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This chapter on cryptography focuses on private-key encryption: Alice uses a secret key she shares with Bob to send him an encrypted message over a channel observed by an eavesdropper. Constructions of private-key encryption schemes can be based on pseudorandom generators, which in turn can be based on one-way functions (which are efficiently computable but not efficiently invertible). The chapter also covers constructions of pseudorandom functions, which are more general than pseudorandom generators and have several applications in cryptography and complexity theory.
What kind of Arctic actor will China be in 2050? China has entered the Arctic, and its future ambitions in the region are closely tied to its future trajectory in global politics. We conduct a scenario analysis of China’s ability to realise its Arctic ambitions in three scenarios: A continuation of the status quo (Ascendant China), Chinese economic stagnation (Stagnant China), and Chinese global hegemony (Triumphant China). We find that climate change will affect China differently in these scenarios. In Triumphant China, climate change can act as an enabler of Chinese ambitions, particularly regarding fishing and maritime transport. Even as a non-Arctic state, a Triumphant China will likely wield sufficient global power to realise its Arctic ambitions. In Ascendant China and Stagnant China, we find that climate change primarily acts as an obstacle to China’s Arctic ambitions. China would rely on its Russian partnership to a greater extent, limiting their ability to realise their ambitions. Without a strong Arctic foothold, climate change could cause regional changes too rapid and comprehensive for China to be able to adapt civilian and military capabilities to those changes. Finally, climate change may make Stagnant China more likely, as sea-level rise threatens China’s economic might.
In the face of the everchanging and increasingly complex regulatory and socio-technical challenges posed by AI and the Internet of Things, there is an urgent need for closer collaboration between technology designers and lawyers. Accountable Design provides a timely framework for bridging disciplines to design legally accountable technologies. Proposing the new concept of Accountable Design, Lachlan David Urquhart explores how to incorporate legal values into human-centered design processes. Three novel case studies ground discussion by showcasing uses of new technologies in cities, homes, and biometric applications while exploring how to design for privacy, security, trust, and safety. The book synthesizes insights from across technology law, human-computer-interaction, design research, science and technology studies, and philosophy of technology to address the challenges of building better technological design futures for humans and society.
The world order is undergoing significant changes, marked by growing contestation of the liberal international order (LIO). This article examines how these shifts are reflected in the way international security is conceptualised. It analyses changes in security conceptualisations at the level of both discourses and practices. At the discursive level, the article examines speeches by the five permanent members (P5) of the UN Security Council. It shows increasing contestation among the P5 over three interconnected dimensions of security: whether external interventions constitute security threats; whether individuals threatened by their own governments qualify as referent objects of security; and what role the UN should play as a subject providing security compared to host states. At the level of practice, the article analyses the evolution of UN peace operation mandates. It finds a gradual shift towards more state-centric security conceptualisations, reflected in a rise of minimalist mandates and a relative decrease of human-centric tasks. The findings indicate that the decline of the LIO is accompanied by growing competition in security understandings and a partial reassertion of state-centric approaches in both discourse and practice.
This chapter outlines approaches to studying security that deal with the following topics: (1) security amongst states, (2) the role of geography in defining that security, or so-called geopolitics, and (3) the concept of regional security. This lays the foundation for an in-depth study of Arctic security dynamics. In essence, security relations amongst states inherently entail a regional dimension (states of geographic proximity being more concerned with similar or the same security issues), although various approaches have grappled with this dimension in different ways.
This chapter introduces the book and its main themes and concepts. It starts with Arctic-specific examples including the maritime agreement between Norway and Russia, and the US interest in taking control over Greenland, to highlight how the notions of geography, security, and geopolitics are at the forefront of contemporary international relations. It then goes on to discuss the concepts of geopolitics, regions, and security regions that in turn frame the approach taken in this book to understand some fundamental questions about states, security, and geography.
This chapter examines the turbulent aftermath of Camp David, marked by the al Aqsa Intifada, escalating violence and renewed diplomatic efforts through the Clinton Parameters, the Taba talks and the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative (API). President Bill Clinton’s proposals sought compromise on core issues: Jerusalem would be divided along demographic lines – Arab areas under Palestinian sovereignty and Jewish areas under Israeli control – while the Haram al-Sharif and Western Wall would be separately administered. On refugees, Clinton distinguished between moral acknowledgement and practical resolution, proposing international compensation, resettlement and rehabilitation efforts. Despite these efforts, Israeli elections in February 2001 brought Ariel Sharon to power, ending prospects for immediate peace. The API, endorsed by the Arab League, offered Israel full normalisation in exchange for withdrawal to 1967 borders and a just refugee solution. While Yasser Arafat viewed it as a viable peace framework, Hamas rejected it outright, and Israel and the US showed little enthusiasm. Amid continued terror, Israel began constructing a separation barrier in 2003. The API was sidelined, and Palestinians turned to rocket attacks. The collapse of diplomacy led to years of violence and a prolonged stalemate in negotiations.
This chapter analyses the aftermath of the Oslo Accords, examining their achievements, limitations and lasting consequences. In 1994, Yasser Arafat, Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres received the Nobel Peace Prize for their peace efforts. The Declaration of Principles (DoP) created the Palestinian Authority (PA), granting it control over civilian affairs and internal security, while Israel retained external security. Key milestones followed: Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and Jericho (May 1994), Arafat’s return to Gaza (July) and Oslo II (September 1995), which divided the West Bank into Areas A, B and C – an arrangement that heavily favoured Israel and fragmented Palestinian governance.
Implementation quickly faltered. Hamas and Islamic Jihad exploited PA weaknesses, while suicide bombings in Israeli cities shattered trust. Rabin’s assassination in 1995 devastated the process, and Benjamin Netanyahu’s 1996 election halted progress. President Bill Clinton’s 1998 Wye River Summit and the 1999 Sharm El Sheikh Memorandum revived talks briefly, but by not sufficiently addressing core issues – settlements and terrorism – the Oslo process remained fragile and ultimately failed to achieve lasting peace.
In this chapter, we trace the history of how the EU emerged as a leader in using development aid and diplomacy to restrict migration, particularly from Africa. We also broadly describe the scope of migration management projects, including their intended impact on state capacity, economic development, a country’s domestic governance including civil society, and the return of a country’s nationals via forced and voluntary repatriation. We then turn to the EUTF, analyzing where and how the EU spent more than €5 billion across the African continent. We explore which actors benefited the most, what projects received the most funding, and where these interventions had the most impact. Overall, the EUTF prioritized state capacity, security, and economic development, while civil society and other non-state actors received significantly smaller allocations.
This paper takes up a case of constrained militarisation in the most militarised region in the world. After decades of external threats culminating in the 1990 Iraqi invasion, oil-rich Kuwait launched a massive effort to modernise and expand its armed forces. By the 2000s, however, those efforts had stagnated, while its equally oil-rich neighbours in the Arabian Gulf initiated successful campaigns to upgrade their defence sectors. Prevailing theories struggle to predict this puzzling outcome. Kuwait has all the structural attributes that would facilitate rapid militarisation: it is a small state suffering from territorial insecurity, governed by a rentier authoritarian monarchy whose martial aspirations were supported by US hegemonic interests. To account for this counter-intuitive result, this paper presents domestic politics as a critical explanatory variable. Kuwait’s large-scale military build-up in the 1990s broached domestic political disputes, subjecting elite decision-making to popular pressures that ultimately scuttled the ruling monarchy’s ambitions. It delivers a focal case study of a failed US–Kuwaiti arms deal in the late 1990s to illustrate how internal contestation over domestic issues like corruption and fiscal mismanagement can restrict militaristic imperatives, even if the state leadership has the incentive and resources to pursue such policies.
Is the Arctic destined for conflict, or can cooperation prevail? This timely book explores the complex interplay of security, geography, and regions in the Arctic. Moving beyond simplistic narratives of geopolitical rivalry, it offers a nuanced, multilevel analysis of state security practices, foreign policies, and regional cooperation across distinct subregions. Challenging conventional notions of 'regions' and re-evaluating the role of geographic proximity, it provides fresh insights into how states engage with their neighbours. It also explores the enduring relevance of geography in international relations, demonstrating how the concept of an 'Arctic region' can be a powerful framework but also rests on some false assumptions. Essential for scholars, students, and policymakers, Arctic Geopolitics reshapes our understanding of security dynamics in the Arctic and beyond. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.
Chapter 5 reviews the tensions that arise between the Liberal ideology’s broader goal of establishing and enforcing the rule of law, including sovereign equality, and states’ perennial interest in using trade as an instrument of influence. The multilateral system is founded upon a bedrock principle of non-discrimination, and yet statesmen have a natural desire to treat allies better than adversaries. The chapter explores how philosophers and statesmen manage these tensions in theory and in practice, distinguishing first between the ideas on the left and the right and then between the strategies of the British and American hegemons. This introduction to the two leaders’ differing objectives and styles sets up the detailed histories that follow.
The final chapter of this book considers external challenges – namely, discourses and regulatory moves driven by concerns about state sovereignty and, relatedly, security and development – to the dual-sided framework in the current digital era. It starts by discussing to what extent China provides a counter-model to the liberal conception of information freedom and the dual-sided framework and argues that there is not really a Chinese (counter-)model. It moves to consider other Global South countries, looking at firstly Brazil and India and then the peripheries of the periphery. It argues that placed in a chain of dependence, practices of Global South countries generally do not present fundamental challenges to the dual-sided framework despite their genuine normative contestations. The chapter finally moves to recent sovereignist policies and discourses from the Western liberal world and observes that the main challenge to the dual-sided framework comes from an increasingly fascist United States.
Chapter 13 reviews where the US-China trade war fits in the larger competition between these two states, with special emphasis on national security as a justification for trade restrictions. These issues are explored at both at the strategic (economy-wide) and tactical (sectoral) levels, starting with a review of where the trade war fits in current thinking on law, military science, and technological innovation. The analysis turns to a more detailed review of the rationales for, and impact of, specific actions that the Trump and Biden administrations have taken to control trade. The sectors reviewed include agriculture, rare earths, energy, steel and other metals, arms and dual-use goods, and goods and services in the communications sector.
The growing literature on populism and international security portrays populist governments as particularly prone to confrontational security politics. Yet whether populist rhetoric translates into substantive changes in security policy remains contested. We argue that populist governments exert uneven influence across different dimensions of security policy-making, with greater capacity to reshape the ideational and institutional dimensions than the geopolitical, operational, and material ones. To explain this variation, we develop a five-dimensional framework of security policy-making and apply it to Poland under the Law and Justice (PiS) government (2015–23). Drawing on official documents, secondary sources, and twenty-eight anonymised interviews with policymakers and security experts, we examine how populist discourse translated into policy change. We find that PiS successfully politicised security narratives, broadened threat perceptions, and intensified the domestic use of security discourse, while largely maintaining continuity in Poland’s strategic orientation. Major shifts in defence policy were driven primarily by Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine rather than by PiS’s populist agenda. The Polish case demonstrates that the effects of populism vary systematically across different dimensions of security policy-making and are conditioned by geopolitical constraints, institutional resilience, alliance commitments, and external shocks. The article contributes to debates on populism and international security by specifying the conditions under which populist governments are – and are not – able to produce lasting security policy change.
Ad hoc coalitions (AHCs) have been a persistent feature of global governance. However, only recently have they become the focus in governance scholarship. Why are they created, and how do they vary in their composition and afterlife? We examine AHCs since 1919 across health and security governance challenges. Our analysis rests on archival material from international organizations (IOs) and national governments. We argue that, in bringing together political rivals, AHCs serve three primary purposes. Firstly, as agenda setters, they address new governance challenges. Secondly, as capacity generators, they reshuffle membership compositions. Finally, as decision accelerators, they enable their members to bypass existing IOs. Beyond these commonalities, notable differences exist that are rooted in relative issue salience. Less salient issues are often led by bureaucrats and experts, glossing over political agendas and mediating between rivals. This set-up often leads to permanent cooperative structures. Issues that decision-makers perceive as highly salient occupy the attention of politicians who want to keep the coalition small. As a result, rivalries can easily come to the fore, leading to short-lived coalitions. Overall, AHCs point to more or less exclusionary action that serves as a testing ground for international cooperation in times of uncertainty and (geo)political crises.
We step inside a closed-door customs committee meeting in Brussels, following Louise and her colleagues his chapter offers a rare, immersive account of a customs committee working group, where twenty-seven member states, interpreters and Commission officials grapple with the minutiae of classifying consumer goods – from vacuum cleaner parts to decorative balloons – amidst a whirlwind of digital tools, linguistic compromises and political maneuvering.
Through vivid ethnographic detail, we reveal how EU law is crafted. Here, the classical diplomat – negotiator, mediator, generalist – confronts the realities of digital mediation. Through Louise’s eyes, and in rare ethnographic detail, we witness the labour of multilingual lawmaking: interpreters juggling languages and distractions, delegates scrolling for images to clarify a product’s classification and the relentless clicking of keyboards as twenty-seven member states haggle over every word, comma and image in a three-column Word document.
This chapter reveals how digital technologies, while promising efficiency and speed, also fragment attention and introduce new layers of complexity. The negotiation room becomes a microcosm of the EU’s ‘Brussels effect’ – its power to set global standards – where the mundane (classifying vacuum cleaner parts or decorative balloons) intersects with the monumental (shaping trade, safety, and environmental rules for 500 million citizens). As interpreters and diplomats alike rely on digital tools to bridge linguistic and political divides, the chapter asks: How is the craft of diplomacy transformed when screens and algorithms mediate human judgement? And what does this mean for the future of EU governance, as AI begins to reshape the invisible labor that keeps the Union running?
The fifth chapter examines the European Union’s course correction since the late 2000s, which is characterised by a paradigm shift away from market-oriented liberalisation towards a comprehensive security orientation. Empirically, the chapter is dedicated to EU crisis management between 2009 and 2025, examining key events such as the Eurozone crisis, the migration crisis, Brexit, the Covid-19 pandemic, and the war in Ukraine. The analysis considers both institutional changes and the development of political narratives and priorities. It identifies a third major transformation of European integration, after those of the 1950s and the 1970s/80s. This change was brought about not by planned reforms, but by crisis-driven adjustments. The new security orientation reflects both the loss of post-Cold War optimism and the realisation that the EU must act in an increasingly dangerous world. While this transformation has strengthened the EU’s ability to survive, questions remain about the democratic legitimacy and effectiveness of the new security architecture.
This article tests claims from the comparative extractive literature by examining how state-company linkages shape civil society mobilization against extractive projects. We focus on convenios de cooperación (CCs)—contracts through which extractive companies finance branches of the Colombian armed forces or judiciary to provide security for company operations. We employ a mixed-methods design. First, we analyze a panel dataset of nearly six hundred contracts signed between 2002 and 2020, assessing their relationship to threats, assassinations of social leaders, arbitrary detentions, and other security indicators across municipalities. We then pair this statistical analysis with fieldwork in two case study sites: Jericó, Antioquia, and the Ariari region of Meta. Our analysis asks two central questions. How do CCs fit into extractive companies’ broader repertoires of community control? And what do they mean for civil society mobilization—how are they lived and felt on the ground? Findings reveal sectoral variation and differences in how CCs are activated and experienced over time. By introducing the first systematic dataset on CCs, we make visible a widespread but understudied mechanism through which firms embed repressive capacity in state security apparatuses, thereby advancing debates on corporate counterinsurgency, protest criminalization, and security governance in Latin America.
COVID-19 deepened the interface between health and security, making information the decisive currency of collaboration. This paper foregrounds the “confidentiality–utility dilemma”: how health and security communities—each premised on strict secrecy in distinct operational contexts—can share information without undermining the other side’s core values. We argue that purposeful managerial design is both necessary and feasible. First, we address the structural limitations of global rule-making and the concomitant drift toward diversification of sources and strengthened capabilities to uncover hidden information that renders security-sector actors increasingly relevant. Drawing on previous assessments and cases, we reformulate the importance of three managerial levers: (1) organizational and structural interventions including two-tier arrangements; (2) tiered classification and de-identification that embed share-by-design access controls for both health and security data; and (3) joint investigations and co-analysis, exemplified by UN-SGM (United Nations Secretary-General’s Mechanism)-type mechanisms, which can act as clearinghouses by enabling full sharing within the team while preserving external neutrality.