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This chapter studies the golden years of the PSBR and how this facilitated the rise of neoliberal policy languages. The PSBR acquired magnetic features for policy debates after a combination of government strategic ambiguity, unfavorable international comparisons, erratic forecasting, and weaponization by different actors boosted its salience and left it at the center of national framing contests about the impact of economic policy on, for example, inflation, industrial investment, economic growth, the balance of payments and macroeconomic stability more generally. The chapter first looks at how the 1974-1979 Labour governments lost control of the terms of public economic policy debate and the PSBR became the centerpiece of public economic policy debate despite government elites’ reframing attempts. The government ended up elevating the PSBR to the status of official fiscal policy indicator even if it had not been devised for such purpose and government elites had explicitly discouraged its use for demand management appraisal. The chapter then traces how the PSBR became the deliberate cornerstone of economic policy during the 1980s Conservative governments.
Chapters 5 and 6 offer novel explanations of the politics of shrinking policy space in the 1970s by tracing how (i) structural changes in the economic and institutional environments, (ii) strategic interactions between policymakers, civil servants, trade unions, financial investors, and international organizations, among others, and (iii) specific policy and cognitive devices combined to constrain government elites’ perceived menu of available policy options. Chapter 5 studies the strategic interactions between policymakers intending to legitimize an active fiscal policy and uncooperative financial markets. It argues that the institutional and cognitive underpinnings of the relational setting of sovereign debt shaped government elites’ (and financial investors’) understandings of economic policy options, and proposes the notion of an economic policy trilemma to explain and theorize the way in which financial confidence became a binding constraint to government policy.
This paper investigates the heterogeneous effects of monetary policy on house prices across US metropolitan areas with different urban growth. Based on a simple two-period model, we demonstrate that the interaction of population growth and land scarcity generates cross-regional heterogeneity. When undeveloped land is scarce, population growth intensifies future land shortages, leading to larger house price responses to monetary policy shocks. We then estimate the effect of housing price response following a monetary policy shock using monthly data across 375 US metropolitan statistical areas. Consistent with the theoretical proposition, we find that house prices in high urban growth areas are more responsive to monetary policy shocks than in low urban growth areas. We also construct a novel dataset on land scarcity using a recently released land cover database, and find supporting evidence for its important role in shaping housing supply and regional heterogeneity in the transmission of monetary policy to house prices.
This study estimates the dynamic effect of monetary policy on the labor share in the Euro Area. We adapt panel local projections to the Double/Debiased Machine Learning estimator, developed for causal inference in high-dimensional control settings. We find robust evidence that the labor share increases after a monetary policy tightening. The response reflects a broad contractionary transmission mechanism: output, labor productivity, employment, investment, and prices decline, while average real wages adjust less persistently. This pattern is consistent with recent evidence showing that monetary contractions raise the labor share because labor productivity falls more than real wages. Our results indicate that a causal Machine Learning estimator can recover plausible monetary policy innovations and deliver price- and production-puzzle-free responses without relying on high-frequency instruments.
At the outset of the Song dynasty, the western region of Sichuan was unique in its reliance on iron coin, an even more cumbersome currency than bronze coin. In the 990s, private merchants in Sichuan began to issue paper bills known as jiaozi, which initially found favor as a means of intraregional exchange. But the circulation of these private bills foundered as many issuers became insolvent. Attempts at state regulation failed, leading to a state takeover of the jiaozi paper currency in 1024. Subsequently, jiaozi bills became a success and were adopted as the region’s monetary standard for both public and private payments, reducing iron coins to a subsidiary currency. The success of jiaozi stemmed both from its greater efficiency in long-distance trade and its place in “fiscal circulation” – the monetization of taxation, interregional transfers of revenues, and state procurement and expenditure – that became hallmarks of Song political economy.
During the Northern Song period, paper money remained confined to the Sichuan region. After the loss of North China to the invading Jurchen (Jin Empire) in 1127, the Song state was confronted with even more dire military and fiscal challenges. In the 1160s, the court sanctioned the issue of a new paper currency (huizi) in most of its territories. Other regional paper currencies were created for circulation in the frontier regions along the Song–Jin border, dividing the Song realm into four monetary regions, each with its own distinct paper currency. Despite much debate over the feasibility of paper currency, the huizi bills won favor in the marketplace, in part because of the state’s strategy of using silver as an implicit reserve currency to maintain their value. The Jin also adopted paper currency as a substitute for bronze coin but encountered more severe problems in sustaining its market value.
Using the Gordon growth model, this paper investigates monthly fluctuations in the US housing market. The investigation is based on a vector autoregressive model with fixed coefficients that can explain the broad movements in housing volatility at the zip code level. The corresponding variance decomposition analysis further shows that the housing premium is the main driver of housing market fluctuations. Motivated by previous studies and using impulse response functions, it is also investigated how different components of the housing market respond over time to a shock in the interest rate in zip codes with different levels of income or demographics. The corresponding results reveal that the rent growth channel of monetary policy is effectively blocked in zip codes with lower income, higher female or minority populations, or lower education, while remaining functional in less vulnerable areas. These findings lead to important policy suggestions for targeted interventions.
We study real and monetary growth models with households endowed with limited foresight and planning only for a finite number of periods, despite being infinitely lived (myopia). In the real model, there emerges a unique Balanced Growth Path ($BGP$) characterized by sub-optimal capital accumulation. However, by relaxing myopia, it converges to the $BGP$ of the economy with perfect foresight. We then prove the existence of equilibria where money, even in absence of financial frictions or liquidity constraints, is positively valued and non-neutral, in contrast to usual results in infinite horizon. Specifically, there arise two monetary $BGPs$, where money is non-neutral along the first one and neutral along the second one. Eventually, we perform a global stability analysis and identify the optimal monetary policy maximizing welfare.
This paper tests the Milton Friedman hypothesis that money growth variability affects the velocity of money. It compares the Federal Reserve’s simple-sum monetary aggregates, the original (non-credit-card-augmented) Divisia aggregates, and the credit-augmented Divisia and credit-augmented Divisia inside monetary aggregates using two classes of empirical models. Standard Granger causality tests and a bivariate structural GARCH-in-Mean VAR model examine how money growth variability affects the consumption and income velocity of money. Using monthly data for the post-2006 period, when all monetary indicators are available, the findings reject the Friedman hypothesis when money supply volatility is modeled explicitly using recent advances in macroeconometrics and financial econometrics. This result is robust to a longer sample extending back to 1967 with monthly and quarterly data, across alternative model specifications. From a policy standpoint, this enhances the predictability and reliability of monetary policy actions aimed at stabilizing the economy using monetary aggregates.
I use a combination of a structural dynamic factor model and quantile regressions to study how monetary policy shocks affect the predicted distributions of GDP growth and inflation in the US. Contractionary monetary policy shocks shift the expected distribution of GDP growth to the left and deepen its two modes. The expected distribution of inflation is spread out and retains significant probability mass for inflation increases.
Central banking and monetary policy face particular challenges in heterogenous and multilevel currency areas. And yet, most literature on central banking, like most modern central banks themselves, assumes the validity of a unitary monetary authority implementing uniform monetary policy, even in compound polities. Here, I explore the dilemmas of central banking and monetary policy in politically decentralized currency areas by analyzing the origins of the Federal Reserve Act of 1913 and its provisions for a multilevel governance structure and decentralized monetary policy. The origins of the Federal Reserve remain puzzling because its decentralized structure is often dismissed as a failed experiment or a political compromise that nobody truly wanted. However, I find that its design was the product of a deliberate political effort to reimagine central banking in a federal society, and I trace the idea of a decentralized “central” bank to a distinct interpretation of the American political-constitutional tradition.
This chapter reviews the Bank of England’s use of QE since the global financial crisis. It takes stock of research from the Bank of England and elsewhere on its impact and effectiveness, drawing out the implications for monetary policy.
We investigate the aggregate effects of household debt on a monetary policy easing shock using a smooth transition vector autoregression model. Using generalized impulse response functions, we measure whether the effect of a reduction in interest rate on output is conditioned by different levels of household debt in Australia, Sweden and Norway, three developed economies with high levels of household indebtedness, and in the world’s seven largest economies. Our findings show that the short-term effects of a reduction in interest rates are generally stronger during periods of high household debt. On average, the monetary stimulus (on impact) is 0.06% (percent of GDP) larger in Norway and the United States during periods of high household debt. Our findings also suggest high levels of household debt may diminish the persistence of monetary policy shocks in the medium term (4–8 quarters).
Monetary policy implementation refers to the mechanism for interbank payments, the set of administered interest rates, and the strategy for central bank actions designed to achieve an intermediate monetary policy goal – for example a target for an overnight nominal interest rate. This piece shows the implications of the Poole model – a common framework used to articulate ideas about monetary policy implementation – for corridor and floor systems of monetary policy implementation. A general equilibrium Poole-type dynamic model is also studied, which shows where Poole-type analysis can go wrong. Given current interest in how large central bank balance sheets and floor systems matter, the author also analyzes a general equilibrium model of quantitative easing and discusses issues with quantitative easing and monetary policy.
This article examines the cyclical nature of monetisation and demonetisation in Taizhou (台州) during the Song and Yuan dynasties. By analysing local fiscal policies, taxation systems, and economic structures, it reveals a complex process of monetary evolution. The Song Dynasty saw significant fiscal monetization, driven by military needs and implemented through innovative tax systems. However, the Yuan Dynasty witnessed a partial reversal, with a shift towards physical taxation and reduced monetary demands. This research highlights the interplay between central government policies, local fiscal structures, and broader economic trends. It challenges linear models of economic development and emphasises the importance of regional variations in understanding historical monetisation processes.
The balance sheet of the ECB expanded greatly after the Great Crisis of 2007-9, similarly to other core central banks, but this development does not signify the adoption of a new ‘interventionist’ stance. The expansion of the balance sheet by core central banks reflects a profound change in the framework of monetary policy responding to pressures generated during and after the Crisis. In the case of the ECB, however, the expansion also resulted from attempting to cover the cracks of the fragmented European money market to protect the euro. This fragmentation persists and concern about the euro continues to shape ECB policy. The resurgence of inflation since 2022 led the ECB to contract its balance sheet, again similarly to other central banks, making a new framework necessary for monetary policy. But it is not clear what that would be, given the fragmented European money market. The monetary policy of the ECB is in a quandary reflecting the structural deficiencies of the Eurozone.
We examine the response of the exchange rate to monetary policy shocks using structural vector autoregression (SVAR). The SVAR approach in this study differs from previous studies by incorporating uncertainty measures and employing shock-restricted identification constraints. Using structural shocks that are in accordance with the event and external variable constraints, we demonstrate that the US exchange rate appreciates immediately in response to contractionary monetary policy shocks, with the maximum appreciation occurring within one to two months. Our finding highlights the importance of allowing contemporaneous interaction between interest rate and exchange rate, as facilitated by the shock-restricted SVAR, and accounting for uncertainties to address the puzzle of the exchange rate response.
This chapter analyses the Federal Reserve’s mandate and statutory objectives and how they have evolved since the Fed was established in 1913, and considers the mandate in the context of environmental and social sustainability challenges. The chapter argues that the Fed’s mandate and statutory objectives historically were interpreted broadly to allow discretion for the Fed and its Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) to manage monetary policy in support of Government policy. The chapter further argues that the legislative history behind the adoption of the dual mandate to achieve price stability and full employment allows the FOMC and the Board of Governors discretion to use their powers to mitigate the risks emanating from the broader economy and society that might impact the price stability and full employment objectives. Despite the conventional interpretation by Fed officials that the Fed ‘should stick to its knitting’ by focusing on short-to-medium term risks to price stability, the chapter concludes that the economic evidence is compelling that climate finance risks and other sustainability challenges can undermine price stability and full employment and therefore should be factored into the Fed’s monetary policy and financial stability strategy.
Proposals for deploying monetary policy to fight climate change and reduce inequality rely on the use of the nation state’s monetary authority to allocate capital to different parts of the economy. Against those proposals stands the publicly stated commitments of central bankers to avoid ‘allocating credit’ by implementing ‘market-neutral’ policies. A review of the financial empirics of central banks’ market operations shows a historically consistent pattern of using monetary authority to allocate debt and equity capital to different sectors of the economy at critical moments. Legal frameworks impose no effective constraints on that state-guidance of investment and, when necessary, the law of central banking actively facilitates capital allocation in ways that allow policymakers to fight deflation, provide emergency fiscal support, and rescue crisis-stricken parts of the financial sector. Against those empirics, commitments to avoid capital allocation appear as communication strategies rather than descriptions of the reality of central bank operations. Given the position of central banks as statutory public agencies, this creates various types of constitutional problems, notably concerning the protection of liberal property rights from government interference. Understanding these legal, market, and political dynamics provides a principled basis to debate reform proposals regarding the constitutional status and institutional functions of central banks in market economies responding to climate change and destructive inequality.
Central banks around the world are increasingly shaping, as well as following, broader climate policies, a development we theorize as policy coordination. In this chapter, we study how and why the European Central Bank (ECB), previously narrowly focused on its primary objective of price stability, has moved towards more extensive coordination with the political institutions of the EU. Based on an analysis of actual policies and views held by ECB top officials, we trace the evolution of the practice and ideological backing of ECB coordination with fiscal and climate policies. Our findings document an interesting paradox: although the ECB has increasingly engaged in policy coordination, it has done so on a unilateral basis by choosing on its own whether, when, and with which economic policies it coordinates monetary policy. We refer to this practice as “independent policy coordination”. Analysed against recent case law by the Court of Justice of the European Union, the legal limits to independent policy coordination are only vaguely defined. As it is notoriously difficult to distinguish independent policy coordination from autonomous policymaking by the ECB, we conclude that multilateral coordination, to the extent it remains compatible with the primacy of price stability, would be the next logical step.