Gervais & Fessler (G&F) hearken back to the formative years of social psychology to make a strong case for resuscitating the concept of a sentiment, or “a functional network of discrete emotions moderated across situations by an attitudinal representation of another person” (sect. 1.3, para. 1). We applaud their effort, and expect it to help bridge the largely disparate literatures on attitudes and emotions. Although it may be pragmatic for scientists to conceptualize constructs as primarily attitudinal or emotional – and carve out corresponding niches in circumscribed academic subfields – ample evidence suggests that many constructs involve components of both. For example, feelings-as-information theory suggests that individuals rely on momentary affect when making attitude-like evaluations (Schwarz Reference Schwarz, Van Lange, Kruglanski and Higgins2010), and functionalist models of distinct emotions often explicitly incorporate attitude-like evaluations of the self and others as necessary prerequisites for certain emotional experiences (e.g., Tracy & Robins Reference Tracy and Robins2004; Van Dijk et al. Reference van Dijk, Ouwerkerk, Smith and Cikara2015).

G&F propose a provisional set of sentiments that might serve unique social affordances (i.e., love, liking, respect, hate, fear; sect. 4.3). We would add another construct to this list – one that also does not fit well with current models of emotions or attitudes: humility. Like contempt, humility does not meet the standard criteria to be considered a basic emotion (Ekman Reference Ekman1992a); for example, it lacks a cross-culturally recognizable nonverbal expression, distinct physiological signature, and evidence of manifestation in any nonhuman species. However, also like contempt, humility is clearly an affective experience (Saroglou et al. Reference Saroglou, Buxant and Tilquin2008), and is characterized by several features typically used to define emotions (Izard Reference Izard2010), including antecedent cognitive appraisals (i.e., accurate evaluation of one's abilities) and activation of distinct cognitive-behavioral patterns (i.e., directing one's attention toward others and their accomplishments; Chancellor & Lyubomirsky Reference Chancellor and Lyubomirsky2013; Tangney Reference Tangney2000). Yet, alongside these emotion-like qualities, humility exhibits several features more characteristic of attitudes: it is thought to be a relatively enduring quality of persons (e.g., Kesebir Reference Kesebir2014; Peterson & Seligman Reference Peterson and Seligman2004) and is considered by some to be a judgment, composed of at least as much cognitive content as affective content (Davis et al. Reference Davis, Worthington and Hook2010).

Adding to this complexity, we recently found converging evidence across a series of studies examining lay experiences and semantic conceptualizations, as well as experts' reports, that humility is experienced in two distinct forms, each of which involves both emotional and attitudinal features (Weidman et al. Reference Weidman, Cheng and Tracy2016). The first of these, which we labeled appreciative humility based on its most representative feelings and thoughts, typically follows personal success; it is associated with compassion, grace, and understanding, and with traits such as high self-esteem, status, and agreeableness; and it motivates a behavioral orientation toward celebrating others. The second form, labeled self-abasing humility, is more likely to follow personal failures; is associated with feelings of submissiveness, unimportance, and worthlessness, and with traits such as low self-esteem and introversion; and motivates a behavioral orientation toward hiding from others.

In light of this complexity, how should humility be understood? To date, researchers have reached little consensus; humility has variously been described as a relationship-specific personality judgment (Davis et al. Reference Davis, Worthington and Hook2010), a personality trait (Kesebir Reference Kesebir2014), a hypo-egoic state (Kruse et al. Reference Kruse, Chancellor, Ruberton and Lyubomirsky2014), an emotion (Saroglou et al. Reference Saroglou, Buxant and Tilquin2008), spiritual intelligence (Emmons Reference Emmons1999), an accurate assessment of one's abilities (Tangney Reference Tangney2000), and a virtue (Chancellor & Lyubomirsky Reference Chancellor and Lyubomirsky2013; Peterson & Seligman Reference Peterson and Seligman2004). In the face of such disparate conceptualizations, the concept of sentiment could prove useful. Consistent with the first major component of G&F's definition, each form of humility involves several narrower distinct emotional experiences; for appreciative humility these include authentic pride and gratitude, and for self-abasing humility they include shame and embarrassment. Consistent with another major component of G&F's sentiment, each form of humility involves the adoption of a particular attitude toward a person. Episodes of appreciative humility promote a sense of appreciation toward others' accomplishments and a desire to connect with those individuals. Self-abasing humility also fosters an attitude toward a person, but, interestingly, that person is oneself. Indeed, this form of humility leads individuals to view themselves as unimportant, unintelligent, and incompetent, all of which reflect a negative attitudinal self-evaluation. If humility is a sentiment, this last finding suggests that sentiments may involve attitudinal representations of either another person or the self, suggesting a possible minor amendment to G&F's definition.

Conceptualizing humility as a sentiment may yield a much needed, more nuanced understanding of the construct. To date, humility has been portrayed as a universally positive characteristic, with wide ranging and somewhat disparate effects, such as attenuating death anxiety (Kesebir Reference Kesebir2014), reinforcing gratitude (Kruse et al. Reference Kruse, Chancellor, Ruberton and Lyubomirsky2014), fostering forgiveness (Davis et al. Reference Davis, Worthington, Hook, Emmons, Hill, Bollinger and Van Tongeren2013), promoting prosocial behavior (Exline & Hill Reference Exline and Hill2012; LaBouff et al. Reference LaBouff, Rowatt, Johnson, Tsang and Willerton2012), buffering against stress (Krause et al. Reference Krause, Pargament, Hill and Ironson2016), and facilitating self-control (Tong et al. Reference Tong, Tan, Chor, Koh, Lee and Tan2016). These findings likely result from the aforementioned contrasting conceptualizations of humility, as well as the fact that most researchers view humility as uniformly positive but do not specify what exactly it is (Peterson & Seligman Reference Peterson and Seligman2004). To date, these findings have not been integrated into a comprehensive theoretical model, leading to the conclusion that humility simply promotes a grab-bag of desirable outcomes. Yet it is not immediately clear why existential anxiety and gratitude – two entirely distinct emotional processes – would both be influenced by humility. Similarly, why would humility lead to both prosociality and increased self-control, given that the former requires focusing on others, whereas the latter involves focusing on (and withstanding) one's own desires? Crucially, conceptualizing humility as a sentiment could prompt researchers to move beyond viewing the construct as broadly and uni-dimensionally positive, toward building a more nuanced theory, as G&F have done for contempt (see their Figure 1 in the target article). This, in turn, might generate specific predictions regarding the elicitors, phenomenology, and functional consequences of humility.

In closing, we appreciate G&F's attempt to integrate constructs with both attitudinal and emotional components under the rubric of a sentiment, and believe it may foster novel insights into certain constructs that have defied proper classification – like contempt and humility.