This chapter shifts the focus to the impact of disciplinary theories and practices in international relations and international law on climate migrants, peoples displaced through climate change and environmental causes. In contrast to transnational business corporations who are empowered by domestic and transnational laws, climate migrants are disempowered by laws that deny them protection as refugees from the vicissitudes of climate change and environmental decay. Instead, climate migrants are injected into circuits of transnational value chains as commodified, migrant labour in the creation of a new precariat and proletariat under the transformation of transnational labour relations.

This chapter examines how race is used conceptually and as a set of practices in Russian politics. Race is a social construct that is made meaningful depending on the social context. As such, race is often used by political actors, or even by regular citizens, to highlight differences and create an “us versus them” paradigm that is mobilized to “other” a group or its members in pursuit of an agenda. We explore how race and racialization works in practice by looking in detail at migration, including at student migrants from Africa and China, labor migrants from Central Asia, and refugees from Ukraine.

This chapter looks at Romani migration to the Americas from a Canadian vantage point. It illuminates the continuities of transatlantic mobilities that have been peppered by moments of heightened visibility, a dynamic conditioned primarily by the interactions of kinship networks with the administrative state. One such visible moment was the arrival of Romani asylum seekers from Central and Eastern Europe to Canada in the early 2000s. The chapter places this episode into a wider migration context and, rather than foregrounding the singularity of this moment, it foregrounds the persistence of a Romani presence on the North American continent through less mediated moments. Relying on extensive oral histories and ethnographic fieldwork, it shows that Romani lives and diasporic ties have not only been shaped by Atlantic geopolitics, local realities and the connections between families and individuals, but also by attempts to control their movements seen by some as disorderly and dangerous.

Chapter 1 introduces the study’s five social categories (languages, religions, ethnicities, ethno-nations, and tribes) and their expressions in modern Iran. It explains multiple theoretical and methodological approaches to understanding these diverse types of people. It describes Iran’s positioning in the Persian Gulf region and compares its societies and cultures with those of neighboring countries. Refugees entering Iran include people fleeing from recent wars and conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq. Millions of Iranians emigrated since 1978, often motivated by the Islamic theocracy’s repressions. These emigrants reconfigured their identities as participants in the large, dispersed global diaspora of Iranians.

This chapter examines the conception, conduct and collapse of the 2000 Camp David Summit, analysing the roles of the American mediators and the Israeli and Palestinian delegations. The summit unfolded in four phases: initial exploration (11–15 July), intensive negotiation (16–19 July), a pause during President Bill Clinton’s trip to Japan (20–22 July) and final, unsuccessful attempts to secure an agreement (22–25 July). The chapter focuses on the leadership of Ehud Barak, Yasser Arafat and Clinton – each bearing substantial responsibility for the summit’s failure. Despite ambitious intentions, the gaps between the parties’ positions proved too wide to bridge within two weeks. Jerusalem and the Temple Mount emerged as the central obstacles, alongside the unresolved issue of Palestinian refugees’ right of return. Neither side was prepared – or politically able – to make the painful compromises required for peace. For Israel and the United States, Camp David ended in frustration and disillusionment; for the Palestinians, it ended in relief at resisting external pressure to concede core principles without sufficient guarantees. Ultimately, the summit exposed the profound mistrust, asymmetry and entrenched national narratives that continued to thwart a just and durable peace settlement.

This chapter examines the turbulent aftermath of Camp David, marked by the al Aqsa Intifada, escalating violence and renewed diplomatic efforts through the Clinton Parameters, the Taba talks and the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative (API). President Bill Clinton’s proposals sought compromise on core issues: Jerusalem would be divided along demographic lines – Arab areas under Palestinian sovereignty and Jewish areas under Israeli control – while the Haram al-Sharif and Western Wall would be separately administered. On refugees, Clinton distinguished between moral acknowledgement and practical resolution, proposing international compensation, resettlement and rehabilitation efforts. Despite these efforts, Israeli elections in February 2001 brought Ariel Sharon to power, ending prospects for immediate peace. The API, endorsed by the Arab League, offered Israel full normalisation in exchange for withdrawal to 1967 borders and a just refugee solution. While Yasser Arafat viewed it as a viable peace framework, Hamas rejected it outright, and Israel and the US showed little enthusiasm. Amid continued terror, Israel began constructing a separation barrier in 2003. The API was sidelined, and Palestinians turned to rocket attacks. The collapse of diplomacy led to years of violence and a prolonged stalemate in negotiations.

This chapter provides a comprehensive overview of the changing attitudes within the Norwegian labor movement towards Israel and the Palestinians from the late 1940s to the 1980s. Initially, Norway was a strong supporter of Israel, with prominent Labor Party figures expressing wholehearted support for the Jewish state. This support was rooted in sympathy for Holocaust survivors and solidarity with fellow leftists in the Zionist movement. However, a significant shift occurred during the 1970s and early 1980s. The Labor Party and the Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions began to adopt a more balanced approach, recognizing Palestinian rights and opening dialogue with the Palestine Liberation Organization. Several factors contributed to this shift. The Six-Day War in 1967 altered perceptions of Israel from a vulnerable state to a powerful military force. The Lebanese Civil War and Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in 1982 further damaged Israel’s image in Norway. Norwegian participation in the peacekeeping UN Interim Force in Lebanon exposed many Norwegians to the complexities of the conflict. This shift in Norwegian attitudes towards the Israeli–Palestinian conflict was part of a broader European trend and laid the groundwork for Norway’s later role in the Oslo Peace Process.

Chapter 9 revisits our central contributions and considers the scope conditions of our argument. While the underlying governance conditions of a recipient state matter for the impact of migration management aid, we argue that it is migration management aid itself, rather than the regime type of recipient states, that carries the risk of increased repression or worsening authoritarian practices. We argue that reform of migration management aid is possible but that it requires decoupling its focus on building the migration state capacity of recipient countries from more “traditional” development or humanitarian aid, and that it must be accompanied by stronger accountability measures. Finally, we consider the impacts of continuing migration management aid not only for recipient countries, but also for donor countries, particularly those in Europe. The EU’s willingness to forego normal procedures to quickly implement the EUTF has not only undermined its commitment to democracy but has also yielded ground to the political maneuvering of far-right parties, spelling disaster for its own citizens as well as noncitizens within and beyond its borders.

Chapter 5 explores how migration management aid impacts a democratic state like Kenya, in the context of its colonial legacy and contentious regional politics. While there have been two significant revisions of the Refugee Act (2006/2021), Kenyan refugee policy relies on a compromise: the government agreed to host thousands of refugees in camps in exchange for billions in aid and a shirking of responsibility for managing the camps. Within this context, the EUTF is the latest package of funding in which Europeans condition aid on reforms by the Kenyan government. The chapter traces the long history of migration and international meddling in Kenya from formal colonialism to independence, examining the role of migration aid in the de facto encampment policy and in the 2006 and 2021 reforms. Through various interventions supported by the EUTF, Kenyan elites gained important political and financial capital, while pushing unpopular migration policies. Despite some democratic progress, we document specific projects related to counterterrorism and peacebuilding that securitized migration in Kenya, justifying more repression and restrictive policies (pathways I, II, III).

Chapter 8 examines Sudan, which was engulfed in civil war at the time of writing. Sudan’s current and previous conflicts stem in part from British and Egyptian colonial policies that promoted competing Arab versus African identities within the country, and after independence the country fought two civil wars that stemmed from entrenched racial divisions. In 2014, Sudan became a key player in the EU’s externalization of migration control via the Khartoum Process, and then President Omar al-Bashir selected the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) as the central security force responsible for patrolling borders and building the enforcement capacity of the Sudanese state. Beginning in 2016, the EUTF allocated more than €200 million to Sudan, in addition to regional funding, to draft national legislation on migration management and human trafficking, to manage “return and reintegration” programs, and to further build the state’s capacity to address irregular migration. Sudan represents an extreme cautionary tale when it comes to migration management aid – EU funds increased the state’s capacity for repression (pathway I) – both toward migrants and its own citizens.

In this chapter, we trace the history of how the EU emerged as a leader in using development aid and diplomacy to restrict migration, particularly from Africa. We also broadly describe the scope of migration management projects, including their intended impact on state capacity, economic development, a country’s domestic governance including civil society, and the return of a country’s nationals via forced and voluntary repatriation. We then turn to the EUTF, analyzing where and how the EU spent more than €5 billion across the African continent. We explore which actors benefited the most, what projects received the most funding, and where these interventions had the most impact. Overall, the EUTF prioritized state capacity, security, and economic development, while civil society and other non-state actors received significantly smaller allocations.

Chapter 7 explores Egypt, a consolidated autocracy. Historically colonized by the French and British, Egypt also received substantial financial support from the United States. Egypt was initially less involved with Europe’s external migration approach throughout the 1990s and 2000s in comparison to neighboring countries, but in 2017 the EU and Egypt signed an agreement under the EUTF worth €60 million. The funding was divided among seven projects, ranging from institutional capacity building to job generation and entrepreneurship. The majority of EUTF funding went toward infrastructure improvement in line with the current President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi’s domestic priorities. In this way, migration management aid reinforced Egypt’s authoritarian rule through substitution (pathway II) and by channeling funding through patronage networks (pathway III). The EUTF’s predominant spending on local infrastructure projects tied beneficiaries to government networks, and also allowed the government to redirect its funding toward mega infrastructure projects built through military contracts, thereby further capacitating the regime’s repressive apparatus.

In this chapter, we define what migration management aid is and is not. We argue that migration management aid is a specialized kind of foreign aid because it aims to transform domestic migration institutions of recipient states, advocates for restrictive migration policies, and is ideologically motivated by the “root causes” of migration. The chapter also describes a brief history of foreign aid and migration, connecting the history of colonialism, imperialism, development, and migration controls.

Chapter 6 examines migration management aid in Ethiopia – a semi-democracy. Ethiopia’s history of foreign aid and migration is intertwined with intra-regional conflicts, the politicization of famine, and forced resettlement in service of centralizing control and statebuilding. The EU and its member states built on shifting alliances throughout the 1990s and 2000s to become the largest humanitarian and development donors in Ethiopia, all while pushing European interests in the region and overlooking the government’s human rights record. The EUTF grants fit within this pattern of conditional aid in which the EU dangled the carrot of €281 million, in exchange for ambitious promises to reform refugee protection. By the end of 2023, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, winner of the 2019 Nobel Peace Prize, had fought a devastating war in the Tigray region, relocated refugee camps, blocked aid to displaced people in Tigray, and redirected economic investments toward his allies. In the case of Ethiopia, migration management aid was used to tie domestic actors to central authorities in the refugee agency (pathway III), and ultimately to redirect aid away from Tigray (pathway II).