In their target article, Gervais & Fessler (G&F) develop a theoretical approach to understanding the role of contempt and use contempt as a case study to develop a broader argument about the architecture of basic affect systems (Attitude–Scenario–Emotion [ASE] model). A cornerstone of the article is that contempt is an attitude state defined as “an absence of respect” that potentiates the activation and deactivation of two different clusters of emotions (muted prosocial emotions and potentiated hostile emotions) (sect. 5.2). We believe this statement to be biologically and clinically implausible, and we argue that the available data from affective neuroscience and experimental psychopathology provide evidence that contempt is not an emotion, nor an attitude, but a reactive defensive mechanism evolved to help individuals to avoid and minimize the experience of self-harming emotions such as shame. We present three issues that are inconsistent with the authors' conclusions and support our view.

G&F identify “the absence of respect as the sentiment contempt” and propose “that the core of contempt is an attitude state that represents others' low intrinsic value to self, due to their inefficacy in adhering to social-relational standards; they have either failed to establish their worth or shown themselves unworthy of previous positive valuation” (sect. 5.2, also see their Fig. 1). Accordingly, in the sequence for generating contempt, first, cues to inefficacy and low value are detected (relational cues); then contempt is activated (attitude); then anger, disgust, and mirth are activated (emotions); finally, intolerance and exclusion are enacted (behaviors). In other words, the timeline of events according to the ASE model is stimulus → attitude → emotions → behavior. This assumption is not supported by affective neuroscience findings (Damasio Reference Damasio1999; Grecucci & Job Reference Grecucci and Job2015; Grecucci et al. Reference Grecucci, Theuninck, Frederickson, Job and Bryant2015; Panksepp Reference Panksepp1998). Emotion has a neurobiological primacy over cognition (attitudes) and behavioral responses in terms of temporal dynamics (emotional information is processed a few milliseconds before cognitive processes take place [Damasio Reference Damasio1999; LeDoux Reference LeDoux1998]) and anatomical circuitry (direct links between perceptual systems to detect salient stimuli and emotional structures, and then, higher cognition areas; Panksepp & Biven Reference Panksepp and Biven2012). It follows that a biologically plausible sequence is stimulus → emotion → behavior/cognition (Frederickson Reference Frederickson2013; Grecucci et al. Reference Grecucci, Frederickson and Job2017; Panksepp Reference Panksepp1998). This evidence contradicts the model presented in G&F's Figure 1. We suggest that for the ASE model to work, these findings should be incorporated in the model, which should be reformulated accordingly.

G&F argue that contempt shares some features of a sentiment. However, we see two major problems with this approach. On one hand, the nature of contempt is misunderstood; on the other hand, the link between contempt and emotions is unclear. A useful distinction from clinical psychology and psychotherapy is between emotions and defensive affects (Dadomo et al. Reference Dadomo, Grecucci, Giardini, Ugolini, Carmelita and Panzeri2016; Frederickson Reference Frederickson2013; Grecucci et al. Reference Grecucci, Recchia and Frederickson2016). The first refer to primary biologically generated emotions. They are elicited by specific stimuli and have certain temporal dynamics with specific strength and duration proportional to the relevance of the stimulus itself. The second, defensive affects, are generated by the operation of defensive mechanisms. They are not proportional to the entity of the stimulus and can be longstanding. Defensive affects serve to avoid and cover primary emotions. For their functions, defensive affects can be considered as part of defensive mechanisms typically used to ward off unwanted emotions (Vaillant Reference Vaillant1992, p. 238). We propose that contempt is not an emotion, nor a sentiment, but rather a defensive reaction that serves to protect the self against the experience of unpleasant emotions. The ASE model does not incorporate this distinction and is thus unclear regarding the nature of contempt.

Building on the previous considerations, we suggest that contempt is a defensive reaction to cope with the experience of shame. Robust clinical evidence indicates that shame-eliciting situations cause expressions of intense reactive contempt, anger and hostility (Izard Reference Izard1991; Kohut Reference Kohut1971; Lewis Reference Lewis1971; Nathanson Reference Nathanson1994; Tangney et al. Reference Tangney, Mashek and Stuewig2007). Lewis (Reference Lewis1971) first noted that patients' shame co-occurs with responses of humiliated fury and suggested that shame can elicit defensiveness, anger, and overt aggression. Shame rage or humiliated fury is thought to represent a defensive response to a wounded self (Stuewig et al. Reference Stuewig, Tangney, Heigel, Harty and McCloskey2010). Shamed individuals may become angry, blame others, and use contempt to regain a sense of agency and control (Gilligan Reference Gilligan, Cordess and Cox1996; Scheff Reference Scheff1987, pp. 109–49; Stuewig et al. Reference Stuewig, Tangney, Heigel, Harty and McCloskey2010; Tangney Reference Tangney1992; Tangney & Dearing Reference Tangney and Dearing2002). This is especially true for individuals with antisocial and narcissistic personality disorders, who suffer from excessive shame sensitivity. This sensitivity leads to the creation of a defensive pathological grandiose self that keeps the self-esteem at tolerable levels (Kernberg Reference Kernberg1984; Kohut Reference Kohut1971; McWilliams Reference McWilliams1994). When the grandiose self is publicly threatened with cues of inefficacy and low value, these individuals avoid the experience of shame by reacting with contempt, devaluation, and narcissistic rage, defense strategies designed to humiliate the offending person (Izard Reference Izard1991; Kernberg Reference Kernberg1984; Lewis Reference Lewis1971). This reaction aims to restore self-esteem and a pathologically positive self-view to protect the self from further harm (Kohut Reference Kohut1971). Recent experimental data from our lab show that individuals, when criticized for socially and morally unwanted aspects of the self, experience shame and subsequently react with anger towards others. Such anger reactions take the form of contempt aimed at devaluing and punishing the partner who criticized and shamed them (Grecucci et al., in preparation).

The above considerations allow us to frame the role and function of contempt, and its link with emotions, in a clear and consistent pattern. When someone is threatened by relational cues of inefficacy and low value (stimulus), shame is experienced (emotion). Contempt is not a feeling, but a defensive strategy to avoid shame. Contempt (as well as other cognitive and behavioral reactions) attempts to restore a positive self-image (defensive reaction) by devaluing the image of the other person. As it stands, G&F's framework cannot account for the pattern we have outlined on the basis of neuroscientific data and clinical observations, and we suggest that some aspects of G&F's approach need rethinking.