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Perceptual Modal Collapse is the view that no unperceived perceptibles exist. Aristotle takes Perceptual Modal Collapse to be central to Protagoreanism. But Aristotle’s Categories 7 commits Aristotle to Perceptual Modal Collapse: perception and perceptible correlate; each relative pair is constituted by its relation to its correlative; correlatives exist at all the same times; so, perception and perceptible exist at all the same times. Hence, there are no unperceived perceptibles. Moreover, correlatives are simultaneous by nature. Aristotle’s arguments that this does not apply to perception and perceptible are unconvincing. I argue that Aristotle’s second definition of relatives can save Aristotle’s theory from Perceptual Modal Collapse, since the definition distinguishes perceptible as a schematic relative from specific perceptible qualities. Once we disambiguate, we can see that specific perceptibles need not exist at the same time as perceptions. Thus, the specific heat of a fire in a forest can exist, even when unperceived. These ideas underlie Aristotle’s account of intentional relatives in Metaphysics 5.15, where specific perceptual qualities are the content of perceptions.
This chapter examines and clarifies Aristotle’s views concerning truth, truthaptness, truthbearers, truth-conditions, and temporal relativism and argues against two common readings of Aristotle. First, while Aristotle is often credited with the first correspondence theory of truth (wherein items such as beliefs and declarative sentences are true if and only if there is some item – such as a fact or obtaining state of affairs – to which the relevant belief or declarative sentence corresponds), I argue that there is little reason to attribute a substantive correspondence theory of truth to Aristotle. Secondly, although it is often thought that Aristotle is inclined towards a temporalist view according to which truthbearers vary in truth across times while undergoing mere Cambridge change, I argue that Aristotle instead held that truthbearers do not undergo any change at all. This, I suggest, has interesting implications for Aristotle’s views concerning temporalism and apparent changes in truth value.
In this paper Centrone shows how traces of the tension between the unitary character of the Platonic eidos and the multiple one of the logos referred to it can be found in the Theaetetus’ ‘doctrine of the dream’. The thesis about the asymmetry of knowledge present in the doctrine of the dream, according to which while the elements of a compound are not knowable, the compounds are knowable, does indeed entail an objective difficulty also for the Platonic doctrine of Forms. Centrone argues that Plato allusively indicates the solution to this problem in the notion of holon, namely in a unitary entity endowed with multiple parts but articulated as an organic complex. Although the confutation of the doctrine of the dream is based on the indistinction between the notion of holon and that of pan, Centrone argues that Plato admits such an indistinction in the Theaetetus only for dialectical aims. As can be easily inferred from both other texts of the Platonic corpus and some passages in Aristotle’s Metaphysics, in fact there are several reasons to believe that Plato had a notion of ‘whole’ distinct from that of ‘all’.
This chapter analyzes Aristotle’s criticism of dichotomous division, focusing especially on the first Book of the De partibus animalium. It argues that Speusippus, not Plato, is the direct target of this criticism, but that Aristotle also indirectly addresses a Platonic norm of division, explicitly argued in the Statesman and plausibly applied in the Sophist. The chapter contends that Aristotle and the Academics shared a common agenda on cross-cutting divisions and establishing norms for discovering essences, even while fundamentally disagreeing on method.
This chapter argues that the Sophist prompted the reflection of the Early Academics on at least two main fronts: (1) the elaboration of binary divisions of entities (Xenocrates, Hermodorus, divisiones aristoteleae, Aristotle’s On the Good); and (2) the critical reaction to Eleatic monism, as it emerges especially from Aristotle’s Metaphysics N 2. In doing so, the chapter also brings out ways in which this can shed light on aspects of the background of Aristotle’s ontology and theory of predication. It also discusses the problem, recently brought to scholarly attention, of the Early Academic composition of a textual canon functional to a work of systematization of Platonism.
This chapter shows that Aristotle’s discussion of being as truth and not-being as falsehood in Metaphysics Δ, E, and Θ is a sustained reflection on the Sophist’s account of falsehood and its analysis of categorial sentences; and that the Metaphysics responds to the Sophist on whether Motion-Itself and Knowledge-Itself exist among separate intelligibles, a point on which Plotinus would later defend the Platonic position against Aristotle.
Both in antiquity and in more recent times, Aristotle has often been considered a misleading reporter of his predecessors’ theories. Regarding his testimony on the Pythagoreans in Metaphysics A, the paper criticizes this diagnosis and proposes a more nuanced assessment. It does so by focusing on two charges of distortion: that Aristotle forcibly reduced the Pythagorean doctrine to a dyadic scheme (apeiron and hen); and that Aristotle confused arithmetic number and cosmogonic number. On the first point, the paper argues that Aristotle’s mention of apeiron and hen is due to a confusion of peras and apeiron present in the Pythagorean doctrine itself. On the second point, the paper shows that number theory and cosmology were not distinguishable in what was arguably Aristotle’s source. The conclusion is that Aristotle does not misrepresent the theories of the Pythagoreans but draws the consequences implicit in some of their statements, translating them into conceptual schemes that, inevitably, were not the original ones.
This introduction explains the intellectual project underlying the volume and the reasons for gathering this selection of papers by Bruno Centrone in English.
Several aspects of Aristotle’s distinction of four types of opposites remain unclear, despite the familiarity of the distinction itself. This chapter sketches a story about some of those aspects as the result of Aristotle’s implicit but systematic engagement with Plato’s Sophist. The first section focuses on a passage from Metaph. XIV.2, which seems to refer to the Sophist and the way in which Plato discusses non-being there. I suggest, among other things, that the Sophist was read by Aristotle as embedding the ‘archaic’ mindset that eventually misled people into thinking of the opposition between being and non-being as a sort of categorial distinction between term-like items. The second section turns to illustrating how a series of remarks Aristotle drops at different places about negation, otherness, and the different types of opposites can be read as reactions to some of the things Plato writes in the Sophist. While the first section illustrates Aristotle’s take on the Sophist with respect to some basic metaphysical questions, the second section shows that points of detail in Aristotle’s account of the opposites can be taken as responses to the Sophist.
Plato's Sophist in Antiquity offers the first comprehensive account of how one of Plato's most challenging and influential dialogues was read, interpreted, and transformed throughout the ancient Mediterranean world. Spanning from the Early Academy to Late Neoplatonism, the volume unites leading scholars in a systematic investigation of the Sophist's complex afterlife. Combining historical depth with philosophical insight, it uncovers how ancient thinkers – Aristotle, the Stoics, Plutarch, Plotinus, Porphyry, Proclus, and others – engaged with the dialogue's central questions about being, non-being, truth and falsehood, identity and difference, linguistic reference, and much else. By tracing these rich trajectories of reception, the book not only fills a major gap in Platonic studies but also demonstrates the continuing vitality of the Sophist for contemporary debates in metaphysics, epistemology, and the philosophy of language.
This volume collects ten revised and translated essays by Bruno Centrone, one of Italy's leading scholars of ancient philosophy. Together they trace a rich and coherent intellectual narrative from Plato's metaphysics, ethics, and psychology to their reinterpretation to later Pythagoreanizing writings. Centrone's studies combine meticulous philological accuracy with philosophical depth, shedding new light on Plato's conception of truth, being, virtue, and the soul, as well as on the complex processes through which later thinkers reshaped Platonic doctrines. A particular strength of the book lies in its treatment of post-Hellenistic pseudo-Pythagorean texts, for which Centrone's work remains foundational. By collecting and making these landmark studies available in English, this volume provides an essential resource for scholars, graduate students, and libraries, and a crucial bridge between Italian and anglophone traditions of scholarship on ancient philosophy.
Aristotle discusses intellect in Metaph. 12.9. This chapter, however, seems incomplete, because a question posed in it (1074b36–8) remains unaddressed. Another passage (1072b14–30) in Metaph. 12.7 seems to address a similar topic, yet appears extraneous to its present chapter. This article argues that the placing of the aforementioned passage within Metaph. 12.7 is incorrect, and that its original position is actually at the end of Metaph. 12.9. This alternative reading offers a better understanding of 1072b14–30, and has the potential to finalize the unfinished discussion in Metaph. 12.9.
Aristotle had a decisive impact on the development of ancient medicine. He and his followers conducted a dialogue about life and living beings, body and soul, and health and disease with doctors from the Classical period down to late antiquity: interlocutors who included key figures like Galen and the Hippocratic commentator Stephanus of Alexandria. Philip van der Eijk's magisterial and attractively written book describes and analyses this dialogue and argues that Aristotle strategically positioned himself within these discussions while making important and innovative contributions to them. The author further uncovers unpublished evidence showing how Aristotle's philosophy itself – and also the way it was elaborated by its later advocates and exegetes – was influenced by its close engagement with medical theory and practice. This important and much-anticipated book will transform both the study of Aristotle and his followers and that of Greek and Roman medicine.
The interlude explores Aristotle’s influential account of rhetorical redescription, showing its limits as a source for understanding paradiastole. It shows how ancient rhetorical treatments of the figure were quite varied, and at times critical of Aristotle’s approach. It concludes by analysing Dionysius of Halicarnassus’ treatment of language and stasis, showing how it critiques Aristotle’s account of redescription in the Rhetoric.
This chapter examines Amartya Sen’s ethical writings in relation to Critical Ethical Naturalism (CEN). While Sen’s capability approach and later work on ethics are often read as alternatives to consequentialism and deontology, he never presents them as a systematic moral theory. His emphasis on freedom, capabilities and functionings reflects an implicit realist orientation which some, notably Martins and Lawson, interpret as ontological in character. Lawson further suggests that Sen’s framework might be viewed as a special case of CEN. It is argued, however, that the two projects diverge: Sen’s ethics rests on implicit ontological tensions, whereas CEN is explicitly grounded in ontological coherence. The chapter highlights these tensions, contrasts the orientations of the two projects toward Aristotle and mainstream ethics, explores the sources of Sen’s ontological reticence, and considers the form of embedded liberalism shaping his stance. It concludes by reflecting on whether limited synthesis between the two frameworks is possible.
The conclusion offers an overview of the book’s central arguments. It first reflects on the development of Critical Ethical Naturalism (CEN) within a particular interpretation of Aristotle, showing how this alignment strengthens both its ethical content and its role within Cambridge Social Ontology (CSO). Situating CEN in this way provides a richer ontological grounding for understanding human flourishing and supports the broader project of reviving political economy on realist foundations. The discussion then revisits the comparison between CSO and Amartya Sen, highlighting that while both seek to integrate ethics and economics, they rest on contrasting ontological orientations. Sen’s reluctance to engage systematically with ontology produces conceptual ambiguities that limit the coherence of his framework. The conclusion also considers how Nussbaum’s and Robeyns’s liberal presuppositions reinforce these tensions. It closes by reaffirming the necessity of ontological inquiry for conceptual clarity, ethical critique, and the revival of political economy as a comprehensive social science.
This chapter examines the key features of Critical Ethical Naturalism (CEN) through a sustained engagement with Aristotle’s ethics and politics. Four central dimensions of CEN are explored. First, its account of humans as community beings, mutually constituted and co-developing, is illuminated through Aristotle’s notions of character friendship and our intrinsically political nature. Second, the Aristotelian conception of eudaimonia clarifies CEN’s understanding of human flourishing. Third, CEN’s claim that all humans are, in a sense, ethical naturalists, owing to their inherent dispositions to care, is reconsidered alongside Aristotle’s view that rational agents choose to endorse caring tendencies not merely because they are natural but because they are good. Finally, the chapter explores CEN’s recognition of human vulnerability and the social conditions that inhibit care, drawing parallels with Aristotle’s critique of defective political systems. Aristotle’s notion of organic social development also deepens the analysis of authenticity in CEN and its relation to human flourishing.
This chapter examines the interpretive consequences of Amartya Sen’s ontological reticence. While Sen recognises the social world as open and processual, his continued reliance on formal, taxonomic methods generates a deep tension that shapes how his work has been received and operationalised. It is argued that the plurality of interpretations surrounding the capability approach reflects not theoretical flexibility but ontological ambiguity. Drawing on developments in Social Choice Theory and mainstream empirical modelling, the chapter shows how Sen’s framework has been adapted within methodologies that presuppose closed systems, thereby diluting its relational orientation. It then contrasts these uses with heterodox applications that foreground an evolutionary outlook. Finally, by examining the contributions of Nussbaum and Robeyns, it is highlighted how liberal conceptions of personhood reinforce ontological inconsistencies and preliminary counters to their claims are offered. The chapter concludes by reflecting on the stakes of these tensions for the future development of the capability approach and its role in the revival of political economy.
This article examines the two examples of ‘lengthened name’ (ἐπεκτεταμένον ὄνομα) given by Aristotle in chapter 21 of the Poetics. It argues that the generally printed text is unsatisfactory because it does not serve the purpose of Aristotle’s examples well. In the case of the first example, the article suggests that a branch of the manuscript tradition other than the one privileged by most editors should be followed, while in the case of the second, a conjecture is offered. An appendix is devoted to highlighting a detail of William of Moerbeke’s translation of the first example.
This article examines a fundamental problem in ancient Greek medical thought, namely, how to conceptualize the variety of human health conditions. Beginning in the Classical period, the notion that health gradually shades into illness stood in tension both with the assumption that these categories are dichotomous and with the definition of health as an exact proportion. After examining how these matters were framed by Aristotle, this article explores two later attempts at solving the tensions. It is shown that Galen of Pergamon used the resources of Peripatetic philosophy to reconcile two of these conflicting intuitions while following certain Herophileans in rejecting the idea that health and illness are dichotomous. This article also offers an interpretation of the largely overlooked position of Asclepiades of Bithynia, that health does not admit of degrees. It is argued that this was a reasonable view within a corpuscular physiology and did not, pace Galen, lead to the ‘doctrine of perpetual suffering’. Asclepiades could have effectively deployed his account in arguments against the Empiricist sect and against humoural theories.