This chapter examines Turkey’s use of transnational repression, arguing that it is a function of three key drivers: threat perception in globalized conflicts, democratic backsliding under the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government, and the instrumentalization of diaspora communities for geopolitical purposes. Turkey employs diverse mechanisms ranging from direct violence and surveillance to indirect pressure through religious institutions and pro-government diaspora networks, as well as mediated approaches that leverage international organizations and diplomatic pressure. The chapter demonstrates how domestic political developments—particularly the 1980 coup, Kurdish conflict escalation, and the 2016 coup attempt—correlate with intensified transnational repression. These practices have complicated Turkey’s relationship with European states and the European Union, as well as with the US and NATO, while also contributing to brain drain via increased emigration. The case illustrates broader challenges to the liberal international order, with Turkey as an EU candidate state and NATO member able to leverage its strategic importance to limit international consequences. The chapter concludes by assessing recent political developments and the prospects for continuity or change in Turkey’s transnational repression practices.

This chapter examines the global business environment, tracing its historical development, current dynamics, and potential future trajectories. It explores the long-term evolution of global trade, investment, and economic integration, highlighting key periods such as the Age of Exploration, the Age of Imperialism, and the Era of Globalization. Key drivers of globalization are discussed, including technological advancements in transportation and ICT, political liberalization of markets, and the emergence of globally connected consumers. The chapter also analyses the current levels of globalization, addressing critiques of hyperglobalization and evidence of uneven international integration. Attention is given to de-globalization trends influenced by geopolitical shifts, global crises, and protectionist policies. By examining both opportunities and challenges, the chapter provides insights into the interplay between markets, politics, and socio-economic factors, helping students understand the forces shaping globalization, regional integration, and the uncertain prospects for the global economy in the coming decades.

This chapter summarises the findings from across the previous chapters and attempts to discuss both the ‘region’ status of the Arctic, and what the Arctic is a case of in terms of security dynamics, regionality, and security regions. First, it evaluates the relevance and usefulness of security regions theories – the RSCT in particular – in unpacking Arctic security relations. Thereafter it takes a look at what these findings mean for the study of security regions and regional security complexes more broadly. It concludes with an emphasis on state-centric small-scale SRSCs, which can roughly be conceptualised as circles of overlapping spatial and security domains (i.e., a Venn diagram), before musing about the increasing relevance of maritime ‘regions’ in security considerations.

This chapter outlines approaches to studying security that deal with the following topics: (1) security amongst states, (2) the role of geography in defining that security, or so-called geopolitics, and (3) the concept of regional security. This lays the foundation for an in-depth study of Arctic security dynamics. In essence, security relations amongst states inherently entail a regional dimension (states of geographic proximity being more concerned with similar or the same security issues), although various approaches have grappled with this dimension in different ways.

This chapter introduces the book and its main themes and concepts. It starts with Arctic-specific examples including the maritime agreement between Norway and Russia, and the US interest in taking control over Greenland, to highlight how the notions of geography, security, and geopolitics are at the forefront of contemporary international relations. It then goes on to discuss the concepts of geopolitics, regions, and security regions that in turn frame the approach taken in this book to understand some fundamental questions about states, security, and geography.

Chapter 3 summarizes that doctrine’s three variants, emphasizing how the current iteration hearkens back to the original article by appealing to the interests of the most powerful states. Major elements in the latest version of Mercantilism emerged as a US response to the competitive challenge from Japan. Although this proved to be an overreaction, it did set important precedents for the discriminatory measures – both positive and negative – that Washington would later use in its trade war with Beijing.

The final chapter of this book considers external challenges – namely, discourses and regulatory moves driven by concerns about state sovereignty and, relatedly, security and development – to the dual-sided framework in the current digital era. It starts by discussing to what extent China provides a counter-model to the liberal conception of information freedom and the dual-sided framework and argues that there is not really a Chinese (counter-)model. It moves to consider other Global South countries, looking at firstly Brazil and India and then the peripheries of the periphery. It argues that placed in a chain of dependence, practices of Global South countries generally do not present fundamental challenges to the dual-sided framework despite their genuine normative contestations. The chapter finally moves to recent sovereignist policies and discourses from the Western liberal world and observes that the main challenge to the dual-sided framework comes from an increasingly fascist United States.

Brexit was an act of gross economic vandalism. Many leavers understood that at the time. Most were indifferent. When push came to shove, an economic hit seemed, to those who thought about it at all, to be a price worth paying for autonomy. ‘Take Back Control’ proved to be a winning formula. Ten years on, we are in a better position to decide how much control we have really gained, and how much it has been worth to us. Control and autonomy are legal and constitutional concepts, but their value depends on political realities. In a world of huge nations like the United States and China, it is in the interest of smaller nations to join together in powerful multinational blocs like the European Union. Its members have more control and more global power collectively than they can ever hope to have individually. Britain’s own ability to exercise ‘control’ over its own fate is inevitably more limited outside the European Union.

By now, we have established firmly that the green transition will cause accelerated economic growth. By the performance-stability trade-off discussed in Chapter 3, this accelerated growth could occur at the expense of economic stability. This is because the green transition will cause untold upheaval. In this chapter, we lay out the pace and scale of this likely upheaval, looking at the great transformation that inevitably has to take place across industry, trade, investment and geopolitical power. Different countries will face different challenges, some gaining in international economic power, others losing. This will inevitably lead to a brand new map of international relations worldwide, of debtor–creditor relationships, of trade relationships and of international purchasing power. We discuss the challenges that developing countries face in financing a transition towards environmental and financial sustainability.

This chapter examines the relationship between geopolitical rivalry and world trade law. It begins by discussing the consequences of trade for national power and security, and how dominant states approach foreign economic policy. It then analyses recent geopolitical developments and their implications for the evolution of the international economic order. It concludes by discussing the implications of the analysis for world trade law and policy in the future.