This study examines how WTO members have engaged in Ministerial Conferences from 1996 to 2024 by analyzing over 1,500 formal ministerial statements. Despite being the most public and standardized form of participation in WTO deliberations, these statements have rarely been analyzed systematically. By treating them as indicators of institutional engagement, the study traces long-term patterns in the frequency, intensity, and content of member participation. The analysis confirms some established expectations – such as the tendency of economically larger members to participate more actively – but also uncovers less visible dynamics. Engagement levels shifted significantly around key institutional moments, notably the rise and suspension of the Doha Development Agenda, and evolved unevenly between developed and developing members. Methodologically, the study demonstrates how computational text analysis can extract meaningful patterns from formal international discourse. Using metadata and text-based measures, it shows how member statements can offer insight into negotiation alignments and institutional vitality. These findings complement existing accounts of WTO behavior and suggest new directions for understanding participation and representation in multilateral trade governance.

The obligation of stability generally requires host States to maintain a relatively stable regulatory framework to mitigate political risks facing foreign investments. It has played a significant role in international investment tribunals’ review of host States’ renewable energy transition policies. This paper critically reviews tribunals’ interpretation of the obligation with a particular focus on the Spanish cases involving renewable energy incentive schemes. It canvasses the two ‘dimensions’ adopted by investment tribunals in the interpretation of stability, namely the protection of legitimate expectations and States’ right to regulate for public purposes. Examining the contents of the two dimensions separately, this paper argues that legal stability should be disentangled from the notion of legitimate expectations and be assessed through the reasonableness of regulatory changes per se. It further argues that an intrusive interpretation of legal stability lacks legal and institutional bases; instead, more deferential standards should be adopted in the review of renewable energy transition policies.

On 11 September 2024, I completed 30 years at the World Trade Organisation (WTO). In fact, the WTO was not formally established until 1 January 1995, a few months after I joined the Secretariat. I was lucky enough to be involved in the ‘Prep Com’, the series of works of the Preparatory Committee to the WTO. During that period, the Legal Affairs Division (LAD) was engaged in more than their main function of assisting GATT Panels. Roessler's contribution during that pivotal transition from the GATT to the WTO played a fundamental role in shaping the current architecture of global trade governance. As will be discussed further as we progress, Roessler designed the transition of the GATT and Tokyo Round Codes, and their continuation as an integral part of the WTO. Roessler's mark on the WTO was thus reflected in many areas. Before discussing the amazing architecture of this transition from GATT to WTO, I would like to add a few words on one of Roessler's most enduring contributions to the WTO – his contribution to the dispute settlement mechanism. Frieder's role in the very foundation and birth of the GATT dispute settlement system still stands today.

Early signs suggest that Trump may revise the Biden administration's incentive-driven semiconductor policy and instead rely more heavily on tariffs to restore US semiconductor manufacturing. To what extent can semiconductor tariffs serve as a form of policy whiplash to compel foreign companies to relocate their operations? This article argues that while tariffs can influence investment decisions, Trump overstates their effects on fab locations and supply chain diversification. Semiconductor manufacturers weigh a complex set of factors encompassing partners in the supply chain ecosystem, potential regulatory scrutiny, technological trends, and more. Tariffs in and of themselves may not be a determinative factor behind TSMC's recently announced plan to expand its US investment.

In the face of ongoing disruptions to the multilateral trade regime, from deadlock at the WTO to the rise in unilateralism, this contribution examines the role that free trade agreements (FTAs) can play in supporting the adoption of common standards for sustainable development. It does this in three moves: first, it reframes the role of FTAs from sources of obligation and mechanisms of compliance to sites of economic diplomacy where governments can shape international standards through FTA structures; second, it unpacks the relationship between regulation and standards through three case studies (dolphin-safe labelling, automotive standards, and nutrient profiling), identifying means through which FTAs can be leveraged by trade policy actors; third, it draws on these lessons to examine how FTAs can support the uptake of key new standards and quasi-standards for sustainability, in this case, the ISO Net Zero Guidelines. Finally, this contribution reflects on the implications of reappraising the development of world trade law as part of the practice of economic diplomacy.

One of the objectives of the Trump administration’s economic policy is to revitalize the American industrial fabric and create a large number of high-paying blue-collar jobs. However, the main instrument used to achieve this goal – tariff protection – is a point of contention. We discuss the relevance of the recently introduced policy for an emblematic sector: the automotive industry. The latter operates highly integrated production chains where intermediate products frequently cross borders to circulate within a ‘Big Factory’ encompassing production sites located mainly in Mexico, Canada, and the USA, but also in other countries. The imposition of a 25% tariff on finished cars and their parts could lead to significant disruptions for consumers and producers alike. The lessons learned from the automotive sector retain much of their relevance for other areas of the US economy.

In the absence of a nationwide adequate solution, the lot of displaced workers could be improved through place-based workforce transition programmes limited to disadvantaged areas. Industrial policy measures targeting disadvantaged communities and regions could also be envisaged. In this case, however, it would be necessary to deploy a variety of instruments adapted to the circumstances and to take into account, as far as possible, the interests of trading partners in order to avoid conflicts.

As counsellor in the GATT Office of Legal Affairs (1983–1989), director of the GATT and WTO Legal Divisions (1989–1995), and first executive director of the Advisory Center for WTO Law (2001–2015), Frieder Rössler (1939–2024) is widely recognized as having contributed to the design and successful operation of the WTO dispute settlement system. This tribute focuses on Rössler's academic contributions to what has been described as ‘Geneva ordoliberalism’. Section 1 briefly recalls the long-standing initiatives by ‘Geneva ordoliberals’ – since William Rappard's founding of the Geneva Graduate Institute of International Studies (Institut de Hautes Etudes Internationales: IHEI) in 1927 – for promoting rules-based, multilateral trading systems based on close cooperation among the worldwide institutions at Geneva. Section 2 describes some of the legal, economic, and political justifications by GATT officials (such as GATT Director-General Arthur Dunkel, Rössler, and GATT's former chief economist Jan Tumlir) for ‘ordoliberal’ (rather than ‘neoliberal’) conceptions of multilateral trade systems limiting ‘governance failures’. Section 3 concludes that the efforts of former WTO Director-General Pascal Lamy at promoting a ‘Geneva consensus’ for an inclusive ‘multilateral trading system beneficial for all’ – and the current WTO initiatives for the digital and green transformation of the ‘brown economy’ (driven by fossil fuels) into a ‘green economy’ (driven by renewable energies) – have failed to overcome the geopolitical divides between European ordoliberalism, Anglo-Saxon neoliberalism, and authoritarian state capitalism. Authoritarian power politics, ‘securitization’ of economies, and national protectionism disrupt the UN and WTO legal, political, and economic systems in ways Rössler's ‘public choice’ methodology had predicted. Without effective UN and WTO legal constraints, ‘governance failures’ and ‘constitutional failures’ tend to increase; they undermine an ordoliberal ‘Geneva consensus’ on protecting human rights and sustainable development.

The urgency to tackle climate change has placed sustainable development at the centre of recent trade related debates. An emerging consensus is that trade should be considered and can be used as means to achieve sustainable development goals. As the circumstances are changing, one issue to be addressed is how to adjust trade negotiations which used to be the main approach to pursuing market opening and liberalization with the support of the theory of comparative advantage. In this context, this paper examines trade negotiations on environmental services by focusing on developing countries' participation. Environmental services and related trade play a critical role in achieving environmental and sustainable development goals. Nevertheless, developing countries' participation in environmental services trade negotiations has been limited. By analysing the reasons behind such limited participation and assessing some new approaches, this paper attempts to explore how environmental services trade negotiations could be adapted to better engage developing countries and serve Sustainable Development Goals.

The resilience of international supply chains is increasingly becoming a policy objective within international trade law making. Unilaterally, States have resorted to a myriad of trade tools to achieve this objective, including subsidizing domestic industries, facilitating critical minerals, and imposing tariffs on dominant supplying States to encourage supply diversification. In this context, the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity Supply Chain Agreement is the first major international trade agreement primarily aimed at achieving regional supply chain resilience. This Research Note explores the WTO compatibility of the economic interventions that underpin the Supply Chain Agreement’s ‘managed trade’ approach to supply chain resilience. First, it outlines the firm-centred governance approach that is central to supply chain management under the Supply Chain Agreement. Second, it explores the likely challenges and justifications of the envisaged interventions under GATT 1994 and Agreement on Safeguards. Finally, it reflects on the potential role of the WTO to shape cooperative supply chain governance interventions.

The exercise of environmental ‘leverage’ via trade-related measures and trade in environmental goods offers opportunities to tackle the climate crisis and advance transnational decarbonization. Inward-looking, adversarial, and short-term national security-centred approaches, however, are disrupting the trade and climate change mitigation linkage. This article employs the race for critical raw materials and US and EU strategies to promote the net-zero transition at the domestic level as case studies to illustrate the environmental pitfalls of the ‘securitization’ of the trade and climate change mitigation nexus. The article demonstrates that the pursuit of strategic dominance in key net-zero sectors, attempts to exclude systemic rivals and reshore supply chains, opportunistic forms of friendshoring and loose agreement on regulatory means jeopardize recourse to environmental ‘leverage’ and undermine decarbonization at both national and transnational levels. This analysis casts a light on the inherent tension between national security and climate change mitigation. Taking stock of these findings, the article advocates a radically different approach to the governance of the trade and climate change mitigation nexus.

‘U-huh’. This is what I recall being Frieder's routine reaction whenever he was exposed to an argument. He rejected nothing, but at the same time he agreed to nothing right away. He needed his time to process, and would reach his conclusions only at a later stage. He applied this standard to his own, spontaneous thinking which might have sounded entirely convincing to me when we were working together, but not to him. ‘Let us think this issue through’ – a literal translation of the German‘durchdenken’ – he would say to me when we on occasion spoke together.

The informal exit of the United States from the WTO under Trump is the culmination of US frustration with the organization's legislative and judicial rigidity, a frustration that has been building on a bipartisan basis for two decades. The WTO's commitment to a single undertaking, its reliance on consensus-based decision making, and an activist Appellate Body that imposed de facto stare decisis eroded political support for WTO rules in the United States and opened the door for political opportunists to cast them aside. We argue that the original GATT was, on balance, a more flexible and politically savvy bargain despite its imperfections. The 30-year history of the WTO that replaced it suggests the folly of trying to rein in powerful countries with a ‘rules-based’ institution, at least when the rules are unable to adjust to political shocks.

‘De-risking’ is the latest buzzword in the China strategy of the United States and its allies. It means limiting dependence on and engagement with China in select strategic sectors. One of such sectors concerns critical minerals (CMs) which are essential for the ongoing green economic transition. To secure access to CMs and reduce reliance on China, the US and its allies have been developing networks for ally-shoring supply chains. A major problem with the ‘de-risking’ strategy in this regard is that it treats China as the risk and hence excludes China from the discussions and collaboration on global supply chain issues. In this paper, we argue that this strategy fails to consider China's strategies and policies regarding CMs. We therefore offer a detailed analysis of China's policies which shows that they have been primarily aimed at addressing internal challenges and policy priorities in China rather than dominating, weaponizing, or causing disruptions in global supply chains. To address supply chain risks most effectively, international collaborative frameworks should engage with, rather than exclude, China. Confrontational strategies with ‘China being the risk’ at the core might themselves be a risk by undermining rational policymaking and leading to disruptive policies.

Frieder Roessler devoted his professional career to international law and inter-governmental cooperation in international trade. He believed in cooperation, economic integration, and the international rule of law, as objectives for the promotion of world peace, justice, and prosperity. In the GATT Secretariat, he contributed importantly to improving the legal quality of GATT dispute settlement decisions and to strengthening the rule of law in the multilateral trading system. After 1995, he focused on international trade law being upheld towards and by developing countries. Frieder Roessler was an international civil servant who defended the highest standards of independence, impartiality, and integrity. His legacy is a deep understanding of GATT and WTO law, which he disseminated through his scholarship, and the quality and rigour of his lawyering. Frieder Roessler was a kind, approachable, warm person, committed, passionate, and faithful to his convictions. He generously shared his wisdom as interlocutor in stimulating legal discussions. All international trade lawyers can continue to learn enormously from him and his experiences.

President Trump’s tariff policies have increased the prices of a wide range of internationally traded goods entering the United States. Contrary to assertions made by the Trump administration, it is very largely the importing country – that is, the United States – that pays the tariffs. The policy has been erratic and subject to frequent changes, adding to uncertainty, as well as reduced trade and risks of increased inflation and macroeconomic instability more generally. The paper examines the impact of the United States’ new trade policy on the WTO, but notes that a series of intractable policy challenges, pre-dating the Trump tariff assault, have plagued the organization for some years. In this context, we identify a loss of negotiating capacity, a growing tendency to rely on preferential trade agreements rather than the WTO to define market access conditions among nations, decision-making stasis, a substantially failed dispute settlement system, and continuing discord among WTO members on the question of entitlement of certain countries to special and differential treatment in response to developmental imperatives. In sum, the destructive consequences of the Trump tariffs and some of the responses to them have further eroded the effectiveness of the WTO, which is already facing significant challenges and is beset by widespread non-compliance. There is an urgent need for governments to come together and reform the WTO if they wish to sustain and benefit from multilateral trade cooperation.