Political scientists are increasingly interested in analyzing visual content at scale. However, the existing computational toolbox is still in need of methods and models attuned to the specific challenges and goals of social and political inquiry. In this article, we introduce a visual structural topic model (vSTM) that combines continuous image embeddings with a structural topic model. This has important advantages compared to existing approaches. First, continuous embeddings allow the model to capture the semantic complexity of images, which is relevant to the study of politics. A consequence of using continuous embeddings is that we can directly use off-the-shelf pretrained deep learning models, offering state-of-the-art performance in image analysis tasks while saving time, cost and resources. Second, the structural topic model provides the ability to analyze how topics and covariates are related, while maintaining a nuanced representation of images as a mixture of multiple topics. In our experiments, we show that the vSTM is able to identify topics that are interpretable, coherent and relevant to the study of online political communication.

Many Western democracies have experienced an increase in the prevalence of parties that have never been in government. Since these so-called challenger parties are not held accountable to the same extent as established parties, there is a concern that they will simply churn out promises and fuel a process of rising political distrust. This paper explores the extent to which this image of overpromising populists is accurate. Instead of expecting more promises from challenger parties, the paper argues that we should find the opposite. Using a novel dataset of over one million content-coded quasi-sentences from election manifestos, the paper empirically demonstrates that challenger parties make substantially fewer election promises than established parties and that this is likely due to their lack of governmental experience. These results have important implications for research on the growing phenomenon of challenger parties and their distinct communication in electoral campaigns.

This study investigates contemporary forms of political representation by analyzing the Facebook communication of 110 political leaders from eight European countries during both national and 2024 European Parliament (EP) election campaigns. Based on constructivist theories of representation, we introduce the concept of ‘representational style’, defined as the specific combination of six communicative elements: policy focus, personalized communication, direct voter connection, appeals to social groups, references to a homogeneous people, and antagonism toward opponents. Using manual content analysis of 7,854 posts, the study identifies three distinct representational styles through inductive cluster analysis: People’s Policy Warriors, Technocratic-Pluralist Heroes, and (Wo)man of the People. The findings reveal substantial variation across political and national contexts. A clear East–West divide emerges with Western European leaders tending to adopt a Technocratic-Pluralist approach, while Central and Eastern European politicians more often represent themselves as responsive figures closely connected to the people.

Considerable attention has been devoted to understanding individual-level factors shaping immigration attitudes. However, we know far less about the top-down influence of political elites on such attitudes. In this review, we synthesise scholarly evidence to examine how elite discourse affects public opinion about immigration. We propose that immigration preferences are best understood through three dimensions of public opinion: attitude extremity (the degree to which individuals support or oppose immigration), attitude importance (the extent to which they consider immigration to be an important issue), and attitude expression (the behavioural manifestation of immigration attitudes). Our review suggests that elite rhetoric has a limited effect on the extremity of immigration attitudes, as these preferences are typically rooted in long-standing belief systems and shaped early in life. Isolating the influence of elites on the importance of immigration as an issue is more complex, as shifts in public concern often coincide with changes in elite discourse and media coverage, all of which are shaped by external events. However, our review indicates that political elites can play a significant role in shaping the expression of immigration attitudes – both at the ballot box and in everyday social interactions. These insights have important implications for identifying pressing research gaps and for understanding the politicisation of immigration in contemporary politics.

We investigate whether large language models (LLMs) threaten democracy through their persuasive capabilities. Using two survey experiments (N = 10,417) and real-world simulations, we compare the cost-effectiveness of LLM chatbots against traditional campaign tactics, taking into account both the “receive” and “accept” steps in the persuasion process. Our design advances prior research by assessing extended human-LLM interactions and measuring short- and long-term effects across three political domains. We find that while LLMs are comparably persuasive to campaign ads once seen, real-world impact depends on both message reception and acceptance. Simulations estimate LLM-based persuasion costs $48–$75 per voter versus $100 for traditional methods. However, traditional methods currently scale more effectively. While LLMs do not yet offer substantially greater potential for large-scale persuasion, this may shift as capabilities improve and techniques for scalable exposure become feasible.

This article will explore the interplay between public opinion and local governance through the lens of state formation in Savoy in the first two years of French rule. Savoy and the county of Nice, formerly Piedmontese provinces, officially became French départements on 14 June 1860. Napoleon III wanted to use state-building in Savoy as a propaganda tool aimed at both internal and external (European) public opinion, to showcase the grandeur of his regime and the benefits of French rule. Following the April plebiscite in Savoy – which established the importance of popular sovereignty in international politics – state formation in Savoy was also characterised by mutual links with public opinion. The new state agents in Savoy attempted to win Savoyards’ ‘hearts and minds’ through a moderate implementation of French laws in the first two years, with scope for flexibility and accommodations. They also ensured – through an active policy of political communication – that the large financial investment of the French state in Savoy was not lost on the Savoyard population. This example therefore provides an interesting lens to study the beginnings of modern local governance, attuned to public opinion and aware of the need to complement public action with political communication.

The use of emotive rhetoric in legislative debates has attracted increasing scholarly attention in political science research. Building on recent scholarship, I examine the conditions under which emotive rhetoric dominates legislative speeches in the UK House of Commons between 2001 and 2015. By coding nearly half a million legislative speeches according to Ekman's six basic emotions – anger, disgust, fear, joy, sadness and surprise – I argue that members of parliament (MPs) strategically use emotions in their speeches to maximize their influence and visibility. The findings reveal modest but discernible effects related to electoral safety, seniority and party status. Specifically, the results show that speeches by electorally vulnerable, junior and opposition MPs contain higher levels of emotive language compared to those by other MPs. Notably, despite considerable similarity in the correlates of individual emotion categories, there are also significant differences. For example, opposition MPs and electorally vulnerable MPs rely more heavily on negative emotions such as anger, disgust, fear and sadness than government MPs and electorally safer MPs. While junior MPs use fear, sadness and surprise at higher rates compared to their senior counterparts, they are statistically indistinguishable from senior MPs in their use of anger, disgust and joy. Overall, these results underscore the need for greater scholarly attention to the communication styles of representatives in legislatures and emphasize the importance of examining the nuanced strategies behind the use of different types of emotions.

What makes some challenger parties succeed and others fail? Existing research on party‐level factors finds that it is essential for parties to close a representational gap. However, this condition cannot be sufficient. For each successful challenger, there are many others proclaiming a similar message but going unheard. Hence, we argue that, instead of only to the messages, more attention should be paid to parties’ abilities to communicate their messages effectively.

Using an original dataset on 74 challenger parties in five countries in a similar political and economic situation (during the post‐2008 economic crisis), we show that communication is key for electoral success. In particular, we show that challenger parties can win over voters by, on the one hand, harnessing the prominence of a well‐known personality (a locomotive) and by, on the other hand, establishing a means of contacting voters which bypasses the traditional news media and amplifies their message (like a megaphone). But this megaphone only works if it amplifies a message that fills a representational gap (here: an anti‐austerity message) – only then do parties benefit. Furthermore, we provide evidence for the widespread but unproven claim that populism helps challenger parties succeed, but this, too, depends on whether parties are able to contact voters on a large scale.

By including three crucial aspects of communication (sender, channel, and message), we can explain a large share of the high variability in challenger party success.

Can communicative interventions by the government influence political trust and increase public compliance during crises? This study examines the impact of a televised speech by German Chancellor Angela Merkel at the onset of the COVID‐19 pandemic. Using an unexpected‐events‐during‐survey‐design, we find that the speech led to a 7‐percentage point increase in trust in the federal government and up to a 25‐percentage point decrease in citizens' mobility. We also observe demographic variation in susceptibility to speech. We explore the underlying mechanisms by comparing Merkel's speech with similar televised addresses by Mark Rutte and Boris Johnson, where we observe no comparable effects on attitudes. We suggest that specific content, such as an emphasis on solidarity and positive sentiment, may have played a role in mobilizing public support. Our findings indicate that effective leader communication can be a powerful tool for sustaining public support and ensuring compliance with crisis measures.

This article provides the contextual background to the symposium on Populist Discourses and Political Communication in Southern Europe. It explains the symposium’s objectives and introduces the rationale of its articles on Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain. Within this context, the editors also highlight the specific conditions for the emergence of typical forms of Southern European populism, as well as its distinctive features, focusing on the challenges populism poses to politics and media research. The implications of the phenomenon for the future of the European project are also addressed.

The aim of this article is questioning the commonly held assumption that Problem-Based Learning (PBL) is necessarily good for students. Drawing on the experience of teaching a postgraduate module about terrorism and the media as a case study, it shows that PBL can definitely benefit the Political Communication curriculum. However, this is only part of the story. PBL, in fact, appears to have an ‘amplifier’ effect on the learning outcomes of a module: the achievement of outstanding results for those who are committed to the coursework; lower achievement than would have been gained through more ‘traditional’ learning methods for those who do not fully engage with it. As the case study suggests, students’ individual expectations and previous experiences of coursework, although currently overlooked, appear to make all the difference within the learning process.

Social media have changed the way politicians communicate with and relate to their constituencies during election campaigns and routine periods alike. Many scholars have postulated that populists would benefit most from the new digital media. Despite their growing importance, few studies have addressed the features of online populist communication and how to assess its success. The purpose of this article is to fill this gap by providing a framework for the analysis of populist communication on social media. Taking the case of Italy’s Lega Nord (Northern League (LN)) as an example, the article will clarify which aspects of online communication are most valued by LN supporters, in relation to both the key elements of populism (references to ‘the people’, ‘elites’ and ‘others’) and the expression of an emotional style in the messages. The article analyses the controlled communication that LN and its leader, Matteo Salvini, published on their Facebook profiles during a sample period of 30 days. Our findings demonstrate that populism, emotional style and, in general, the role of the leader as a source of communication positively affect the ‘likeability’ of a message.

The symposium is motivated by the question of how the war in Ukraine is ‘framed’ and ‘narrated’ in media outside the West. It aims to shed light on the diverse ways in which information is manipulated and disseminated to serve political interests. The emphasis on developing an interdisciplinary conceptual prism is particularly noteworthy. Integrating insights from International Relations, Geopolitics, and Media and Communication studies offers a holistic understanding of the complex dynamics at play. Moreover, by highlighting the influence of foreign propaganda and disinformation campaigns, the symposium underscores the importance of critically analysing media representations in shaping public perceptions and potentially influencing foreign policies. Understanding these dynamics is crucial for mitigating the impact of misinformation and fostering informed public discourse on global conflicts. The symposium promises to contribute significantly to the scholarly understanding of the nexus between conflict and communication, while also offering valuable insights for policymakers and media practitioners alike.

Portuguese politics and mainstream media have been resistant to the recent spread of populism. This article examines the specific features of Portuguese politics and media that might explain the apparent exception, and puts it to test by analysing the prevalence of populist discourses and styles of communication in different types of online media. The sample is composed of mediated and unmediated messages on immigration and corruption, two issues that are commonly present in populist discourses by both right- and left-wing political actors. Overall, the content analysis shows that although populist discourses are not recurrent in politics and media, social media have amplified the visibility of this kind of discourses in Portugal.

Social media are the great social leveler – or so some commentators would have us believe. Social media put the power of communication directly into the average person’s hands. They also present opportunities for politicians to improve their contacts with the common person – to directly share their messages with and better understand the concerns of constituents. This study explores whether and to what extent the potential for such citizen–politician engagement is fulfilled. Deploying an original dataset of tweets from politicians in the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States, this exploratory study examines the interlocutors with whom politicians engage reciprocally via Twitter. The results show that a large share of politicians’ genuinely reciprocal exchanges includes average citizens. Although there is much room for improvement, this study suggests that Twitter is indeed opening spaces for citizens and policymakers to engage one another on matters of political import.

Previous research suggests the effects of negative campaigning are highly conditional on country context and the specific messages that are used. In this paper, we present an experiment on negative campaigning in an unexamined context in which existing studies could point to differing outcomes. We examine the effect of attacks placed in campaign leaflets on a candidate’s personal traits and policy positions in Great Britain. Unlike prior studies, our treatments are contrast ads and not purely negative ads. While the inclusion of positive messaging from the sponsor could increase voters’ parasocial relationship with the candidate, shielding them from backlash, the results from our experiment suggest that British voters view attacks on personal traits as too negative and lower their evaluation of the sponsor as a result.

Can American state legislators use social media to influence the political behaviors and attitudes of the public by crafting strategic messages? While elected officials from every level of government use social media, it is not clear how the public responds to their individual posts. I argue that the rhetorical strategies employed by legislators can have a direct impact on their online constituencies, moderated by the existence of a copartisan relationship. I test my argument using a simulated social media environment embedded within a traditional survey experiment to mimic the impact of real-life social media posts. I find that legislators’ social media posts influence their approval ratings, and at times, the public’s trust in government. However, I do not find evidence that small numbers of social media posts affect a willingness to participate in politics.

A successful energy transition requires the reallocation of private capital away from fossil fuel assets to greener alternatives. This transition is typically hindered by investors’ focus on today’s returns. In times of crisis, however, credible and unambiguous political signals about the future profitability of green industries can steer investments toward low-carbon assets. Drawing on European Union interventions during the onset of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, we present an event study of daily stock market returns following the most salient policy announcements by the European Commission in 2022. Our analysis shows that markets for shares of EU-based energy firms were initially prepared to move capital to cleaner companies, suggesting support for the clean energy transition. However, the short-lived distributional effects materialized only for announcements that could unmistakably be understood as unwavering commitments to the EU’s green renewal, while more ambiguous announcements did not have the same distributional implications. Our findings emphasize that repeated and unambiguous political signals during crisis episodes can create favorable market conditions, at least in the short term, to support capital reallocation toward greener stocks.