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Chapter 6 examines authority and the fragile structures that hold society together. It surveys concepts of justice and order, the roles of kings and councils, and the practice of assemblies, including debates about the ‘seeds’ of democracy. Through episodes of dispute and persuasion, it shows how Homeric communities negotiated power when coercion, charisma, and tradition competed.
The contestation of international organizations (IOs) over past decades has inspired a rich research program. This essay takes stock of progress by reviewing key findings in existing scholarship and identifying critical areas for future study. We propose a typology that distinguishes between internal contestation, which criticizes the institutions or policies of an IO with the aim of reform, and external contestation, which challenges an IO’s foundational principles and very existence. Building on this conceptual distinction, we review the most important findings of existing research on three key themes: patterns of contestation, drivers of contestation, and responses to contestation. We also argue that this conceptualization helps us better understand the changing nature of contestation: while criticism of how IOs function has long been a staple of world politics, it recently appears to have shifted toward a deeper form involving more fundamental questioning of IOs themselves. We conclude by highlighting the need for dynamic theories and improved measurements to explain when and how IO contestation shifts from internal criticism to external rejection, and by outlining a forward-looking research agenda on organizational robustness, hegemonic contestation, and the relationship between IO contestation and the broader contestation of global governance.
This chapter underscores the critical role of leadership in driving public health change. There is a rich scholarship on leadership, often organized around three archetypes: transactional, transformative and shared leadership. We define leadership as the ability to mobilize others to achieve change. As such, it is not restricted to those in positions of formal authority but can be exercised by all stakeholders in the health system. Leadership is essential to public health because public health challenges are, by nature, “wicked” problems that are becoming increasingly intersectoral, and that sit at the intersection of science and politics. Five leadership skills are of particular importance for the public health challenges of the twenty-firstst century: societal responsibility, systemic wisdom, comfort with uncertainty, mastery of change management and a focus on execution. Developing leadership skills is essential: without leaders, even the best-designed health systems will fail.
This chapter introduces the main approach developed in International Leviathans through (1) a sociological understanding of sovereignty and (2) the concept of international administration. First, the chapter presents a new take of the debate between Kelsen and Schmitt around sovereignty and presents the sociological understanding of sovereignty by unpacking sovereignty practices. It makes the case for analysing the socio-political or socio-legal struggles happening between competing claims of political authority and accountability. It then discusses and theorises the concept of ‘international administration’, pointing out the limitations of two strands of the literature: the functionalist approach, defining international administrations through the functions they ought to perform as underlined in their mandate, and the normative approach, focusing on self-proclaimed goals and objectives. I posit that sovereignty practices deployed by international officials are social practices which cannot be understood solely through mandates or stated goals – they need to be understood through the reality on the ground, created by claims of political authority deployed by actors and the concomitant claims of accountability these practices elicit.
This chapter presents the central claim of the book, arguing that sovereignty practices emerge at the confluence of struggles – on the one hand, by actors asserting the political authority over a specific territory and, on the other hand, through resistance to this move by actors pursuing accountability and the responsibilisation of sovereign actors. I claim that practices of political authority – expressed through effective rule over territory – are central, constitutive acts of world politics, entailing specific obligations. Broadening the study of sovereignty practices beyond state relations, I argue that understanding how specific actors such as international organisations act as sovereign actors opens up new perspectives on international accountability and obligations in world politics.
The International Court of Justice (ICJ, the Court) increasingly addresses major regional and global conflicts and crises. In contentious proceedings, its limited jurisdiction—regarding both subject-matter and matters affecting third States—often confines the Court to examining a small portion of the actual dispute between the parties. In advisory proceedings, by contrast, the Court faces no such constraints when determining the legal positions of individual States. This article argues that legal determinations made in advisory opinions can, in principle, be relied on as ‘givens’ in subsequent contentious proceedings where the Court would otherwise be prevented from making such determinations. The Court’s advisory and contentious jurisdictions are both built on consent, which is required to protect States’ sovereignty from exercises of the Court’s authority. If the Court exercises its authority in an advisory opinion by determining the legal position of a State, it removes sovereignty concerns regarding this determination for subsequent contentious proceedings. The significant practical challenges in relying on legal determinations from advisory opinions as ‘givens’ are most likely to be overcome in relation to determinations of status, rather than for establishing specific internationally wrongful acts. ‘Givens’ from advisory opinions are thus not a general workaround to the limitations in the ICJ’s contentious jurisdiction. Still, relying on determinations from advisory opinions in subsequent contentious proceedings invites the Court to enter into an intricate dialogue between its two forms of jurisdiction, a dialogue which may further intertwine them and thereby enhance coherence in the ICJ’s exercise of its judicial function.
Luther named the “Scriptures alone” as the ultimate authority in doctrinal matters and in steering religious practices in communities of faith where the proper meaning of the gospel was to be taught with attention to God’s two sermons – law and gospel. Underscoring of Christ as the unique lens to God’s goodness, and to salvation, Luther fails to see the value of other religions, which calls for critical attention, with Luther and with medieval catholic teaching in general.
Interpretation of Luther’s spiritual despair that led him to discover the liberating gospel of grace from the Scriptures and to reset his religious compass to reorient the teachings and practice of Christian faith with the assurance of the security of salvation. The chapter proposes freedom as the way to interpret Luther’s reform impulses as well as his own spiritual journey, theological insights, and negotiating his authority as a reformer.
When should we dismiss the reasons agents give for their views and instead invoke alternative psychological or causal explanations for their behavior? Philosophers such as Amy Flowerree and Nicholas Smyth have recently argued that we should generally avoid such dismissive psychologizing of individuals on moral grounds. In this paper, I critique these views and argue that the morality of psychologizing depends crucially on the formal authority an agent possesses. This psychologizing is not only permissible on my view, but even recommended in light of an agent’s formal authority. I advocate for the following principle: we should default to psychologizing agents who occupy powerful formal positions of authority, while we should be comparatively more hesitant to psychologize those outside of such positions. Psychologizing the non-formally authoritative does carry a certain moral and political risk. It can encourage political disenfranchisement, denying others full-fledged, equal participation in political life because they are taken to lack the necessary rational capacity for this participation. This is a possibility that researchers in particular should contend with. My discussion draws out implications for understanding propagandistic threats, academic research on epistemic behavior, defenses of epistocracy, and the moral dimensions of our epistemic lives.
This first substantive chapter introduces readers to Truth Commissions as an institution and their relationship with international law; the core problem examined in the book, and the overall argument; the main debates in scholarship and practice, which frame the book’s intervention; and the book’s methodological approach and contribution. The chapter begins with an overview of Truth Commissions, their contemporary role, and historical transformation. The discussion focuses on how the jurisprudential tradition of ‘jurisdictional thought’ offers a way of examining how Truth Commissions have ‘authorized’ their accounts of violent events as the truth by drawing on different dimensions of international law. The chapter explains how the book approaches the analysis of Truth Commissions through the study of their representations of truth and authority. This involves setting out the book’s theoretical orientation, which includes the jurisprudence of jurisdictional thought, law and humanities scholarship, and the theory and history of international law; and explaining the importance of the author’s in-country visits and archival research.
This chapter examines the relationship between human rights and Chile’s 1990-1991 National Commission on Truth and Reconciliation, and the way this relationship continues to shape state-society relations in the aftermath of Pinochet’s dictatorship (1973-1990). The argument is two-fold. First, the Truth Commission draws on the language of human rights to authorize its account as the ‘major’ truth. Second, in doing so, the Truth Commission displaces from public life ‘minor’ truths, specifically the experiences of state-violence by Indigenous communities (Mapuche people) and women (Arpilleristas). The argument is based on an analysis of the representation of truth and authority embodied in Chile’s Museum of Memory and Human Rights. The chapter shows how the Museum gives continuity to the work of the Truth Commission by giving it a material (spatial and experiential) form. While the Truth Commission and the Museum remain two distinct institutions, in visiting the Museo/Truth Commission it becomes apparent how human rights authorizes the Truth Commission’s account, and how the Museo gives it continuity in public life.
The book concludes with a short chapter that invites readers to re-consider the relationship between Truth Commissions and international law. It emphasizes the consequences of this relationship for the quality of state-society relations in the aftermath of violent conflict. It also highlights the importance of paying attention to who is authorizing the inclusion of local cultural expressions of violent conflict in the accounts produced by Truth Commission; who benefits from such inclusions; and what ends are being served.
This chapter analyses how the Argentinian Truth Commission (CONADEP 1983-1984) accounted for the dictatorship’s state-violence, and how international law is involved in the making of this account as truth. The argument is that the Truth Commission draws on international law’s promises of peace and democracy to authorize its account as truth. In turn, the Truth Commission deauthorizes, and thereby silences, accounts of the dictatorship’s state-violence that do not conform with the official version embedded in, and mobilized by, the promises of international law of the late-Cold War. To show this, I read the Prologue to the Truth Commission’s Final Report as a literary text that not only works to establish the account that is set out in the Final Report, but that also authorizes that account as the truth by connecting it to international law. This reading of the Prologue to the Final Report’s textual representation of truth and authority draws on scholarship in the field of law and literature. The chapter also discusses the ongoing role of the Prologue in Argentina’s contemporary public life, particularly during the Kircher, Macri and Milei governments.
This book examines how truth commissions construct authoritative accounts of conflict, and how they account for the plurality of accounts across affected communities. Vázquez Guevara examines three of the earliest and most influential truth commissions: Argentina (1983–1984), Chile (1990–1991), and El Salvador (1992–1993), and examines how relevant cultural objects support or counter the official account for each. In doing so, she argues that these truth commissions drew on international law to authorise their accounts of violent conflict, and that this had the consequence of privileging an internationally-authorised truth over other truths, whilst simultaneously strengthening the authority of international law over the post-conflict state. By demonstrating how truth commissions turn to international law for authority, the book shows how this produces an official account of past violence and promises of future community, which fundamentally affects how communities live together in the aftermath of violent conflict.
This article studies the commissive use of can in conditionals such as I can do the dishes, if you like. Its main goal is to spell out the semantic building blocks of what we call offer-can, arguing that the seemingly speech act interpretation is a feature of the conditional statement as a whole rather than the modal itself. To achieve this, we disentangle authority and ability at the semantic level (in agreement with Copley 2009), and single out the notions of “issue to be solved” and “preferred solution worlds” as epistemic basis and bouletic ordering, respectively, for modal quantification. We propose a comparison between the conditional offer and other non-conditional conditionals, and offer some thoughts regarding permission-can and can-you-pass-me-the-salt questions, arguing for authority shift in questions, in a way akin to the interrogative flip in questions with evidentials and epistemic modals.
Discussions on the relationship between science and society frequently advocate for direct engagement between scientists and lay people. While such engagement is often framed as a remedy for declining trust in science, it introduces a distinct set of ethical challenges. One such challenge concerns the risk of epistemic trespassing, the overstepping of disciplinary boundaries. Another arises when individual scientists, by virtue of their public role, are seen as representatives of “science” as a whole. These issues are further complicated by a less-discussed form of trespassing: the ethical tensions that emerge when scientists draw on non-epistemic sources of authority, such as charismatic or traditional authority (in the Weberian sense), to bolster their public claims. This paper argues that addressing these challenges requires a nuanced, context-sensitive approach. In some cases, the most ethically defensible strategy and pragmatically viable strategy may be not to communicate individually, but rather to contribute to collective efforts that facilitate responsible public communication. By reframing public engagement as a team task, scientists can mitigate the risks of trespassing while still fulfilling their role in fostering trust in science.
This paper analyses a dispute that flared up in the 1790s about whether Kant’s moral theory leaves room for the possibility of imputable wrongdoing. Contra Paul Guyer’s reading, I argue this was not merely a matter of mutual misunderstanding but reflected its participants’ varying perceptions of an arguably genuine dilemma for Kantian ethics: that what he needs to say to explain how imputable action contrary to duty is possible within his framework is prima facie incompatible with what he needs to say to establish that the moral law is categorically binding. In addition to presenting my interpretation of the controversy, I offer a suggestion as to how Kant might be able to escape the dilemma and further suggest we have good reason to think that Kant himself was both aware of the danger and endorsed the proffered solution.
Christians faced the specific problem of reconciling capital punishment with the belief in the sanctity of human life. ‘God made man in his own image’ (Genesis). However the Church, from the time of Constantine, found it advantageous to ally itself with the State in order to forward and exploit its influence and authority. This alliance involved the Church in a cruel penal system: in fact, it introduced a new capital crime, heresy. Such disquiet as there was largely went underground. When dissent was expressed, Jesus was called up as an advocate for the cause, not as a missionary for penal reform (his Kingdom was not of this world), but because of his life, teaching, and vision of a New Age. Of our two Italian abolitionists, the devout Catholic Pelli repeatedly invoked the Christian God and the Sermon on the Mount. Earlier it was a Protestant, Sébastian Castellion, who caused a stir. Castellion campaigned fiercely against the criminalization of heresy, following the brutal execution of Michael Servetus, burned at the stake in 1553 in Calvin’s Geneva. Castellion, however, was striking a blow for freedom of belief rather than for the abolition of capital punishment as such.
Chapter 7 focuses on more local dynamics over cross-border voting in certain borderland localities where all scales merge, and where palimpsestic political communities emerge even more clearly. It emphasizes the question of authority in the recognition or contestation of belonging. By campaigning in the Togolese borderlands in the 2000s, the Ghanaian political parties aimed to instrumentalize cross-border ties and recognized the authority of the local level in confirming belonging to the nation. This chapter demonstrates that the local level is the authority on and the gatekeeper of national belonging. As a consequence it shows that the local level is the most powerful layer of belonging in the palimpsestic political communities of the region, since it is capable of influencing all the other layers of belonging.
This chapter explores the relationships between regulations (laws, senatorial decrees) and female visibility in Republican Rome. The focus is on the earliest epigraphic and literary evidence for regulations mentioning women, citizen and non-citizen. Key examples include the senatus consultum de Bacchanalibus (186 BCE), one of the Clusium Fragments (late second to early first century BCE), the lex Osca Tabulae Bantinae (100–91 BCE), the Tabula Heracleensis (post-Social War), the lex Coloniae Genetivae (59 to 44 BCE), as well as Cicero’s references to a lex on female mourning from the XII Tabulae (Twelve Tables), the lex Voconia of 169 BCE and the pontifical responsum and senatus consultum on the Vestal Licinia in 123 BCE. These are compared with Republican regulations attested in later sources. This chapter argues that these regulations rendered some women visible, both physically and symbolically, and that they offer us valuable insight into women’s agency, authority and property in the Roman Republic.