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Early examples of deadpan theatrical performance in Australia are heavily mediated by English and American theatre cultures and do not readily map onto nascent discourses on Australian humor or Australian comic character types such as the laconic bushman or the larrikin. Early examples of deadpan performers and productions in Australia do, however, participate in projects of colonial institution-building. This chapter considers early colonial deadpan performance as part of transnational genteel culture. Drawing on digitized newspaper accounts of performance style, it examines the reception of Gilbert and Sullivan’s H. M. S. Pinafore (1878) in 1879, when comic actor and budding theatre impresario J. C. Williamson paid the British D’Oyly Carte Opera Company £300 for the sole rights to stage it in Australia and New Zealand. By comparing Williamson’s production with three other unauthorized productions of Pinafore that ran nearly simultaneously, it shows how style signified on the colonial stage at a moment that shaped international theatre production and management practices.
This chapter approaches emporia as settlements organized to afford new forms of interactions in the context of their landscapes. Such an approach reveals how their spatial patterns were manifested through social norms and institutions, which in turn governed communities and their ability to handle interactions between strangers. I show how communities in emporia used simple, effective devices such as road networks and plot systems to define social rights and obligations in ways that were both similar to and different from our concept of urban places. The physical structure of housing plots or ‘yards’ served to premediate and resolve disputes. I argue that this feature reflects legal provisions for strangers as much as it does practical concerns for space. The chapter also demonstrates the limitations of a focus on the dense waterfront neighbourhoods. Defying a traditional ‘strongbox’ concept model of urbanism, the physical structure and activities of the emporia were in fact dispersed over a much wider landscape. The arguments draw upon insights from settlement and landscape archaeology, together with theories of agency and structuration.
The conclusions argue that artificial intelligence, despite its disruptive nature, does not undermine the essential role of innovative entrepreneurship within capitalism. While AI reshapes entrepreneurial processes and competitive dynamics, the persistence of entrepreneurial space depends primarily on institutional arrangements and policy choices. Preserving a dynamic and socially valuable form of capitalism in the AI era ultimately hinges on human agency rather than on technology itself.
This chapter charts the evolution of green theorising within International Relations (IR) and situates the Middle East as integral to both the development of global energy regimes and efforts to create global environmental norms and institutions. The chapter shows how green IR theories build upon the study of global environmental politics, political economy, political ecology, and environmental security. The case study of the Yemen conflict highlights how an ageing offshore oil tanker, the Floating Storage and Offloading Safer, became a flashpoint in conflict dynamics between non-state armed actors, international organisations, and regional powers, given the risk of a massive oil spill into the Red Sea and Persian Gulf. The case study emphasises the usefulness of moving beyond conventional units of analysis in IR, such as states, to consider the role of multinational firms and voluntary systems of environmental compliance, as well as shifting analysis to ecological scales, such as watersheds and seas, to fully grasp the cumulative impacts and diverse sources of marine oil pollution. The chapter shows how green theories have questioned fundamental assumptions within IR and opened new avenues of research inquiry.
Liberalism is a foundational school of thought in International Relations with a well-established and rich intellectual heritage dating back to the seventeenth century. It seeks to address core problems in world politics, including the appropriate scope of state authority, the conditions underpinning international cooperation, and the maintenance of international stability. With liberal scholars most notably contributing to debates on the causes and limits of cooperation. Liberal scholars have made their most influential contributions by examining questions such as what enables or constrains cooperation between states, with many claiming that political, economic, and social integration between states leads to more peace and less war. However, liberalism emerged from Western historical and philosophical contexts, and while liberal scholars claim that it is universally applicable, its assumptions can be criticised for not reflecting non-Western experiences. This chapter evaluates liberalism’s applicability to the Middle East by applying liberal theory to the analysis of cosmopolitan law, examining in particular the impact of Special Economic Zones (SEZs) on interstate relations. Thus, it applies liberalism to answer the following questions: do SEZs lead to greater economic integration between states in the Middle East? And is there any observable pacifying effect on political relations between trade partners?
This first chapter explores the legacy of colonial credit as antecedent of nineteenth-century finance. The traditional credit systems were the lifeblood of circulation and property during the 300 years of Spanish and Portuguese rule in the New World. They were highly segmented in both colonial Spanish America and Brazil, and are comparable to those of early modern Catholic Europe, preceding the modern integration of credit and monetary markets. The increasing use of bills of exchange during the colonial era reflected the development of interregional systems of mercantile credit. Also of great interest was the creation of mining banks in Peru and Mexico in the eighteenth century. At the same time, the credit transactions supplied by hundreds of ecclesiastical institutions were of great importance for urban real estate proprietors and rural landowners throughout both Portuguese Brazil and Spanish America. In sum, the principal objective of our first chapter is to identify key aspects of the role of credit and finance in the performance of the colonial economies of Spanish America and Brazil, and to suggest how loans and debts wove complex networks of relationships between many economic and social actors before the outbreak of the wars of independence.
This book focuses attention on the antecedents, birth and relatively late development of modern banking in Latin America. The novelty of the chapters that follow is to offer a panoramic overview of the trajectories of banks and credit markets across a significant number of nations in this extensive region over a long time period. The approach is chronological, but each chapter pays attention to a distinct theme that can allow the reader to grasp key problems that refer to the process of creation and expansion of banks in order to grasp the successes as well as the failures of different financial regimes and enterprises during successive phases from the end of the colonial regimes down to 1914. We maintain that the economic history of the nations of this vast region should not be viewed simply as a story of failure, but rather as an expression of a prolonged and sometimes unstable process of slow capitalism during what we describe as the long nineteenth century.
The political independence of the Latin American nations did not usher in modern capitalism since economic stagnation and the repressed nature of financial markets were evident from the 1820s and 1830s in most countries. This chapter focuses on the role of credit and finance during the first half of the nineteenth century in the new states. Liberal constitutions and laws were put in place but did not produce the desired economic results since fiscal reforms did not prove successful. Attention is directed to the experience of the earliest banking entities. We begin with Brazil, where a first bank in Latin America began to operate in 1808, followed by a brief summary of history of the first commercial bank in Argentina and of an early investment bank in Mexico. Nonetheless, the collapse of imperial rule, the wars of independence and extensive civil conflicts created persistent fiscal and monetary difficulties. So much uncertainty affected decision-making by both economic and political actors, reducing the availability of credit, making it more expensive and risky. Political stability and institutional transparency were required to spur early capitalism but economic and political instability created many obstacles in postcolonial Latin America during the first half of the century.
Across the many forms of organization that distinguish our social species – surgical teams, firms, markets, bureaucracies, professions, caste orders – labour is divided, and the divided activities are integrated coherently by distinctive schemes that fall across a range of possibilities. We require a principled account of the dimensions along which such schemes vary. This paper supplies one organized around two axes. The primary axis distinguishes task, role, and station differentiation, according to the unit on which the differentiated labour assignment lands. The secondary axis is governed by the placement of coordinative labour itself (the labour by which first-order labour is organized): non-mediated, intermediated (through a coordinator or organization), or diffuse (across signals, practices, and inherited arrangements). Across these three categories, the paper develops six (non-exhaustive) mechanisms of integration: mutual adjustment or negotiated coordination; direction or administered rule; and signal-mediated coupling or sedimented normative coordination. The paper distinguishes civic self-government by the placement not only of ongoing coordination but of vigilance and the labour of revising the scheme. The resulting taxonomy, available to all social science, distinguishes the terrain of division-cum-coordination from the economic forces that produce movement across it, including specialization gains, coordination and communication costs, technological change, and entrepreneurial judgement.
Cultural groups often differ in how much they trust political institutions. Yet such differences need not reflect culture alone or at all because cultural groups are frequently embedded in distinct institutional environments. I examine this issue in Switzerland, where linguistic diversity overlaps with cantonal federalism and allows language-group differences in trust to be studied across and within institutional contexts. Using pooled cross-sectional survey data, I find that French-speaking respondents report lower trust in cantonal authorities than German-speaking respondents in national comparisons. This gap attenuates sharply within cantons, indicating that much of the national difference is associated with between-canton variation. Consistent with this pattern, the national French–German gap is substantially attenuated when cross-cantonal differences in direct-democratic participation rights are taken into account. Evidence from bilingual cantons further reinforces this contextual interpretation, as language-group differences vary in ways consistent with minority status rather than following a uniform French–German divide.
There is a broad agreement that political and economic institutions matter for long-term development. Yet relatively little is known as to how to adopt good-quality institutions and reform weak institutions, for which one needs to know how they change. This paper provides a systematic econometric investigation of long-run patterns of institutional change, using panel time series methods allowing for different forms of country-specific heterogeneity and cross-section dependence. We focus on variables capturing the quality of four key political and economic institutions over 200 years and 161 countries from the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) database: electoral democracy and executive constraints, for political institutions; and the rule of law and property rights, for economic institutions. We test whether institutions change or persist, whether political and economic institutions tend to co-evolve, and whether changes in political institutions cause changes in economic institutions in the long run. We find that political and economic institutions are non-stationary, suggesting that institutional change is more the norm than the exception. We also find that they tend to co-evolve, although this is less evident for property rights, and that long-run causality runs mainly from political to economic institutions. We illustrate the cross-country evidence with discussions on Indonesia and Chile.
The aim of this paper is to define the concept of the institutional environment. First, it makes use of the concepts of affordance and physical-behavioural units to define a broader realm, referred to as the action environment. Second, the paper distinguishes two subdomains within the action environment: the domain of realization, which is composed of routinized physical-behavioural units as well as larger action scenarios, and the domain of opportunity, which consists of possible, yet untried, scenarios and is thus free from any routine. Third, the paper discusses a key economic difference between the two: realizations are assigned exclusive property rights, while opportunities constitute a commons. This establishes specific conditions for the institutionalization of an action environment and, consequently, for an institutional environment. The paper will provide an account of how such institutionalization works and its objectives.
Contemporary democracies face growing public disaffection and mistrust. Governments have tried to revert these trends by promoting participatory governance. Prior studies established how deliberation can empower citizens. However, whether these effects hold in real-life initiatives initiated by partisan governments remains unclear. We test the ability of citizens’ assemblies to foster democratic attitudes in a natural experiment leveraging the random selection of participants to Lisbon’s citizens’ assemblies Participation led to an increase in issue knowledge and salience, external political efficacy and institutional trust. However, it did not impact internal political efficacy nor helped citizens better recognize the challenges of collective decision-making. The results hold for two assembly editions and reveal the potential of government-led participatory initiatives to reconnect citizens with democracy.
International Relations (IR) scholarship has long debated the design of peacebuilding interventions. Yet institutional design often reveals little about how peace institutions function in practice. Many institutions persist despite failing to meet their intended goals, evolving in unanticipated ways. This article asks why peace institutions endure and what unintended and unforeseen legacies they generate. To centre the political lives of peace institutions, we advance cross-disciplinary dialogue and draw on historical institutionalism. Its core concepts – particularly displacement, layering, drift, and conversion – provide an analytical lens through which we advance a threefold argument: first, peace institutions follow political trajectories through which they assume unforeseen roles and acquire new political significance; second, they persist through change amid failure; and third, institutional change follows patterned trajectories across conflict junctures. We develop this argument through discussions of peace institutions in four contexts: Angola, Colombia, Cyprus, and Sri Lanka. These cases anchor the article’s central contribution: demonstrating the analytical merits of historical institutionalism across diverse peacebuilding settings. Beyond offering a new impetus for theory building, historical institutionalism also provides cautious hope: peace institutions frequently fall short of their grand ambitions to engineer peace, yet their endurance can generate legacies that open space for unexpected political change.
This chapter focuses on how to evaluate and improve the performance of health systems. It frames performance as a relative concept: how well a system attains its goals compared to what is achievable under given circumstances. It examines how health system architecture, including vertical and horizontal integration, influences performance. We also argue that improving performance requires strengthening key system components and propose four priority areas (the “LIST” elements): leadership, institutions, systems design, and technologies. Finally, the chapter argues that health systems must be accountable for determinants they can influence, even if external, and stresses the importance of rigorous assessment methods to inform evidence-based policy and effective reforms.
What do we know about fiscal response to the COVID-19 pandemic in its early phases? Does the government’s ideology matter for the scope of anti-crisis measures? There is a growing literature and public debate on the economic and social implications of COVID-19. However, we still know little about the drivers of particular reactions of governments to this extraordinary shock. In this paper, we apply econometric tools to analyze the relevance of government ideology regarding economic policies for anti-crisis fiscal packages enacted in 2020. The results imply that right-wing governments provide significantly bigger fiscal packages than those observed in countries ruled by other political parties. Different responses to the crisis are also noted for the wealthy and the Nordic countries.
Institutions are considered as ‘rules of the game’ in this chapter, which is informed by two approaches taken to the analysis of institutions in natural resource governance. The first approach centres on viewing co-management itself as an institution. This section draws on common property theory and Ostrom’s design principles for sustainable common property regimes. The section also considers insights from literature on ‘institutional fit’ as a response to scale mismatch to identify lessons for co-management. The second approach is concerned with investigating which institutions shape co-management and how, from formal, bureaucratic institutions of policy and legislation to informal, socially embedded institutions, such as customary systems, kinship ties and gender norms. Critical institutionalism suggests that bureaucratic and socially-embedded institutions may interact through processes referred to ‘institutional bricolage’, with implications for how co-management evolves and performs.
This chapter explores the experiences of Romani women (Gitanas) in the Spanish Atlantic empire through the lens of inquisitorial records from the seventeenth century. Centering the 1668 trial of María de la Concepción in Veracruz, it investigates how Gitanas navigated the complex religious, social and political landscapes of colonial society. By comparing inquisitorial cases from both Spain and New Spain, the chapter argues that colonial governance was less rigid than its peninsular counterpart, creating spaces in which Gitanas could engage in love magic, healing practices and other ritualized forms of knowledge. Operating in liminal zones across ethnoracial and class boundaries, these women provided services to a wide range of clients. Their practices functioned as both survival strategies and subtle forms of resistance against imperial and ecclesial authorities. The chapter demonstrates that Gitanas leveraged their ambiguous social position to subvert normative boundaries of ethnicity, gender and class, particularly by facilitating relationships that unsettled colonial hierarchies and exposed the permeability of imperial control.
Why do some countries grow while others remain mired in poverty? This chapter investigates global inequality and the role of institutions in shaping growth. It shows that markets alone cannot guarantee shared prosperity. Effective governance and adaptive institutions are critical for channeling growth into opportunity. Through case studies and empirical data, it contrasts inclusive and extractive models of development.
The growing literature on populism and international security portrays populist governments as particularly prone to confrontational security politics. Yet whether populist rhetoric translates into substantive changes in security policy remains contested. We argue that populist governments exert uneven influence across different dimensions of security policy-making, with greater capacity to reshape the ideational and institutional dimensions than the geopolitical, operational, and material ones. To explain this variation, we develop a five-dimensional framework of security policy-making and apply it to Poland under the Law and Justice (PiS) government (2015–23). Drawing on official documents, secondary sources, and twenty-eight anonymised interviews with policymakers and security experts, we examine how populist discourse translated into policy change. We find that PiS successfully politicised security narratives, broadened threat perceptions, and intensified the domestic use of security discourse, while largely maintaining continuity in Poland’s strategic orientation. Major shifts in defence policy were driven primarily by Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine rather than by PiS’s populist agenda. The Polish case demonstrates that the effects of populism vary systematically across different dimensions of security policy-making and are conditioned by geopolitical constraints, institutional resilience, alliance commitments, and external shocks. The article contributes to debates on populism and international security by specifying the conditions under which populist governments are – and are not – able to produce lasting security policy change.