The concluding chapter by Klaus Brummer and Sumit Ganguly first summarizes the main findings of the volume with regard to its main explanatory factors for transnational repression, in the form of salience, state capacity, regime type, and host state characteristics. It then engages in a discussion of the policy implications of the volume’s country studies. After that, it highlights various avenues for future research. The chapter ends with a brief outlook, which suggests that there is no reason to expect transnational repression to disappear anytime soon. Already now, the costs of engaging in transnational repression seem limited. The country chapters have shown that most countries get away with it most of the times. The likely continued erosion of the liberal international order should further decrease both the normative and the political costs of engaging in transnational repression. This, in turn, should continue to embolden states to use various tools and tactics to repress their nationals abroad.

The introductory chapter sets the scene for the following discussions. It starts with defining the phenomenon of transnational repression, suggesting that at its core, transnational repression is about extraterritorial repressive actions by states against members of their national community abroad. The discussions similarly highlight the scope and relevance of said phenomenon for international politics. More specifically, the chapter suggests that transnational repression can be approached along three dimensions. First, what are the motives for states to engage in transnational repression (the “why”)? Second, what instruments and tactics do states employ when engaging in acts of transnational repression (the “how”)? Third, what are the implications and consequences of transnational repression (the “so what”)? The chapter points to four possible answers to, or explanatory factors for, transnational repression. Those factors are: salience; state capacity; regime type; and host state characteristics. It is those factors that the country chapters contained in this volume address in their discussions of a total of fourteen states from both the global north and the global south.

As the Egyptian diaspora grew following the 2011 uprising and 2013 military coup to include larger numbers of Muslim Brotherhood members and liberal activists, the Egyptian government increasingly turned to transnational repression to instill fear in its nationals abroad, including threats, punishment, surveillance, and by arresting or detaining individuals who decide to return home. In addition to these overt methods, I suggest in this chapter that Egypt’s use of transnational repression can also be less direct and more ambiguous, leaving diaspora members uncertain of how to act and, in some cases, preventing their return to Egypt out of fear. Coupled together, these direct and indirect methods have made Egypt a critical case study to understand the strategies by which lower-state capacity countries attempt to control and repress their diaspora from afar. This chapter draws on an analysis of reports from human rights organizations, journalistic accounts, as well as interviews to assess the impact that different forms of transnational repression have for Egyptian nationals and the country as a whole. It also argues that Egypt’s unfettered use of repression toward its domestic and diaspora populations will likely continue so long as foreign investors and partner countries refrain from adequately critiquing its actions.

This chapter on cryptography focuses on private-key encryption: Alice uses a secret key she shares with Bob to send him an encrypted message over a channel observed by an eavesdropper. Constructions of private-key encryption schemes can be based on pseudorandom generators, which in turn can be based on one-way functions (which are efficiently computable but not efficiently invertible). The chapter also covers constructions of pseudorandom functions, which are more general than pseudorandom generators and have several applications in cryptography and complexity theory.

This chapter outlines approaches to studying security that deal with the following topics: (1) security amongst states, (2) the role of geography in defining that security, or so-called geopolitics, and (3) the concept of regional security. This lays the foundation for an in-depth study of Arctic security dynamics. In essence, security relations amongst states inherently entail a regional dimension (states of geographic proximity being more concerned with similar or the same security issues), although various approaches have grappled with this dimension in different ways.

This chapter introduces the book and its main themes and concepts. It starts with Arctic-specific examples including the maritime agreement between Norway and Russia, and the US interest in taking control over Greenland, to highlight how the notions of geography, security, and geopolitics are at the forefront of contemporary international relations. It then goes on to discuss the concepts of geopolitics, regions, and security regions that in turn frame the approach taken in this book to understand some fundamental questions about states, security, and geography.

This chapter examines the turbulent aftermath of Camp David, marked by the al Aqsa Intifada, escalating violence and renewed diplomatic efforts through the Clinton Parameters, the Taba talks and the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative (API). President Bill Clinton’s proposals sought compromise on core issues: Jerusalem would be divided along demographic lines – Arab areas under Palestinian sovereignty and Jewish areas under Israeli control – while the Haram al-Sharif and Western Wall would be separately administered. On refugees, Clinton distinguished between moral acknowledgement and practical resolution, proposing international compensation, resettlement and rehabilitation efforts. Despite these efforts, Israeli elections in February 2001 brought Ariel Sharon to power, ending prospects for immediate peace. The API, endorsed by the Arab League, offered Israel full normalisation in exchange for withdrawal to 1967 borders and a just refugee solution. While Yasser Arafat viewed it as a viable peace framework, Hamas rejected it outright, and Israel and the US showed little enthusiasm. Amid continued terror, Israel began constructing a separation barrier in 2003. The API was sidelined, and Palestinians turned to rocket attacks. The collapse of diplomacy led to years of violence and a prolonged stalemate in negotiations.

This chapter analyses the aftermath of the Oslo Accords, examining their achievements, limitations and lasting consequences. In 1994, Yasser Arafat, Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres received the Nobel Peace Prize for their peace efforts. The Declaration of Principles (DoP) created the Palestinian Authority (PA), granting it control over civilian affairs and internal security, while Israel retained external security. Key milestones followed: Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and Jericho (May 1994), Arafat’s return to Gaza (July) and Oslo II (September 1995), which divided the West Bank into Areas A, B and C – an arrangement that heavily favoured Israel and fragmented Palestinian governance.

Implementation quickly faltered. Hamas and Islamic Jihad exploited PA weaknesses, while suicide bombings in Israeli cities shattered trust. Rabin’s assassination in 1995 devastated the process, and Benjamin Netanyahu’s 1996 election halted progress. President Bill Clinton’s 1998 Wye River Summit and the 1999 Sharm El Sheikh Memorandum revived talks briefly, but by not sufficiently addressing core issues – settlements and terrorism – the Oslo process remained fragile and ultimately failed to achieve lasting peace.

In this chapter, we trace the history of how the EU emerged as a leader in using development aid and diplomacy to restrict migration, particularly from Africa. We also broadly describe the scope of migration management projects, including their intended impact on state capacity, economic development, a country’s domestic governance including civil society, and the return of a country’s nationals via forced and voluntary repatriation. We then turn to the EUTF, analyzing where and how the EU spent more than €5 billion across the African continent. We explore which actors benefited the most, what projects received the most funding, and where these interventions had the most impact. Overall, the EUTF prioritized state capacity, security, and economic development, while civil society and other non-state actors received significantly smaller allocations.

Chapter 5 reviews the tensions that arise between the Liberal ideology’s broader goal of establishing and enforcing the rule of law, including sovereign equality, and states’ perennial interest in using trade as an instrument of influence. The multilateral system is founded upon a bedrock principle of non-discrimination, and yet statesmen have a natural desire to treat allies better than adversaries. The chapter explores how philosophers and statesmen manage these tensions in theory and in practice, distinguishing first between the ideas on the left and the right and then between the strategies of the British and American hegemons. This introduction to the two leaders’ differing objectives and styles sets up the detailed histories that follow.

The final chapter of this book considers external challenges – namely, discourses and regulatory moves driven by concerns about state sovereignty and, relatedly, security and development – to the dual-sided framework in the current digital era. It starts by discussing to what extent China provides a counter-model to the liberal conception of information freedom and the dual-sided framework and argues that there is not really a Chinese (counter-)model. It moves to consider other Global South countries, looking at firstly Brazil and India and then the peripheries of the periphery. It argues that placed in a chain of dependence, practices of Global South countries generally do not present fundamental challenges to the dual-sided framework despite their genuine normative contestations. The chapter finally moves to recent sovereignist policies and discourses from the Western liberal world and observes that the main challenge to the dual-sided framework comes from an increasingly fascist United States.

Chapter 13 reviews where the US-China trade war fits in the larger competition between these two states, with special emphasis on national security as a justification for trade restrictions. These issues are explored at both at the strategic (economy-wide) and tactical (sectoral) levels, starting with a review of where the trade war fits in current thinking on law, military science, and technological innovation. The analysis turns to a more detailed review of the rationales for, and impact of, specific actions that the Trump and Biden administrations have taken to control trade. The sectors reviewed include agriculture, rare earths, energy, steel and other metals, arms and dual-use goods, and goods and services in the communications sector.