Within the aletheistic tradition, Aquinas thinks creation, as a linguistic act, involves the theme of interpersonal manifestation. He is therefore able to overcome the apparent artificiality of Anselm’s linguistic ostension by setting the deferred ostension back into both the structure of created being and the natural longing for happiness.

How is people’s happiness determined by economic factors such as their income? Big data (particularly, behavioural data at scale) are essential to answering this question, but there is disagreement about the strength of evidence for causal relationships that is given by different types of analysis. This chapter reviews the different approaches to analysis that have been taken. First, it is argued that most existing literature both under-claims regarding the evidence for causality given by some types of analysis of big data, such as correlational analyses, and over-claims for other types of analyses, such as those involving panel data. Thus, even correlational data can be informative to the extent that associations are generally rare and that theoretical targets and alternatives are fully specified and given prior probabilities. Second, a new methodological problem is identified for a specific model of the income–rank relationship. According to the income rank hypothesis, people’s well-being is determined not by their income but by the ranked position that their income occupies within a social comparison group. It is shown by simulation that spurious rank effects can occur in regression analyses if there is noise in measured income, but that this problem can be reduced with the use of robust regression techniques. A new analysis of a large dataset, the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, is reported. The results show that income rank effects are not reduced by the use of robust regression techniques, suggesting that previous support for the income rank hypothesis is not due to an artefact.

The character of the State of Nature that humanity sought to escape divided natural philosophers. There was a sharp reaction against the pessimism of Hobbes’s Leviathan and Mandeville’s Fable of the Bees. The end result of a long process was the development of the ethical theory of utilitarianism: ‘it is the greatest happiness of the greatest number that is the measure of right and wrong’ (Bentham). The seed-bed of utilitarianism was the idea of utility; but utility is an empty vessel, with no fixed or clear definition. During the eighteenth century, happiness became its preferred content. The role of Hutcheson was key here: he coined the phrase (in 1725) that became the Benthamite slogan, and pioneered the application of mathematics to moral philosophy. Later thinkers, notably Helvétius, were less optimistic than Hutcheson, arguing that mankind was not by nature benevolent, but self-interested: it was thus incumbent on legislators to raise the sights of the citizenry to embrace the interests of the whole society. In this Beccaria followed the lead of Helvétius.

Drawing from both the medieval Scholastic philosophical-theological tradition and Aristotelian virtue ethics, Thomas Aquinas offers a comprehensive and nuanced account of the virtuous life – one that suggests fruitful relationships not only with contemporary philosophical and theological discussions but also with recent empirical work. In this short chapter, I sketch the big picture using an Aristotelian, four-causes approach. Section 1 mainly addresses the final cause or telos of virtue: ultimately, perfect happiness in eternal life – although a good earthly life affords “a certain participation” in happiness. Section 2 considers virtue’s quasi-material causes: reason and the appetites, including the intellectual appetite or will. Section 3 focuses on the formal causes (modes) of virtue in general and of the cardinal and theological virtues in particular, as well as the relationships between various virtues in the larger structure of Thomistic virtue ethics – including the possibility of a unity of the virtues. And Section 4 discusses proposed efficient causes of such virtues, drawing on the various ways in which virtues are developed and related to each other in the Thomistic picture. Throughout, I consider connections between Aquinas’s account of the virtuous life and contemporary work in ethics, psychology, and education.

Following Allen Wood, Leibniz’s theodicy can be seen as both totalitarian – it claims that divine wisdom informs every single part of creation – and wholesale – it proves this only in general terms. This chapter explores the criteria Leibniz considers to be criteria of goodness and how he argues, in wholesale fashion, for their instantiation. Leibniz’s criteria can be divided into two categories: metaphysical, which concern properties and features of being as such, and anthropocentric, which bear on the morality and happiness of human beings. What unites them is an overarching conception of goodness as rational intelligibility: a maximally good world provides a maximal number of actual opportunities for rational creatures to appreciate its goodness and thereby perfect themselves. Closer attention to Leibniz’s handling of criteria, however, reveals a danger that anthropocentric ultimately dissolve into metaphysical criteria, the practical into the theoretical. As a result, Leibniz’s project is threatened with dialectical contradiction: the existential concerns that govern his theodicy’s underlying motivation cannot be articulated in the theoretical terms of its execution.

The USA has among the highest levels of mental illness of all countries, together with the most treatment. We seek happiness through mechanisms that produce pleasure, most of which are not effective. Those lower down in the hierarchy use more destructive means to gain gratification, thereby becoming worse off. Americans may suffer more pain than people in other rich nations, especially social pain in response to chronic stressors present here. We consume 80% of the world’s opioids Smartphone use, especially among youth, may be harmful for mental health. Evolutionary pressures make us live to reproduce and nurture the progeny until they can have children. Various mental illnesses that don’t impact propagation can manifest, especially in later life, such as anxiety to cope with danger. Mental health is political, like other aspects of health

The United States spends close to half of the world’s healthcare bill, yet this huge industry does not produce good health. Citizens believe the US is the best at almost everything. In the 1950s we were one of the healthiest nations. Now, comparisons show more diseases present in Americans than in the citizens of the other rich nations, even when considering the healthiest subpopulations here. Life expectancy is now declining here, a unique situation for advanced countries. This plight results in almost 800 excess deaths per day that wouldn’t happen in other nations. Well-being mirrors mortality here and has been declining, despite our pursuing happiness with all the advanced technology in our palms. Reasons include our high income inequality and poor social safety net

Chapter 6 gives a survey of ethical themes in Plotinus. It begins with happiness (eudaimonia) as life at its highest degree, the life of intellect of which human soul is capable. The affairs of bodily existence have no part in this life of intellect, which is a perfect, joyful, peaceful state. To reach this state, virtue is required. Two sorts of virtue are distinguished: the ‘political’ virtues and the ‘higher’ (or ‘greater’) virtues, as stages in assimilation to the divine life of transcendent Intellect. The affairs of our bodily life concern us as souls which have a need, a natural ‘appropriation’, to take care of bodily lives, ours and that of others. Action in this bodily existence should be guided by practical wisdom, a wisdom guided by ‘premises’, i.e., norms derived from theoretical wisdom. Finally, I indicate the variety of texts composed by Plotinus’ Platonist successors where ethical themes may be found.