation efforts can serve as credible signals of state capacity and long-term stability, thereby strengthening confidence among multinational firms operating in or entering climate-vulnerable economies.

Chapter 6 examines the development and implementation of Peru’s 2009 Universal Health Insurance (Aseguramiento Universal en Salud (AUS)) reform. Unlike other Latin American cases, Peru’s party system at the time was highly fragmented and non-programmatic – political parties lacked core values and were therefore disengaged from health policy. This void allowed technocrats, particularly those supported by United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the private sector, to dominate the process. The AUS reform provided formal insurance coverage to millions but failed to specify long-term funding or infrastructure development. Debate around the reform was limited, and key decisions were made by a small group of technocrats and advisors rather than through participatory party politics. As a result, the law was poorly specified, with insufficient attention to state capacity and the practical challenges of expanding healthcare access. The reform led to dramatic increases in theoretical insurance coverage, but actually achieving access to care was hampered by resource shortages, inconsistent funding, and limited political commitment. The Peruvian experience highlights how non-programmatic party systems defer policy authority to technocrats, risking unsustainable reforms that do not deliver on their promises, particularly in times of crisis such as the COVID-19 pandemic.

Chapter 4 examines the policymaking process behind Chile’s AUGE healthcare reform, enacted in 2004. Driven by the center-left Concertación coalition, the reform aimed to expand equitable access to healthcare by providing explicit guarantees for prioritized diseases. The Chilean parties’ strong programmatic commitments were central, ensuring cohesion from agenda-setting through implementation. Political debates focused on balancing public and private sector roles, sustainable funding, and gradual expansion of coverage. Internal disagreements on strategy existed, yet the coalition’s programmatic nature enabled compromise and long-term planning. The reform introduced new regulatory institutions, increased public funding, and improved infrastructure and human resources. Opposition came from right-wing parties, private insurers, and medical groups, but political leadership and consensus-building allowed the reform to pass and be sustained under subsequent governments. Ultimately, AUGE expanded insurance coverage, reduced unmet healthcare needs, and demonstrated how programmatic party commitment shapes effective and sustainable social policy.

In this chapter, we trace the history of how the EU emerged as a leader in using development aid and diplomacy to restrict migration, particularly from Africa. We also broadly describe the scope of migration management projects, including their intended impact on state capacity, economic development, a country’s domestic governance including civil society, and the return of a country’s nationals via forced and voluntary repatriation. We then turn to the EUTF, analyzing where and how the EU spent more than €5 billion across the African continent. We explore which actors benefited the most, what projects received the most funding, and where these interventions had the most impact. Overall, the EUTF prioritized state capacity, security, and economic development, while civil society and other non-state actors received significantly smaller allocations.

Chapter 1 introduces the key concepts of the book, lays out the main argument, and discusses the empirical approach and data used in later chapters. It emphasizes that variation in governance outcomes cannot be understood without examining the incentives and interactions of politicians, bureaucrats, and voters. Ultimately, I argue that politicians in developing democracies have incentives to hire competent bureaucrats but will simultaneously retain tools to influence their career progression. Using tools of career control – interference in bureaucrats’ promotions, work locations, and day-to-day work tasks – politicians can extract bureaucratic loyalty. The introduction also situates the book within existing scholarship. The empirical strategy combines qualitative interviews, survey experiments, and observational data, largely drawn from Ghana but supplemented with comparative insights. Ultimately, the chapter frames the book as an inquiry into how the competing incentives of politicians and bureaucrats shape governance.

Chapter 2 develops the theoretical framework that underpins the book. It argues that politicians in developing democracies face a dual incentive: they need competent bureaucrats who can implement programs effectively, yet they also desire control over those bureaucrats to secure loyalty and political advantage. As a result, politicians often recruit based on merit but retain formal or informal levers of influence, such as control over promotions or geographic transfers. The chapter distinguishes between programmatic and non-programmatic distribution, emphasizing that politicians often require bureaucratic loyalty to engage in non-programmatic distribution. Further, politicians have greater incentives to engage in non-programmatic distribution when local elections are highly competitive. Accordingly, I expect that intense local electoral competition will result in worse governance outcomes, including higher levels of corruption and partisan allocation of public goods. This framework provides the theoretical lens to interpret the empirical evidence presented in subsequent chapters and situates the book’s contribution within broader debates on state capacity, bureaucratic autonomy, clientelism, and democratic accountability.

State intervention can spur development, but only when executed with competence and accountability. This chapter explores when, how, and why state action works. It surveys successful industrial policies and failed ones, identifying the institutional conditions that distinguish them. Rather than demonize or glorify the state, it argues for adaptive, evidence-based strategies that blend public purpose with market discipline.