Gervais & Fessler (G&F), recognizing that attitudes and emotions are highly intertwined in the social domain, make a compelling case for the value of reconciling distinct research traditions that have focused either on attitudes or on emotion in relative isolation. G&F provide a valuable discussion of why and how a broader lens should be used to examine the larger picture of social affect. Specifically, they focus on the unique social functions that are served through particular combinations of attitude and emotion.
The authors conceive of sentiments (such as contempt) as “functional networks of attitudes and emotions” that are organized around the “fitness affordances” – that is, likely costs and benefits of particular types of interactions – of others (sect. 4.2, para. 3). At the same time, the authors acknowledge considerable fluidity in the boundaries of sentiments (arguing, for example, that contempt can co-occur or overlap with love or anger to create pity or hate, respectively). What remains unclear in this formulation is whether and how natural selection could act upon sentiments, given the range of emotions and attitudes that the authors argue are encompassed within a single sentiment and the fluid boundaries that sentiments are proposed to have.
We commend the authors' broad aim of reconciling attitudes and emotions research. At the same time, we remain unconvinced that discrete sentiments such as contempt are themselves subject to selection pressures. Instead, we suggest that contempt emerges as a phenomenologically – and functionally – coherent construct because natural selection operates on underlying processes that, in combination, give rise to the subjective experience of a sentiment. Specifically, we posit that natural selection may act upon (1) basic affective reactions, (2) the cognitive capacity to hold stable representations of specific others in memory, and (3) the high-level ability to experience attitudes and emotions in flexible combinations in the service of particular social goals relative to specific individuals. In this conceptualization, further specification of discrete sentiments as units of functional specialization, or as distinct targets of evolutionary pressures, is unnecessary.
G&F (sect. 6.2, para. 8) discuss how certain neuroendocrine systems, such as oxytocin, may support specific sentiments (the authors do not specify a particular sentiment corresponding to oxytocin, but love might be a plausible candidate). We argue that a parsimonious interpretation of the prior research conducted on non-human animals does not require sentiments as an organizing construct. Instead, oxytocin seems to regulate basic affective and cognitive processes (e.g., desire for proximity; social recognition and memory) that yield attachment outcomes (e.g., proximity-seeking; social regulation of stress) to specific others (e.g., caregivers; mates; Donaldson & Young Reference Donaldson and Young2008; Insel & Young Reference Insel and Young2001). Infant–caregiver bonds and mated-pair bonds clearly serve functions with survival consequences, but these functions can be supported via oxytocin regulating basic affective reactions and cognitive representations (rather than via oxytocin regulating any particular sentiment directly). Oxytocin's basic functions across mammalian species are likely to be evolutionarily conserved. In humans, oxytocin's role in regulating affective and cognitive processes may operate in combination with our species' ability to experience attitudes and emotions in flexible combinations. Love may emerge as a coherent subjective experience out of the core processes that oxytocin supports, but the case for love itself as having an “evolved functional specialization” (sect. 4.1, para. 3) seems more tenuous when the role of oxytocin in the human species is considered alongside its role in other species' cognition and behavior.
Leaving aside the question of whether discrete sentiments are “evolved functional specializations” or not, G&F's discussion of individual differences in “sentiment profiles” of contempt provides interesting future directions for health psychology research. G&F describe a sentiment profile of contempt as an individual's proneness to feeling contempt (sect. 6.1, para. 5). The concept of hostility in health psychology – defined as a “negative attitude towards others, consisting of enmity, denigration, and ill will” (Smith Reference Smith, Siegman and Smith1994, p. 26) – maps well onto G&F's conceptualization of the “hot” aspects of contempt (i.e., anger, disgust, and laughter at the expense of others). A large body of research has linked hostility to coronary heart disease outcomes in both healthy and coronary heart disease populations (Chida & Steptoe Reference Chida and Steptoe2009; Smith et al. Reference Smith, Glazer, Ruiz and Gallo2004).
Several mechanisms explaining how hostility influences coronary heart disease have been proposed, including both behavioral and psychosocial mediators. Hostility and anger are linked to smoking, excessive alcohol consumption, greater fat and caloric intake, lower physical activity, and greater body mass (Bunde & Suls Reference Bunde and Suls2006; Miller et al. Reference Miller, Smith, Turner, Guijarro and Hallet1996). High levels of hostility and anger have also been proposed to create a pattern of “moving away” from others resulting in decreased social support, which could be a factor contributing to the association between hostility and coronary heart disease (target article: sect. 5.4, para. 4; Smith et al. Reference Smith, Glazer, Ruiz and Gallo2004).
G&F's ideas should prompt health researchers to consider the “cold” aspects of contempt (muted prosocial emotions such as compassion, guilt, and shame) in order to better understand the social isolation that has been associated with the “hot” (hostile) components of contempt. Speculatively, decreased levels of prosocial emotions might also result in higher levels of relationship strife and social isolation contributing to greater heart disease risk. Indeed, there is some evidence that lower trait levels of compassion are associated with less adaptive profiles of stress reactivity, including higher blood pressure reactivity and higher cortisol reactivity (Cosley et al. Reference Cosley, McCoy, Saslow and Epel2010). Considering the health implications of “cold” aspects of contempt that often co-occur with the more well-studied “hot” aspects could help researchers develop more comprehensive interventions for individuals with high-contempt sentiment profiles.
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Gervais & Fessler (G&F), recognizing that attitudes and emotions are highly intertwined in the social domain, make a compelling case for the value of reconciling distinct research traditions that have focused either on attitudes or on emotion in relative isolation. G&F provide a valuable discussion of why and how a broader lens should be used to examine the larger picture of social affect. Specifically, they focus on the unique social functions that are served through particular combinations of attitude and emotion.
The authors conceive of sentiments (such as contempt) as “functional networks of attitudes and emotions” that are organized around the “fitness affordances” – that is, likely costs and benefits of particular types of interactions – of others (sect. 4.2, para. 3). At the same time, the authors acknowledge considerable fluidity in the boundaries of sentiments (arguing, for example, that contempt can co-occur or overlap with love or anger to create pity or hate, respectively). What remains unclear in this formulation is whether and how natural selection could act upon sentiments, given the range of emotions and attitudes that the authors argue are encompassed within a single sentiment and the fluid boundaries that sentiments are proposed to have.
We commend the authors' broad aim of reconciling attitudes and emotions research. At the same time, we remain unconvinced that discrete sentiments such as contempt are themselves subject to selection pressures. Instead, we suggest that contempt emerges as a phenomenologically – and functionally – coherent construct because natural selection operates on underlying processes that, in combination, give rise to the subjective experience of a sentiment. Specifically, we posit that natural selection may act upon (1) basic affective reactions, (2) the cognitive capacity to hold stable representations of specific others in memory, and (3) the high-level ability to experience attitudes and emotions in flexible combinations in the service of particular social goals relative to specific individuals. In this conceptualization, further specification of discrete sentiments as units of functional specialization, or as distinct targets of evolutionary pressures, is unnecessary.
G&F (sect. 6.2, para. 8) discuss how certain neuroendocrine systems, such as oxytocin, may support specific sentiments (the authors do not specify a particular sentiment corresponding to oxytocin, but love might be a plausible candidate). We argue that a parsimonious interpretation of the prior research conducted on non-human animals does not require sentiments as an organizing construct. Instead, oxytocin seems to regulate basic affective and cognitive processes (e.g., desire for proximity; social recognition and memory) that yield attachment outcomes (e.g., proximity-seeking; social regulation of stress) to specific others (e.g., caregivers; mates; Donaldson & Young Reference Donaldson and Young2008; Insel & Young Reference Insel and Young2001). Infant–caregiver bonds and mated-pair bonds clearly serve functions with survival consequences, but these functions can be supported via oxytocin regulating basic affective reactions and cognitive representations (rather than via oxytocin regulating any particular sentiment directly). Oxytocin's basic functions across mammalian species are likely to be evolutionarily conserved. In humans, oxytocin's role in regulating affective and cognitive processes may operate in combination with our species' ability to experience attitudes and emotions in flexible combinations. Love may emerge as a coherent subjective experience out of the core processes that oxytocin supports, but the case for love itself as having an “evolved functional specialization” (sect. 4.1, para. 3) seems more tenuous when the role of oxytocin in the human species is considered alongside its role in other species' cognition and behavior.
Leaving aside the question of whether discrete sentiments are “evolved functional specializations” or not, G&F's discussion of individual differences in “sentiment profiles” of contempt provides interesting future directions for health psychology research. G&F describe a sentiment profile of contempt as an individual's proneness to feeling contempt (sect. 6.1, para. 5). The concept of hostility in health psychology – defined as a “negative attitude towards others, consisting of enmity, denigration, and ill will” (Smith Reference Smith, Siegman and Smith1994, p. 26) – maps well onto G&F's conceptualization of the “hot” aspects of contempt (i.e., anger, disgust, and laughter at the expense of others). A large body of research has linked hostility to coronary heart disease outcomes in both healthy and coronary heart disease populations (Chida & Steptoe Reference Chida and Steptoe2009; Smith et al. Reference Smith, Glazer, Ruiz and Gallo2004).
Several mechanisms explaining how hostility influences coronary heart disease have been proposed, including both behavioral and psychosocial mediators. Hostility and anger are linked to smoking, excessive alcohol consumption, greater fat and caloric intake, lower physical activity, and greater body mass (Bunde & Suls Reference Bunde and Suls2006; Miller et al. Reference Miller, Smith, Turner, Guijarro and Hallet1996). High levels of hostility and anger have also been proposed to create a pattern of “moving away” from others resulting in decreased social support, which could be a factor contributing to the association between hostility and coronary heart disease (target article: sect. 5.4, para. 4; Smith et al. Reference Smith, Glazer, Ruiz and Gallo2004).
G&F's ideas should prompt health researchers to consider the “cold” aspects of contempt (muted prosocial emotions such as compassion, guilt, and shame) in order to better understand the social isolation that has been associated with the “hot” (hostile) components of contempt. Speculatively, decreased levels of prosocial emotions might also result in higher levels of relationship strife and social isolation contributing to greater heart disease risk. Indeed, there is some evidence that lower trait levels of compassion are associated with less adaptive profiles of stress reactivity, including higher blood pressure reactivity and higher cortisol reactivity (Cosley et al. Reference Cosley, McCoy, Saslow and Epel2010). Considering the health implications of “cold” aspects of contempt that often co-occur with the more well-studied “hot” aspects could help researchers develop more comprehensive interventions for individuals with high-contempt sentiment profiles.