In the target article, Gervais & Fessler (G&F) propose the Attitude–Scenario–Emotion (ASE) model of sentiment as a remedy to a contemporary disconnect between the study of emotions and attitudes in social behavior. The authors use “contempt” as the main lever for their argument, providing a fascinating portrayal of its functions, cross-cultural instantiations, and potential phylogenetic origins to show that contempt is not simply a basic emotion or an attitude, but rather a functionally integrated network of emotions and attitudes called a sentiment. According to their model, “contempt” is only one of a number of distinct sentiments, including love, respect, hate, and fear, that both keep track of the value of relationships and facilitate commitment to them.
The ASE model productively focuses our attention on how complex networks of attitudes and emotions help us evaluate, react to, and act towards social partners, as well as the evolutionary functions of these networks. However, the focus on contempt rather than on better studied dimensions, such as warmth, competence, and closeness, makes it difficult to judge how the theory improves our understanding over and above an already growing literature on how people evaluate and act towards others. Here I describe some potential linkages that might inform the model as it is filled out with concrete examples in future work.
A recurring prediction in the target article is that contempt for another person will reduce prosocial behavior towards that person – muting prosocial emotions, undermining compassion, potentiating anger, promoting exploitation, and leading not only to relationship dissolution, but also avoidance, exclusion, mockery, and dehumanization (also see Figure 1 in the target article). This fits well with the folk concept of contempt and the negative connotations of the term. However, the article also raises the possibility that the effect of contempt can be completely reversed by another sentiment, love. In such situations, as with one's own young child or a beloved elderly community member, contempt and love together can lead to pity and related prosocial emotions and behaviors. In the English language at least, this seems like an odd way of talking about a loved one. It would be quite an emotional mind-bender to say, for example, that I love my child, but that I also have contempt for her. I'm fine calling my child helpless, needy, or incompetent, but saying I have contempt for her is a stretch. How such challenges arise in other languages and cultures remains to be seen, and is worth considering as the authors further elaborate and assess the ASE theory of sentiments.
A potentially simpler theory of contempt would build from well-established dimensions of warmth and competence already studied in social cognition (Cuddy et al. Reference Cuddy, Fiske and Glick2007; Fiske et al. Reference Fiske, Cuddy and Glick2007). According to this model, a dimension of warmth captures assessments of trustworthiness, liking, and loving. Orthogonally, a dimension of competence captures perceived ability, skills, and efficacy. In evolutionary terms, these are both plausibly cues to the magnitude and reliability of fitness benefits provided by others. The folk concept of “contempt” can easily fit into the low-warmth and low-competence quadrant of this two-dimensional model. Reframing contempt in this way also suggests why it doesn't sound right to view one's beloved young child with contempt. Contempt is not just about “looking down,” but rather about looking down with a lack of warmth or love towards that person. When considered in light of the warmth–competence model, perhaps one of the reasons contempt is an enigma is not that it is an emotionally pluripotent sentiment, but rather that it is a composite of two more basic ways of evaluating others.
In addition to making it easier to talk in English about how I view my young child, this alternative model allows us to compare ways of operationalizing how people evaluate their social partners. In fieldwork in the United States and in rural Bangladesh, respondents can readily talk about concepts like social closeness and liking (coinciding with a warmth dimension) and relative ability or need (coinciding with a competence dimension). In most cases, they don't protest when asked to rank or rate others along these dimensions, and they have reliable correlations with giving and helping (Hackman et al. Reference Hackman, Danvers and Hruschka2015; Reference Hackman, Munira, Khaleda and Hruschka2017). It would have been helpful if the article had discussed how readily people in different cultural settings could rate others in terms of how much contempt they feel towards those others.
The warmth–competence model has largely been applied to social judgments about groups and classes of people. However, it also has clear relevance to how people evaluate, react to, and act toward current and potential relationship partners. For example, the concept of social or emotional closeness in the literature on altruism in social relationships appears to map closely to the warmth dimension. Contrary to G&F's observation that attitudes are often poorly linked with behaviors, numerous studies have found reliable associations between perceived social closeness to a partner and giving both real and hypothetical stakes and helping in naturalistic settings (Aron et al. Reference Aron, Aron and Smollan1992; Bechler et al. Reference Bechler, Green and Myerson2015; Hackman et al. Reference Hackman, Danvers and Hruschka2015; Reference Hackman, Munira, Khaleda and Hruschka2017; Ma et al. Reference Ma, Pei and Jin2015; Rachlin & Jones Reference Rachlin and Jones2008).
I have focused here on the proposed sentiment of contempt because it was described in most detail in the target article. However, it is quite possible that other sentiments proposed by G&F, such as love, may pose similar challenges of definition and operationalization (Fisher et al. Reference Fisher, Aron, Mashek, Li and Brown2002; Hruschka Reference Hruschka2010; Sternberg Reference Sternberg1986). As the hypothesized structure of sentiments is more thoroughly fleshed out against existing and future empirical work, it will be exciting to see what sentiments finally emerge as distinct and functionally coherent. The ASE model may be useful, but it will require considerable working out with appropriate concrete examples and linkage with existing empirical work before this can be determined.
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In the target article, Gervais & Fessler (G&F) propose the Attitude–Scenario–Emotion (ASE) model of sentiment as a remedy to a contemporary disconnect between the study of emotions and attitudes in social behavior. The authors use “contempt” as the main lever for their argument, providing a fascinating portrayal of its functions, cross-cultural instantiations, and potential phylogenetic origins to show that contempt is not simply a basic emotion or an attitude, but rather a functionally integrated network of emotions and attitudes called a sentiment. According to their model, “contempt” is only one of a number of distinct sentiments, including love, respect, hate, and fear, that both keep track of the value of relationships and facilitate commitment to them.
The ASE model productively focuses our attention on how complex networks of attitudes and emotions help us evaluate, react to, and act towards social partners, as well as the evolutionary functions of these networks. However, the focus on contempt rather than on better studied dimensions, such as warmth, competence, and closeness, makes it difficult to judge how the theory improves our understanding over and above an already growing literature on how people evaluate and act towards others. Here I describe some potential linkages that might inform the model as it is filled out with concrete examples in future work.
A recurring prediction in the target article is that contempt for another person will reduce prosocial behavior towards that person – muting prosocial emotions, undermining compassion, potentiating anger, promoting exploitation, and leading not only to relationship dissolution, but also avoidance, exclusion, mockery, and dehumanization (also see Figure 1 in the target article). This fits well with the folk concept of contempt and the negative connotations of the term. However, the article also raises the possibility that the effect of contempt can be completely reversed by another sentiment, love. In such situations, as with one's own young child or a beloved elderly community member, contempt and love together can lead to pity and related prosocial emotions and behaviors. In the English language at least, this seems like an odd way of talking about a loved one. It would be quite an emotional mind-bender to say, for example, that I love my child, but that I also have contempt for her. I'm fine calling my child helpless, needy, or incompetent, but saying I have contempt for her is a stretch. How such challenges arise in other languages and cultures remains to be seen, and is worth considering as the authors further elaborate and assess the ASE theory of sentiments.
A potentially simpler theory of contempt would build from well-established dimensions of warmth and competence already studied in social cognition (Cuddy et al. Reference Cuddy, Fiske and Glick2007; Fiske et al. Reference Fiske, Cuddy and Glick2007). According to this model, a dimension of warmth captures assessments of trustworthiness, liking, and loving. Orthogonally, a dimension of competence captures perceived ability, skills, and efficacy. In evolutionary terms, these are both plausibly cues to the magnitude and reliability of fitness benefits provided by others. The folk concept of “contempt” can easily fit into the low-warmth and low-competence quadrant of this two-dimensional model. Reframing contempt in this way also suggests why it doesn't sound right to view one's beloved young child with contempt. Contempt is not just about “looking down,” but rather about looking down with a lack of warmth or love towards that person. When considered in light of the warmth–competence model, perhaps one of the reasons contempt is an enigma is not that it is an emotionally pluripotent sentiment, but rather that it is a composite of two more basic ways of evaluating others.
In addition to making it easier to talk in English about how I view my young child, this alternative model allows us to compare ways of operationalizing how people evaluate their social partners. In fieldwork in the United States and in rural Bangladesh, respondents can readily talk about concepts like social closeness and liking (coinciding with a warmth dimension) and relative ability or need (coinciding with a competence dimension). In most cases, they don't protest when asked to rank or rate others along these dimensions, and they have reliable correlations with giving and helping (Hackman et al. Reference Hackman, Danvers and Hruschka2015; Reference Hackman, Munira, Khaleda and Hruschka2017). It would have been helpful if the article had discussed how readily people in different cultural settings could rate others in terms of how much contempt they feel towards those others.
The warmth–competence model has largely been applied to social judgments about groups and classes of people. However, it also has clear relevance to how people evaluate, react to, and act toward current and potential relationship partners. For example, the concept of social or emotional closeness in the literature on altruism in social relationships appears to map closely to the warmth dimension. Contrary to G&F's observation that attitudes are often poorly linked with behaviors, numerous studies have found reliable associations between perceived social closeness to a partner and giving both real and hypothetical stakes and helping in naturalistic settings (Aron et al. Reference Aron, Aron and Smollan1992; Bechler et al. Reference Bechler, Green and Myerson2015; Hackman et al. Reference Hackman, Danvers and Hruschka2015; Reference Hackman, Munira, Khaleda and Hruschka2017; Ma et al. Reference Ma, Pei and Jin2015; Rachlin & Jones Reference Rachlin and Jones2008).
I have focused here on the proposed sentiment of contempt because it was described in most detail in the target article. However, it is quite possible that other sentiments proposed by G&F, such as love, may pose similar challenges of definition and operationalization (Fisher et al. Reference Fisher, Aron, Mashek, Li and Brown2002; Hruschka Reference Hruschka2010; Sternberg Reference Sternberg1986). As the hypothesized structure of sentiments is more thoroughly fleshed out against existing and future empirical work, it will be exciting to see what sentiments finally emerge as distinct and functionally coherent. The ASE model may be useful, but it will require considerable working out with appropriate concrete examples and linkage with existing empirical work before this can be determined.