This chapter discusses the implications of this research for our view of British economic policy in particular and the political economy and historical sociology of economic policymaking in general. A multidimensional approach to economic policymaking reveals heterogeneity and discontinuity in postwar economic policymaking that conventional paradigmatic explanations and epochalist categories overlook.

Winning an occupation is difficult, particularly when victory requires regime change in the conquered nation. The US post-World War II occupation of Germany offers a rare success in this regard. Although it does not provide an easily transportable model for other occupations, it offers several important lessons. The occupation succeeded in Germany (1) in spite of (not because of) planning done prior to the occupation and in spite of (not because of) US foreign policy just after the war; (2) because it functioned as a quasi-independent maker of American foreign policy when it came to occupation policy; (3) because it willingly utilized the expertise of the people it supervised; (4) because it acted unilaterally and opportunistically when necessary; (5) because it got lucky at a critical juncture; and (6) because the occupied Germans themselves ultimately embraced reforms once it became clear these reforms worked as hoped.

In this last substantive chapter, we finally make our proposal for a comprehensive climate policy framework. We discuss why we need to rethink climate policy urgently. Then, we cover the various areas in which climate policy needs to be redesigned, that is, technology policy, informing the public, regulating, reforming financial sector rules and rethinking public finance. We discuss the role of carbon taxes, where it can actually be useful, and finally discuss policy mixes for the zero-carbon transition. Then, we turn to risk management and resilience creation, the critical contribution of this book. We cannot head into a rapid zero-carbon transition with zero resilience; it would not end well. We discuss how to actually get out of a brown economy without a crash. We discuss economic capacity constraints, how to spread risk between stakeholders and how to ensure financial supervision. We discuss how spreading wealth creation equitably is the key to a successful zero-carbon transition.

This chapter examines how the Finnish Social Democratic Party (SDP) came to support the process of financial liberalization, while serving in a coalition government between 1987 and 1991. Financial liberalization is widely perceived as emblematic of a neoliberal turn in reformist politics. The chapter examines how a practical social democracy approach can shed light on the interaction between ideology, practical challenges, and coalitional imperatives that shaped policy-making and led to the SDP’s endorsement of financial liberalisation in Finland. It analyses these reforms in the context of the Finnish political economy and the development of social democratic economic policy. The chapter shows that financial liberalisation was debated extensively within the party and the government. The policy reforms were justified as a solution to key practical challenges, but also as a way for the SDP to promote traditional social democratic objectives. The chapter considers the implications of this case for understanding the embrace of markets by social democratic parties.

Describes Meade’s involvement in economic policy debates during the 1960s.

Chapter 2 discusses how India’s rulers have used state power to promote economic development, both growth and its distribution. While India’s growth record is relatively impressive, it is also the case that this growth has not been accompanied by the creation of well-paying jobs, and economic inequality in India has increased sharply.

During and after the Second World War, the influence of the Bank of England in shaping economic governance remained ambiguous. It did not play a significant role in the formative negotiations at the 1944 Bretton Woods Conference, nor was sterling viewed as the definitive international reserve currency in the decades thereafter. Yet with the repeated threats to the British economy, from two devaluations to the devastating IMF loan, the central bank again turned to experts who could offer new perspectives on monetary policy. Over the course of the twentieth century, the Bank began to employ economists who brought novel macroeconomic models into policy discussions. Although the initial postwar years saw its power remain in a state of uncertainty, the Bank was able to reestablish its reputation as a leading monetary authority from the 1980s onward.

Exploring the economic ramifications of climate change, this chapter features insights from financial experts such as Sara Jane Ahmed, Managing Director and V20 Finance Advisor of the CVF-V20 Secretariat. It discusses the adverse effects on GDP growth, inflation, debt, and credit ratings, particularly in vulnerable economies. The chapter highlights the crucial role of financial markets, insurance, and climate finance in addressing these challenges. Innovative financing solutions such as Green Bonds and pre-arranged and trigger-based financing, including loss and damage finance, are explored as means to build economic resilience. The importance of sustainable economic policies and international cooperation is emphasised, with case studies from countries successfully integrating climate resilience into their economic planning. The chapter calls for increased investment in climate adaptation and mitigation to safeguard economic stability and promote sustainable development.

This chapter highlights how low-level tussles for food replaced large-scale engagements as the main mode of conflict among the Nationalists, CCP, and Japanese. In regions of military contestation, namely guerrilla war zones, civilians participated extensively in two endeavors common to all sides: procurement (acquiring grain) and protection (ensuring that grain did not fall into enemy hands). All three main belligerents attempted to control the flow of grain across ambiguous boundaries through blockades and the rush-transportation and rush-purchase of food. These practices dominated everyday civilian life and were invariably laced with violence. The daily threat of food-related bloodshed forced most ordinary Chinese to go to drastic lengths to survive the protracted three-way struggle. Such grim prospects reveal the limitations of nationalism and collaborationism as explanations for wartime behavior, even though Nationalist and CCP propaganda weaponized the “hanjian” label against each other. The moralization of collaboration and resistance in both scholarly work and popular memory has overshadowed the mundaneness of survival.

With the rise of strategic rivalry and geopolitical competition, governments turned to economic policy to gain influence, power, and resources. The defining feature became the pursuit of national interest, which was invoked to introduce investment screening policies, increase tariffs, prevent cross-border M&A deals, expropriate assets, restrict technology transfer, provide preferential subsidies, and create national champions. To respond effectively, global companies must recognize the systemic changes underway and develop capabilities to address them. Companies need to acknowledge that they will come to be defined by their nationality and innovation is an important battlefield. Government policies to contain the influence of foreign firms from adversarial countries cluster around four levers: market access, level playing field, investment security, and institutional alignment. To actively manage geopolitical tensions, companies need to assess how geopolitics will share their resources, competitive advantage, and firm organization. They need to develop skills to scan the global landscape, personalize the information, plan the response, and pivot if there are headwinds. Impact on employees, who works, how work is performed, and where it takes place need to be evaluated. Managing policymakers becomes a crucial part of managing a global business.

This chapter assesses the accuracy of procedural and bargaining models in predicting the outcomes of the reforms of the economic governance of the European Union that took place between 1997 and 2013. These negotiations addressed thirty-five controversial issues and were characterized by high costs of failure. How best should we understand the outcomes of these negotiations? Which factors best explain bargaining success? The chapter confirms the accuracy and robustness of the compromise model, based on country raw influence and the significance of preference centrality for bargaining success. However, a procedural model with a costly reference point performs well, indicating that misestimation of the no-agreement cost may be a reason for its commonly reported poorer accuracy. Procedural models are, however, more sensitive to measurement errors. The chapter also shows how both models contribute to understanding bargaining success and how the conditional influence of the European Parliament should not be ignored.