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In the first two years of his reign, the thirty-year-old Philip had to mobilize as much cash as possible to fight the war declared by France and to refinance the debts of his father into long-term term juros. He did this while in Flanders and while dealing with a reluctant administration in Castile. The procedure for the refinancing was laid down in a letter of April 1557 to the Council of Finance in Madrid. The chapter shows that it was not a default but the first step of a sound policy that would be completed with the Cortes of 1560, when he had returned after the triumph of San Quentin.
This is the first of two chapters on Philip’s first years as king of Spain, from his departure for England and Flanders in 1554 to his return in 1558 after the crushing victories over France. During this critical period of establishing himself, he was led into simultaneous wars against the Pope and against France. This chapter shows how he used the suspension of payments to Rome as a weapon against the Pope. The next chapter will deal with the war against France, its financing and the refinancing of the debt.
In the twentieth century, Western countries like France legislated about women’s reproductive capabilities to limit their access to birth control and to diminish national demographic deficits, while obeying prevailing moral standards and Freud’s compulsory female “destiny”: A woman must deliver and raise babies. Contrary to her Catholicism and to a transatlantic anti-abortion climate during the interwar period, Anaïs Nin made the personal choice of terminating her six-month pregnancy in Paris in the 1930s. Instead of complying with politics on reproductive health and embracing biological motherhood, she nurtured her dependent lovers, including Henry Miller. This chapter examines how Nin’s experience of abortion became an experimental, artistic inspiration to write about – and fictionalize – this surgical procedure in three accounts found in her diaries and in “Birth.” In some of these versions, the illegally performed interruption of Nin’s pregnancy is masked by the artifice of an induced preterm labor to save the life of a heroic birthing mother, another of Nin’s personas. Nevertheless, as this chapter unfolds, these narratives on maternity also pioneer by denouncing the hostility of health providers toward birthing mothers and in revealing the existence of a global phenomenon across time and space: obstetric and epistemic violence in perinatal care.
This chapter moves beyond electoral politics to examine civic engagement. I find that pro-immigration attitudes are associated with greater civic engagement on behalf of migrants. In addition, people with pro-immigration as opposed to anti-immigration attitudes may be more likely to donate to advocacy organizations promoting their respective immigration agenda. This suggests pro-immigration Europeans may concentrate their activism in civic (as opposed to electoral) engagement. However, I do find that people with pro-immigration attitudes may prefer to donate to other causes, which is further evidence of the need to move beyond the cosmopolitan worldview to understand nuances of their engagement.
The United States fought its first conflict as an independent nation against France, the ally that was essential for gaining freedom from British rule. After the United States signed the Jay Treaty with Great Britain resolving outstanding issues from the Revolutionary War and normalizing trade, France reacted by interdicting US commercial ships that were now trading with its enemy. The US policy on freedom of the seas was shaped by the need to protect its neutral shipping rights, especially in the face of increasing French maritime aggression. This policy stemmed from a desire to avoid being dragged into European wars while maintaining profitable commerce. However, the French government, angered by the US neutrality during the French Revolutionary Wars, saw American trade with Britain as a violation of their alliance, and French privateers began seizing American commercial shipping. In response, Congress authorized the use of military force, leading to the deployment of the US Navy to defend American merchant ships against interference by the French Navy.
This Element investigates how citizens in two mature democracies – Italy and France – evaluate fascism as a historical and political object. Drawing on original pre-electoral surveys (Italy 2022 and France 2024), it distinguishes between affective attitudes (emotional or symbolic attachment) and instrumental attitudes (perceived usefulness) toward fascism. The study reveals that these orientations are empirically distinct, shaped by contrasting memory regimes, and differentially associated with support for radical right parties. While Italy's permissive mnemonic environment enables open affective expression, France's high-stigma context channels resonance into coded, performance-oriented language. By moving beyond standard proxies like authoritarianism or populism, the analysis offers a direct, comparative measure of fascist attitudes and their electoral implications. The findings illuminate how discredited pasts remain legible – and politically mobilizable –through divergent registers of public memory.
As legislatures approach gender parity in different parts of the world, questions remain about whether institutional cultures support equal epistemic authority for women. In the French National Assembly, modern republicanism promotes depersonalized representation: deputies are expected to embody the universal citizen, with gender embedded but not defining. Drawing on 24 interviews with deputies elected before and after the 2017 elections, this article develops a feminist institutionalist framework to show how women navigate tensions between republican expectations that demand conformity to masculinized neutrality and pluralist norms that confine authority to “women’s issues.” We introduce the concept of epistemic double bind to theorize this dilemma and present a typology of role expectations and strategic responses that captures how deputies negotiate it. Our findings show that even in more gender-balanced legislatures, women face enduring constraints on epistemic authority. France serves as a critical case for understanding the practical demands of depersonalized representation and how actors reconfigure its contradictions in institutions shaped by parity laws.
The seventh chapter of this book reviews the several waves of expansion of foreign banks in Latin America during the last third of the nineteenth century and the first decade of the twentieth century. This story is of special interest for readers interested in aspects of a complex and diverse phase of financial globalization. Foreign banks participated in several phases of capital flows from Europe, and much later from the United States and Canada, marking a new stage of capitalism that was becoming truly global. The entry of banks of different nationalities into Latin America was pioneered by British overseas banks from the 1860s, which established offices and branches in many countries. They were followed by French investment banks that participated in many public works projects such as canals and railroads, as well as in government banks. Then came the powerful German universal banks from the 1890s, which specialized in trade finance and in some foreign debt transactions. From the 1850s onwards there appeared Spanish colonial banks in Cuba and Puerto Rico that continued to operate until the Spanish American War of 1898. Last of all arrived Canadian and United States commercial banks, in the first decades of the twentieth century.
While many activists in the International shared a common ideological background and some hostility to the way the modern textile industry relied on low-paid female labor, they often differed on how this converted into practical attitudes and policies, depending on national situations, occupational differences, and political leanings. This article first tries to assess how the International discussed female labor centrally, in the congresses, but also in the General Council, using the minutes of the proceedings. It then moves on to a few general points about the attitudes of the British trade unions on women’s work, before focusing on how the question was handled practically at the local level by the London tailors: To do this, it focuses on the way the tailoring trade used both male and female labor. It tries to document the trajectory of Matthew Lawrence, the secretary of the London Operative Tailors, who at the Congress of the International Workingmen’s Association (IWMA) in Lausanne in 1866 argued against a ban on women’s work and who, in April 1867, led a strike of the London tailors, both men and women. The article ends with the debate in France in the labor movement and in the IWMA in the 1860s, when the Proudhonian male breadwinning stance was challenged by feminists and socialists. One example is that of bookbinders in Paris, including Nathalie Le Mel, Eugène Varlin, and Marie Iatskévitch, who opposed any ban on female labor and advocated equal wages.
This article investigates the legal consequences of treaty signature not followed by ratification, focusing on France’s 64-year-old signature of the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness. France’s engagement with the 1961 Convention is unusual, raising multiple questions. One question relates to the customary status of Article 18(a) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT). This provision requires States to refrain from acts defeating a treaty’s object and purpose prior to ratification. However, France is not a party to the VCLT, and in any event the VCLT post-dates the 1961 Convention and does not apply retroactively. Therefore Article 18 does not apply to France unless equivalent obligations exist in customary law. Another question relates to France’s international obligations rooted in customary international law on statelessness. These obligations include rules of customary law which are codified in or have crystallised as a result of the 1961 Convention. After outlining the customary status of Article 18(a) VCLT and of key provisions of the 1961 Convention, the analysis turns to the role of France in drafting the Convention, its reservations, legislative practice and judicial engagement, and persistent failure to ratify despite legislative reforms and parliamentary debate. The article concludes that during the period between signature and ratification, France remains bound by two distinct sets of obligations arising from customary international law: those triggered by its signature under the obligation of a customary character reflected in Article 18(a) VCLT and those triggered by the customary obligations of States in relation to statelessness. Furthermore, the mere passage of time does not extinguish those obligations.
The 1850s saw Britian involved in large-scale combat in India and the Crimea, which left it ill-equipped to intervene in Italy’s war against its Austrian rulers. Though sympathetic to Italy, Britain was more concerned about France’s participation and what was seen as its manoeuvring for greater European power. Britian responded with a massive volunteer movement which wasn’t always taken entirely seriously, and which seeded the potential for the year’s military activities being seen as a literal theatre of war. Charles Kean’s Henry V attempted to ignite pride in Britain’s martial history, but this was countered by the ignominious experiences of British troops in China, and the ‘Pig War’. Barbaric treatment of British soldiers by the military authorities diminished the distance between Britain and its ‘uncivilised’ enemies, and provided a fertile ground for Tennyson’s Idylls of the King, which celebrated in King Arthur another figure from the past.
This chapter examines how ‘race’ took on its modern meaning in the second half of the eighteenth century. It shows how ideas of race were intertwined with the developing idea of civilization, highlights the contemporary comparative lack of knowledge about sub-Saharan Africa in Western thought, and illustrates how race came to feature as a subject of investigation in its own right in the ‘science of race’ at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Particular attention is devoted to ideas in the Scottish Enlightenment but places them within wider European and Atlantic contexts.
I begin Chapter 9 by situating the lessons from the Irish case study within a broader theoretical context. Although there are particularities to all case studies, theoretical frameworks can be developed from in-depth investigations in specific contexts. In this chapter, I explore the relevance of the moral psychology of fairness and feelings of relative deprivation across several other case studies: in the United States, Sudan, Chile, France, and during the Arab Spring in North Africa and parts of the Middle East. Economic inequalities across multiple global regions are a key explanation for civic unrest, feelings of unfairness, and attempts at radical social change. The rise of populism and authoritarian leaders is the subject of the following chapter.
‘Race’ is the same word in French and English, suggesting equivalency, portability, and mutual intelligibility of the term. Yet in the early twentieth century, the word did different work in each language depending on time and place, often creating misunderstandings between Francophone and Anglophone interlocutors on how to fight racism. One instance of such divergent ‘race’ histories was the First Universal Races Congress in London in 1911. Organized by progressive philanthropists in Britain and the United States, the Congress attracted a global constellation of scholars, statesmen, diplomats, and activists to discuss how to diminish the inter-racial tensions internationally. Anglophone attendees spoke readily about the need to study ‘race relations’ scientifically to better manage conflicts between colonizer and colonized. French social scientists neither attended the Congress nor evinced interest in the very concept of ‘race’ contact. A comparison of English and French participation in London makes clear that modern colonialism produced different racial epistemologies in Francophone and Anglophone spaces, ones that only began to converge after decolonization.
This article examines the transimperial fundraising practices of two major continental European Protestant missionary societies—the Paris Evangelical Missionary Society (PEMS) and the Basel Mission (BM)—between the end of the Napoleonic Wars and the 1870s. It proposes a meso-level approach to global history that focuses neither on individual actors nor on abstract categories such as capitalism or religion, but instead on organizations. By analysing the PEMS and the BM, the article shows how missionary societies connected specific subregions of British India and Southern Africa with Protestant regions across the northern transatlantic world. Drawing on rarely studied financial reports, it demonstrates how these societies mobilized hundreds of thousands of donors through global financial networks spanning Europe, North America, and the colonies. In doing so, the article reframes Protestant missionary societies not merely as cultural actors but as economic institutions that helped normalize capitalist practices in both Europe and colonial settings. It thus contributes to transimperial and global history by suggesting a way to study Protestant continental Europe, the United States, and the British empire as mutually constitutive partners.
This revised and updated edition of the definitive history of the French Wars of Religion explains why they were fought and how peace was finally restored after two generations of fighting. Since the publication of the second edition in 2005, recent scholarship has challenged traditional ideas of how the wars started and has included new research on peace-making, memory studies, and the international dimensions of the conflict. Mack P. Holt offers a fresh narrative which incorporates these ideas, while continuing to make this complicated series of civil wars understandable and accessible to readers. Holt explores why France become divided by a civil war fought between both professional armies and civilians, why French elites believed that a simple policy of repression could succeed against the growth of Protestantism, and how peaceful coexistence between the two confessions was eventually established after nearly four decades of war. As a result, this study remains an essential introduction for both students and general readers.
Bat rabies in mainland France is mainly caused by European bat lyssavirus 1 (EBLV-1; Lyssavirus hamburg), which is almost exclusively associated with the common serotine bat, Cnephaeus (Eptesicus) serotinus. Two variants, EBLV-1a and EBLV-1b, circulate in France and display largely distinct, parapatric distributions. Because bats are highly sensitive to climatic conditions due to their physiological characteristics, including heterothermy, we investigated the relationship between climate and the geographical distribution of these two variants. Using generalized linear models and species distribution models, we assessed the influence of temperature and precipitation on EBLV-1 occurrence. The distribution of EBLV-1 cases was significantly associated with climatic variables, particularly minimum temperatures during the coldest month, maximum temperatures during the warmest month, and precipitation during the driest period. EBLV-1a was more frequently associated with areas characterized by milder winters and warmer, more humid conditions, whereas EBLV-1b was linked to colder and drier environments. Habitat suitability models predicted limited overlap between the two variants, supporting the existence of distinct climatic niches. These findings suggest that climatic factors contribute to shaping the spatial distribution of EBLV-1 variants and highlight the need for broader scale studies to better understand their ecology and potential response to future climate change.
The site of Incoronata offers a crucial model for understanding the collective sharing of techniques, objects, rituals, images and ideology between an indigenous Iron Age community and Aegean immigrants on the Ionian coast of South Italy in the eighth century BCE. The dialectic between locality and connectivity is explored through an archaeological investigation of themes such as the leading role of the indigenous communities and the contribution of crafts; the creation of a common ‘middle ground’ for ritual actions; and the shared memories of both communities in the construction of elite identities and hegemony.
In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, much of the rest of northwestern Europe joined Britain on the path of sustained economic growth. Several other economies began to grow as well, among them the United States and Japan. But many others lagged behind. Chapter 7 explains these divergent outcomes. It does so not by analyzing worldwide data on economic growth, but by examining telling examples of rapid economic progress and of stagnation and even impoverishment: France and Russia, the United States and Mexico, Japan and China, and – last but not least – Africa. These examples lead to important conclusions about economic growth in general and about how widely its rewards are shared. As we have seen, political institutions will matter, and so will religion. But inequality will make a big difference too. It may keep people from using their talents or create perverse political incentives that stifle education and the accumulation of human capital. The resulting differences in economic performance can persist for decades.
Why was Britain the first country in Europe to experience economic growth, with sustained technical change and the invention of machines that cut costs by taking over tasks previously done by hand? Cotton spinning is a striking example. In the 1700s, the world’s best spinners in India put in 50,000 hours to spin 100 pounds of cotton. By 1835, workers with machines took only 135. Technical change also generated new products and affected far more than the textile industry. Examples from 1700s would include the steam engine and new ways of making iron. One explanation for why Britain took the lead here was that its high wages boosted the demand for inventions of machines that could substitute for expensive labor. But closer inspection fails to support this argument. Rather, Britain had a more abundant supply of the skills and ideas that made technical change possible. We can see how they favored Britain by comparing two likely candidates for early industrialization: Lancashire in Britain and Normandy in France. The comparison highlights other advantages that benefited Britain as well, from agglomeration effects to the greater toll that land war took in Continental Europe.