Obtaining portfolios is one of the most important pay-offs that parties receive from getting into office. Accordingly, we know a lot about how portfolios are distributed between coalition partners, but surprisingly little about how voters react to these distributional outcomes. We address this research gap both theoretically and empirically. Theoretically, we argue that voters use cues from the quantitative and qualitative portfolio distributions to evaluate coalition partners’ competence in negotiations, which in turn shapes party support. Empirically, we use original experimental and panel survey data from the 2022 Danish general election. We find that voters infer negotiation competence from the number, power, and party-specific salience of the portfolios a party obtains. We also demonstrate that many voters paid attention to the real-world negotiation outcome and withdrew their support for the parties they perceived handled the negotiations less competently.

Ernest Sosa sees the establishment of warrant for our knowledge in part as an a priori mode of establishing externalist warrant for our beliefs and their underlying competences. I clarify the place of this a priori warrant in Sosa’s understanding of the aptness hierarchy — i.e., how knowledge progresses to better knowledge — by showing that it makes sense of the attainment of better knowledge through a tight connection between the a priori mode of warrant establishment and another mode, called the dispositional, representing the brute reliability of our disposition to take our apt first-order beliefs at face value.

Recently, we have witnessed a growing shift from an emphasis on problematic processes to that on positive processes and outcomes in developmental psychopathology and psychological research more generally. Adopting this lens, we addressed three aims. One, we examined developmental sequelae of cumulative positive childhood experiences (PCEs) in infancy, but in contrast to typical retrospective recall, we deployed multiple behavioral and parent-reported measures in a prospective design. We examined children’s socioemotional strengths and competencies – rather than diminished or absent problems – as outcomes at preschool age. Two, we examined how PCEs exert their impact, proposing children’s competence at toddler age as a mediator. Three, we proposed children’s negative emotional reactivity (anger proneness) as a moderator, expecting anger-prone children to be especially affected by variations in early positive experiences. A longitudinal study of 200 mothers, fathers, and infants (96 girls, 104 boys; 20% not “White alone”) from the U.S. Midwest, followed from 8 months to 4.5 years, confirmed the utility of a conceptual and methodological approach that emphasizes cumulative early PCEs and positive socioemotional outcomes and supported both hypotheses (mediation: B = 0.05, SE = 0.02, 95% CI [0.02, 0.10]; moderation: B = 0.12, SE = 0.06, 95% CI [0.01, 0.25]).

This article develops a virtue-epistemological distinction between general and narrow artificial intelligence (AI) systems by analysing AI competence through Ernest Sosa’s virtue-theoretic framework. First, I outline a general distinction between narrow and general AI. I then characterise AI in a way that bridges its terminology with virtue epistemological concepts. Drawing on Sosa’s idea that the telic structure is replicable for systems with merely functional-teleological aims, I argue that current AI systems can possess first-order competence. I argue that increasing domain-specific competence of narrow AI cannot elevate it to the status of general AI, as that requires the constitutional disposition to assess the aptness of one’s own first-order performances, a second-order competence that no amount of first-order improvement can grant. Finally, I argue that the virtue-theoretic distinction between artificial narrow intelligence and artificial general intelligence depends on whether the AI system possesses second-order constitutional competence.

Global migration is reshaping mental healthcare, creating challenges and opportunities that demand intercultural dialogue. In 2021 the World Psychiatry Exchange Program was launched under the auspices of the World Psychiatric Association to promote global collaboration and mutual learning. Its third call for applications, opened in October 2023, received 162 applications from 68 individuals, more than double the number from the second edition. Applicants represented a diverse geographical distribution (Asia 58.8%, Africa 22.1%, Europe 10.3%, South America 5.9% and North America 2.9%), with ages ranging from 25 to 52 years (mean 34 years). Just over half (53%) were early career psychiatrists within 7 years of specialising, while 47% were psychiatry trainees. Following a competitive selection process, 15 psychiatrists undertook exchanges in 2024 across Europe, Africa and Asia, with placements in Croatia, India, Iran, Malaysia, Tunisia, Spain and the United Kingdom. Evaluation data showed consistently positive feedback: 82% strongly endorsed the clarity and ease of the application process, and all participants reported feeling well supported by local coordinators.As psychiatry responds to global demographic change, investment in intercultural competencies and flexible training pathways is essential. The psychiatrist of the future is a global psychiatrist, equipped to deliver care, education, and leadership globally.

With the expulsion of the Central European University (CEU) and the establishment of public trust foundations, the academic world in Hungary has come under pressure unprecedented in the European Union (EU). The measures taken by the Orbán government have been decried as an assault on academic freedom, undermining the fundamental values of the EU. While the European Commission is obligated to uphold European values as per the treaties, its capacity to do so with regard to academic freedom has been underwhelming. In this paper, I argue that the EU is institutionally handicapped in its approach to protecting academic freedom because of, firstly, a lack of competences in the field of higher education and, secondly, an insufficient definition of academic freedom in EU law. By finding innovative ways to link the protection of academic freedom to its competences and by institutionalising an operational definition of academic freedom, the EU could better protect academic freedom and universities in general in its Member States.

Many voters support the inclusion of technocrats in government. Yet we know very little about why technocrats are considered more appealing than traditional party representatives. In particular, it is unclear which advantages and disadvantages voters attach to the defining traits of technocratic ministers: party independence and expertise. We engage with this question drawing on a pre-registered survey experiment in Austria. We examine how manipulating ministers' party affiliation and expertise affects voters' perceptions of their issue competence and bargaining competence. Findings indicate that voters ascribe lower levels of issue competence to partisan ministers than to non-partisan ministers, notwithstanding their actual expertise, and that ministers' partisanship shrinks the positive effect of expertise on perceived issue competence. However, this ‘partisanship penalty’ disappears for supporters of the minister's party. Moreover, voters perceive partisanship as an advantageous trait with regard to a minister's bargaining competence. While voters like technocrats for their expertise and independence from party politics, our findings reveal nuanced perceptions, with voters still recognizing distinct advantages in being represented by party politicians.

This article develops the reward‐punishment issue model of voting using a newly collated aggregate measure of issue competence in Britain between 1971 and 1997, revealing systematic differences between governing and opposition parties in the way citizens' evaluations of party competence are related to vote intention. Using monthly Gallup ‘best party to handle the most important problem’ and vote intention data, time series Granger‐causation tests give support to a classic issue reward‐punishment model for incumbents. However, for opposition parties this reward‐punishment model does not hold: macro‐issue competence evaluations are Granger‐caused by changes in vote choice or governing party competence. An explanation is offered based upon the differentiating role of policy performance and informational asymmetries, and the implications are considered for comparative studies of voting, public opinion and for political party competition.

Using self-determination theory (SDT; Deci and Ryan 1985), we conducted a cross-sectional survey to test the relationship among competence, intrinsic motivation, job satisfaction, and intention to continue volunteering. A total of 180 Special Olympics volunteers from China participated in this study. The results showed that competence positively predicted intrinsic motivation and job satisfaction. Intrinsic motivation was a partial mediator for the relationship between competence and job satisfaction. Job satisfaction positively influenced intention and it acted as a full mediator in the relationship between intrinsic motivation and intention. It was concluded that SDT is a useful theoretical framework in understanding intention to continue volunteering. Theoretical and practical implications are provided.