Why are some countries wealthier than others, despite shared histories and limited resource endowments? This paper examines the economic divergence between Guinea-Bissau and Cabo Verde, two former Portuguese colonies that initially shared colonial administration and political vision through interconnected elites. Both countries were governed by the African Party for the Independence of Guinea-Bissau and Cabo Verde (PAIGC) until their political separation in 1980. Despite its comparatively rich natural resources, Guinea-Bissau remains mired in chronic political instability and underdevelopment. Cabo Verde, despite its geographical constraints and resource scarcity, has achieved remarkable stability and sustained economic development. Drawing on institutional theory and actor-centric approaches, this paper argues that post-independence governance choices and elite behaviour are the decisive factors shaping their divergent trajectories. We highlight, first, the role of institutional quality in determining economic and political outcomes, and second, the centrality of elite agency – through strategies of cooperation, competition and rent-seeking – in driving institutional divergence. Geography and natural resources alone do not determine development outcomes, nor is the colonial legacy deterministic; rather, strategic governance and institutional effectiveness are the key differentiating factors. These findings deepen our understanding of post-colonial development in sub-Saharan Africa and offer actionable insights for policy design in similarly situated small states.

This article argues that the shared prison cell is the central arena of carceral existence in Cameroon, where survival is compressed into endurance and proximity becomes a structuring force shaping dignity, power and relational life. Based on five years of incarceration in Kondengui Principale Prison and over one hundred formal and informal interviews with inmates, visitors and administrators, it develops a series of tightly observed case studies to show how intimacy, violence, moral ambiguity and informal governance are negotiated under conditions of extreme congestion. Beyond its empirical contribution, the article advances an analytical argument: that the shared cell offers a critical lens into broader social dynamics, where scarcity, relationality and uncertainty produce forms of coexistence that are simultaneously solidaristic and dangerous.

Previous scholarship demonstrated that anticipation of future natural resource revenues can lead to negative macro-economic, political and social effects – including societal conflicts – even before resource extraction takes place – a phenomenon labelled ‘the presource curse’. By investigating the impact of the presource curse in relation to boundary disputes between African states, this is the first study that specifically examines the impact of the presource curse on international relations. Our evidence suggests that the anticipation of future oil and gas revenues played a very important role in the evolution of international boundary disputes in Africa, particularly maritime boundary disputes. At the same time, this study points to the increased likelihood of peaceful resolutions of such disputes.

How do traditional authorities with limited resources endure in modern Africa? This article explores the case of the Bunyoro Kitara Kingdom (BKK) in western Uganda, one of Africa’s oldest kingdoms, and how the BKK navigates constraints that limit its access to state-controlled resources. Based on 52 interviews and 4 focus group discussions conducted between 2017 and 2021, this study argues that, rather than relying on pre-existing legitimacy, the BKK seeks to construct legitimacy by cultivating public loyalty and popular support grounded in shared historical memory and collective aspirations. In the context of economic transformation driven by oil development, the BKK draws on narratives of colonial injustice and appeals to future opportunities to overcome its structural fragility and foster solidarity. This mobilisation of popular resources serves as a crucial tool to negotiate the kingdom’s position in national politics and claim a stake in extraction benefits, even in the absence of formal power or territorial control.

This article explores the strategies of politicians from the pastoralist Samburu of northern Kenya since the country’s 2013 devolution – a reform ostensibly designed to remedy Kenya’s corrosive and often violent elite politics. Drawing on ethnographic data gathered between 2021 and 2025, I argue that devolution has rendered the political arena in north-central Kenya more diffuse, convoluted and contested. Ahead of elections, shifting coalitions of actors – cutting across the political structures and scales created by devolution – deploy the material rewards of government to intervene in Samburu beliefs around cattle prestige, gerontocratic norms and spiritual life. They do so to assert political influence, mobilise violence against rival groups, and win local elections. Rather than resolving Kenya’s elite problems, devolution has thus refracted them through new structures, producing distinctive patterns of power and violence across the northern pastoralist landscape.

Despite increases in the military capabilities of Sahelian jihadists over the last decade, similarities and differences between the fighting styles of groups with common transnational jihadist affiliations remain underexplored. This article compares the activities of the two Islamic State (IS)-affiliated groups in the wider Sahel: the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) and the Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP). Despite a common affiliation, these groups operate in different local contexts, over a thousand kilometres apart. Similarities and differences in their military approaches can thus help us understand the respective impact of local and transnational dynamics on jihadist behaviour. Drawing on qualitative fieldwork and quantitative/geospatial analysis, this article explores this issue through analysis of strategic goals, command and control, military hybridisation, tactics/attack profiles and spatial variations. While their activities are by no means uniform, we find a growing convergence between these groups over time driven by a mix of IS influence and local dynamics.

How ruling parties in competitive authoritarian regimes adapt their strategies to sustain power while evading accountability remains central to scholarly inquiry. Yet, little attention has been paid to the role of quasi-state actors in electoral manipulation or how citizens respond. Drawing on fieldwork in Gutu District, this study examines Forever Associates Zimbabwe (FAZ), a Government-Organised Non-Governmental Organisation (GONGO) aligned with the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) and the Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO). FAZ operated as a parallel intelligence structure, deploying covert tactics including unauthorised data collection, surveillance at voters’ roll inspection centres, opposition infiltration and illegal ‘exit polls’. Citizens responded variably; some complied, and others utilised quiet resistance, avoidance or moral denunciation. We argue that FAZ represents an authoritarian innovation that enabled repression while offering ruling elites plausible deniability. Contributing to debates on GONGOs and regime survival, this study shows how such actors entrench dominance and undermine democratic consolidation in Africa.