This paper examines how procurement rules affect international trade, leveraging a novel dataset that characterizes national laws across 142 countries. Analysis of national laws on government procurement identifies prevalent protectionist measures such as preferential treatment for domestic bidders and mandatory domestic sourcing. A descriptive analysis reveals that 124 countries incorporate preferential treatment provisions, highlighting the widespread nature of protectionism. The prevalence of procurement policies, characterized as protectionist, negatively correlates with trade openness across countries, in both public and private markets. This protectionist effect is confirmed in gravity regressions. Countries with more protectionist procurement laws are found to buy more from domestic suppliers than from abroad. Industry-level estimates suggest that such effects are stronger for goods than for services.

As illustrated by the proposed EU Industrial Accelerator Act, concerns over clean technology dependencies are prompting importers to adopt trade-restrictive localization measures. States justify these measures by invoking the threat of weaponization of supplies, a phenomenon theorized in the energy statecraft literature. This article examines whether weaponization concerns, associated with strategic dependencies, can be accommodated under the GATT general exceptions. In order to understand the constraints that the GATT imposes on states’ responses to alleged weaponization risks, it analyses WTO decisions on ‘short supply’ and the recent US–Inflation Reduction Act Panel Report regarding ‘public morals’ based on the energy statecraft theory. It finds that general dependency offers little relief unless importers can demonstrate the unreliability of transnational supply chains, while diversification towards trusted partners may better align with public morals than localization. These constraints do not represent a failure of WTO law – given the threat that protectionism poses to accelerated decarbonization, WTO safeguards are necessary to ensure that clean industrial policies do not slow down the energy transition.

This article examines how Singapore manages US pressure over semiconductor diversion without adopting US extraterritorial export-control logic. Taking AI-server diversion cases as its starting point, it contrasts a US regime that follows controlled items, end users, affiliates, and computing access across borders with Singapore’s territorial, list-based framework, anchored in the multilateral non-proliferation baseline beyond which US controls have moved. It introduces the concept of ‘hub economies’. Unlike chokepoint economies, which are asked to restrict what they produce, hub economies are asked to police what they host, handle, and route. Alignment turns on political judgment, not legal capacity. The article argues that Singapore regards the costs to its strategic autonomy and hub standing as too high. It preserves ‘doctrinal independence’ by retaining multilateral categories, and practices ‘doctrinal substitution’ by reaching diversion through general criminal law and, potentially, cybercrime law. Transactions through Singapore are constrained not by the regulatory divergence but by extraterritorial US controls, licence conditions, and anticipatory firm compliance. Whether this balance holds remains open: remote-access controls, proposed legislation concerning chip traceability and corporate affiliation, and Pax Silica may narrow the space for non-alignment. The findings illuminate how States manage asymmetric extraterritorial pressure without converting it into domestic legal obligation.

Over recent decades, international trade has expanded significantly, increasing economic integration but also amplifying systemic vulnerabilities. Recent global shocks, such as the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russia–Ukraine conflict, have exposed the fragility of international trade systems, underscoring the need for analytical tools to enable timely, evidence-based trade policy. This paper introduces TERRA, an analytical framework created by the Italian National Institute of Statistics to support the monitoring and analysis of European trade patterns using official statistics. Using high-frequency Eurostat COMEXT data, TERRA integrates network-based representations and time series indicators to identify structural vulnerabilities, emerging concentrations, and changes in countries’ roles within trade networks. Beyond interactive monitoring, the framework supports advanced analytical extensions, including programmatic longitudinal analyses and model-based counterfactual analyses, designed to explore trade reallocation mechanisms under stylized supply shocks. The analytical potential of TERRA is shown through two case studies: electricity trade during the COVID-19 pandemic and weapons and ammunition trade during the Russia–Ukraine conflict. The findings demonstrate how network-based monitoring tools, grounded in official statistics, can effectively interpret complex trade dynamics and support evidence-based trade governance.

Provisions prohibiting the mandatory disclosure of source code and algorithms as a condition for market access in digital trade rulemaking aim to prevent forced technology transfer and safeguard confidential business information. However, their proliferation raises significant concerns regarding the state’s capacity to regulate digital technologies, including artificial intelligence. This Article argues that their rapid diffusion signals a regime shift in the international protection of software and algorithms, from intellectual property (IP) law to digital trade law. Under the TRIPS framework, trade secrets primarily protect undisclosed confidential information, such as source code and algorithms, and offer limited protection at the point of market entry. Source code provisions in digital trade function as an ex-ante layer of protection that operates independently of, yet cumulatively with, existing IP rights. Because digital trade law lacks the internal balancing mechanisms characteristic of the IP regime, regulatory space is mediated principally through the design of exceptions and carve-outs. By situating these provisions against this background, this Article reframes current debates from regulatory chill to the governance consequences of this regime shift and contends that the design of source code exceptions and carve-outs is now the primary mechanism for balancing proprietary protection against legitimate public policy disclosure.

This study investigates how institutional interactions shape bilateral trade dynamics within the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), focusing on product-level trade composition, diversification, and the role of governance. Despite regional integration efforts, ECOWAS has seen limited export diversification and modest intra-regional growth in trade. Using a gravity model and detailed bilateral trade data, the study examines how the combined governance quality of trading partners influences trade flows, extensive margins (products per partner, and partners per product), and intensive margins (trade volumes, values, and average value per product per partner). The analysis highlights governance complementarities as key drivers of trade structure within the region. Results show that regulatory quality between trading partners is associated with greater product concentration, while complementarities in political stability support broader geographic market reach across trading partners. Reciprocity effects are also observed in the case of political institutions, suggesting that governance alignment reinforces trade ties. Voice and accountability displays a complementarity effect on the average value per product per partner, deepening bilateral trade relationships. These findings highlight the importance of understanding governance and institutions coordination and the interplay in enhancing intra-ECOWAS trade integration and carry broader implications for regional efforts such as the African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA).

Governments increasingly view data as a strategic asset, providing curated datasets and computing resources to domestic firms as part of national industrial development. This shift raises a fundamental question: can the World Trade Organization’s Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement), which was negotiated for tangible goods in a pre-digital era, accommodate state provision of data and computational capacity as subsidies in the twenty-first-century economy? This paper examines that question, not to argue for a definitive answer but to map the doctrinal pathway and identify key analytical steps, evidentiary requirements, and practical constraints. Rather than focusing narrowly on artificial intelligence, this analysis situates data provision within broader debates about WTO law’s technological neutrality, the evolving purpose of subsidy rules, and the resurgence of digital industrial policy. By tracing the function of data as a critical production input and analyzing specific state initiatives, this paper identifies key considerations for policymakers and adjudicators assessing the alignment of data infrastructure measures with SCM disciplines. The analysis reveals both the analytic promise of existing legal frameworks and their significant practical limitations.

This article examines the interpretative divergence in China – Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, the first WTO dispute to address whether TRIPS obligations contain an implicit territorial limitation. The Panel adopted a strict territorial reading of Article 1.1, holding that TRIPS disciplines apply only to the implementation of minimum standards within a Member’s domestic legal system, and do not extend to measures where the effects are felt abroad. The Multi-Party Interim Appeal Arbitration Arrangement (MPIA) arbitrators reversed this approach, introducing a functional, effects-sensitive interpretation under which Members must implement TRIPS in a manner that does not frustrate the enforcement of intellectual property rights in other jurisdictions. The article argues that the Tribunal’s expanded interpretation is inconsistent with the text, structure, object and purpose, and negotiating history of the TRIPS Agreement. A close reading of Article 1.1 demonstrates that ‘give effect to’ refers to domestic legal operability rather than cross-border consequences. The systemic design of TRIPS, establishing a minimum-standards regime primarily concerned with the domestic implementation of intellectual property protection, further confirms that it does not impose transnational enforcement obligations. The article situates the WTO dispute, China – Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights within broader debates on the multilateral governance of intellectual property. While acknowledging that cross-border spillovers are increasingly common in global standard-essential patent (SEP) litigation, it maintains that such challenges are better addressed through institutional cooperation and private ordering than through judicial expansion of treaty obligations. The analysis clarifies the limits of WTO adjudication in the intellectual property (IP) domain and reaffirms territoriality as a foundational principle of the TRIPS regime.

What factors shape public opinion toward international law? Current research suggests that citizens respond strongly to negative cues, but have found limited effects for information about the potential benefits. We theorize that cues about the reciprocity of international law – that the parties face mutually enforceable obligations – can increase support. We evaluate our theory with a survey experiment in the United States (US) examining views towards Investor State Dispute Settlement (ISDS), a frequently used but controversial dispute settlement mechanism in international investment law. Two findings stand out. First, consistent with previous research, the public is more supportive of international law if their country is the initiator rather than the target of a dispute. Second, when their country is the target, information about the use of ISDS by US firms, which we refer to as specific reciprocity, appears to increase support. More diffuse cues of reciprocity, however, do not affect support. Overall, our findings provide evidence that specific reciprocity cues can increase support for international law even when one’s country faces potential costs.

This article explores the global regulatory landscape for subsidies and countervailing measures, assessing its capacity to address challenges like climate change. While subsidies can effectively correct market failures and support public welfare, they also risk creating trade distortions and enabling protectionism. The analysis assesses the legacy of the Uruguay Round and the resulting Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures and finds that it does not sufficiently distinguish between socially beneficial and negative subsidies. Current rules often disregard the intent and actual impact of government support, resulting in inefficient remedies being applied against positive subsidies. Reviewing past reform efforts, the author presents the ‘renewed net subsidy’ approach – a pragmatic proposal that seeks to balance the flexibility needed for legitimate policy goals with safeguards against trade-distorting actions, aiming to foster more nuanced, cooperative governance of subsidies within the international trading system.

Theory supports two opposing trajectories regarding the effects of trade provisions on micro, small, and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs) and on their integration into the global value chain (GVC). On the one hand, provisions such as increased competitiveness, networking support, and cooperation provisions enhance firms’ GVC participation. On the other hand, provisions that establish common standards and regulations that increase compliance costs can be burdensome for small enterprises. This paper examines the effect of such MSME-related provisions on participation in GVCs. By merging the World Trade Organization trade agreements and the World Bank Enterprise Surveys datasets, we contribute to the literature in two ways. First, we distinguish between trade-related and non-trade-related provisions. Second, we scrutinize the heterogeneity across sectors, income levels, and regions. Our results show a particularly positive effect of MSME-related provisions, with a larger effect of non-trade-related provisions compared with trade-related ones. In addition, this effect is particularly relevant to low-technology-intensive sectors, low-income countries, and Asian economies. Our results remain consistent when using alternative variables, sample characteristics, and estimation methods.

This paper introduces the Granular Trade and Production Activities (GRANTPA) database, which covers international trade flows for 3,124 products and 247 countries over the period 1995–2019 as well as domestic trade flows and production data for the same number of products and years for a subset of 35 European economies. The original data sources that we employ are Eurostat’s Comext and Prodcom databases. A gravity application delivers a large set of product-level ‘home bias’ estimates, which cannot be obtained without domestic trade flows. The average estimates on the standard gravity variables in our model (e.g., distance) are comparable to those from the related literature. However, our disaggregated estimates are very heterogeneous across products, thus highlighting the importance of our new database.

The EU–Mercosur agreement is one of the longest and most complex trade negotiations in modern economic diplomacy. Launched in 1999 and finally concluded in December 2024, it offers a unique lens through which to understand trade negotiations in an era of geopolitical uncertainty, domestic contestation, and multilateral fragmentation. Drawing on the authors’ direct experience in trade policy and negotiation, this article argues that the agreement was not delayed because technical solutions were unavailable, nor concluded because underlying conflicts disappeared. Rather, it moved forward when changing international conditions increased the political value of closure for both sides. Agricultural sensitivities, sustainability concerns, competitiveness debates, and Mercosur’s internal coordination challenges remained. What changed was the cost of failing to reach an agreement. The case suggests that trade agreements today are no longer merely instruments of market access; they also serve as tools of strategic positioning, regulatory reassurance, and geopolitical signaling. In this context, uncertainty can become not only a constraint, but also a catalyst for cooperation and agreement

Are people who are more knowledgeable and interested in trade policy more likely to change their preferences regarding trade agreements compared to their less knowledgeable and less interested counterparts on receiving new information from politicians? This study responds to this question by developing a framework that distinguishes knowledge from interest and assesses it using an original survey conducted on voters during the 2020 US election campaign. Assessing whether information about trade agreements provided by political elites shifts individuals’ trade preferences and whether knowledge and interest condition susceptibility to such information reveals that people knowledgeable and interested in trade policy are less likely to change their original preference. Together, the results sharpen the existing theories by establishing knowledge and interest as moderators of trade opinion change in low-salience trade settings.

This paper contributes to the discussion on the link between international trade policy and food and nutrition security by looking at whether and how these concepts are addressed in Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs). We compile a dataset covering almost 600 PTAs that entered into force between 1948 and 2024, and apply textual analysis to show that the number of references to food security has increased over recent decades. To analyse the role of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) in shaping the rules and practices of international food trade, we investigate the placement, function, and significance of food security provisions in four case studies, looking at the extent to which the regulatory approaches of these PTAs align with or diverge from the relevant provisions of the WTO AoA. Our study reveals that, despite the growing prominence of food security and nutrition in PTAs, their regulatory approaches largely align with the AoA and seldom overcome its shortcomings. While some agreements introduce broader and more contemporary understandings of food security, binding commitments remain limited and structural tensions between national and global objectives persist.

A large body of literature examines the drivers of individual attitudes towards international trade policies. This article contributes to this literature by exploring the role of border regions across the European Union (EU). Border regions offer a unique context for examining trade attitudes. Residency in either EU, non-EU, or maritime borders generates differential impacts on individuals’ support for distinct trade policies. Focusing on attitudes towards import duties and EU trade agreements, this article demonstrates that individuals in non-EU borderlands and maritime border regions are particularly supportive of lowering import duties, whereas support for extra-EU trade agreements is largely uniform across regions, with only a modest positive tendency among maritime residents. Broader sentiment on trade shows limited regional differences, chiefly between EU-border and non-EU-border residents. Including a battery of control variables drawn from the literature, the article leverages individual-level data at the most fine-grained level available in the EU to explore these dynamics relying on several regression models. This article speaks to both the literature on trade attitudes and border studies by offering a conceptualization of borders that distinguishes between EU borders, non-EU borders, and maritime borders, each of which has distinct implications for individuals’ trade attitudes.

Critical minerals are at the centre of divergent state interests defined by developmental objectives, security objectives, energy transition, and sustainability imperatives. Unlike non-critical commodities, they exhibit heightened strategic importance but suffer from significant concentration of supply chains, notably in China. As securitization of trade reshapes global supply chains, governments are looking beyond traditional experiences with international commodity agreements, towards modernized tools of trade and investment cooperation to secure reliable critical mineral supplies. This article offers descriptive and analytical insights into the consequent non-binding international instruments on critical minerals, concluded by the most active participants in this topic: the United States, the EU, Japan, Canada, and Australia, who are amongst the largest demanders and suppliers of these minerals and are all economically developed. It finds that such instruments bear several potential systemic and institutional implications for rulemaking and governance in international trade, which include their ability to divert agency away from the resource rich, the concentration of norm creation and standard creation amongst a few, the phenomenon of ‘selective de-legalization’, and lack of transparency. By highlighting several trends and sources of potential concerns for commodity-dependent countries, this article urges a reassessment of this emerging framework advocating for the need to better balance state interests.