To gain support, political actors must be visible on issues where they are seen as credible and advance these issues on the agenda. Direct online communication and negative messaging can amplify this by gaining traction on social media. While prior research assumes parties attack competitors on issues they ‘own’, we test that assumption in a highly fragmented multi-party system where ownership is fiercely contested. Here, attacks may aim to compete for ownership rather than defend it. Analysing 27,266 posts on X by Belgian party actors over two-and-a-half years, we find that sender issue ownership alone does not predict issue-based attacks. Instead, competition over ownership, especially at the target level, shapes attack patterns. During campaigns, issue-based attacks are significantly more likely to target issue owners than during routine periods. By linking issue competition and negative campaigning, we offer new insights into communication dynamics in fragmented party systems across the electoral cycle.

In elections under proportional representation (PR), proportionality between votes and seats is an ideal never achieved in reality. Discrepancies between votes and seats are most prevalent under the most widely used PR seat allocation formula, D’Hondt/Jefferson. This article provides the first comprehensive model to explain the discrepancies between the national seat allocation and the vote distribution under the D’Hondt rule. The model identifies six systematic factors that drive these deviations, ranging from the bias in the seat allocation rule to differences in the electoral rules (e.g. malapportionment) and party competition across districts. Thus, this model goes beyond the well-known rule that large parties are overrepresented under D’Hondt by providing a quantitative point estimate of this deviation and of between-district inequalities. The model identifies the (expected) beneficiaries and losers of the seat allocation and predicts the magnitude of these penalties and benefits. At the level of political parties, the model predicts the gains and losses in terms of seats, relative to the parties’ proportional share of seats. Empirical tests on 156 elections from 23 democracies, covering 3,653 political parties and 2,139 constituencies, are used to assess its validity and to calculate the resulting substantial effects.

In a globalised world, authoritarian politics does not stay within state borders. Autocrats and their allies reach abroad to influence their international environment to, at a minimum, protect authoritarianism at home or, more ambitiously, to promote pro-authoritarian norms and practices abroad. A rich stream of political science literature – comparative, international and area studies – has mapped the contours of this ‘transnational authoritarianism’ in an increasingly permissive international environment. This review article argues that transnational authoritarianism is facilitated by the rise of authoritarian powers and deepening globalisation. It first examines the drivers of contemporary transnational authoritarianism before identifying and categorising its central actors. The review then organises the literature on this topic into two strands, each enabled by autocracies’ ascendance in a globalised era. First, official channels of transnational authoritarianism see mostly state actors advance regime goals with familiar instruments such as security cooperation agreements, but with renewed vigour and support. Second, unofficial channels feature a mix of state and non-state actors exerting leverage and influence within the networks and channels of global interconnectedness. By necessity, these categories traverse the fields of comparative politics and international relations, revealing how these transnational dimensions are critical to the success of contemporary authoritarian regimes. The review concludes by revisiting earlier literature on autocracy promotion considering these emergent realities, and reflecting on how recent political developments in the United States relate to these processes.

Discursive attacks towards the opposition are often a harbinger of polarisation, democratic backsliding and authoritarianism. We study the evolution of negative language about the opposition in Turkey under Erdoğan, a pioneering case of democratic backsliding. We distinguish between two types of negative language: a valid competitor – ‘rival’ – versus an enemy that needs to be destroyed – ‘villain’. We leverage machine learning to examine every opposition-related sentence in two major newspapers from 2009 to 2022. Our data allow us to compare the depictions of the main opposition party as a rival or villain between media outlets, before and after media ownership change, during election times and beyond. We also test how these depictions respond to currency shocks and military casualties, as the incumbents could try to contain the fallout from these adverse events by discursively attacking the opposition. We find that vilification of the opposition is driven by security challenges rather than economic troubles, which are associated with increases in rival discourse. Results also suggest that political competition can appear unrepresentatively civil precisely during election periods, as an already polarising incumbent may try to present himself in a more reconciliatory light during the campaign period.

European Parliament elections (EPEs) are widely regarded as second-order contests. Their perceived lower importance is expected to produce a distinct set of electoral outcomes, chief among them the proposition that governing parties lose support in EPEs relative to preceding national first-order elections (FOEs). This article examines explanatory mechanisms behind this proposition, focusing on the previously unaddressed effects of clarity of responsibility. Particular emphasis is thus given to whether the expected losses vary with government parties’ size and cabinet role, and with other factors that shape responsibility attribution, including coalition size, ministerial portfolio shares and prior government experience. In addition, I also assess whether parties providing formal external support to governments face electoral penalties in EPEs. Covering all EPEs and corresponding FOEs from 1979 to 2024, the study also examines whether the second-order model and its key mechanisms, such as election timing, have shifted over time in response to broader transformations in European politics.

A characteristic feature of Westminster-style democracy is the convention that the opposition frontbench forms the basis of the new executive following changes in the party of government. Yet we know little about how this convention operates when it comes to individual appointments. This paper examines how frequently opposition frontbenchers have become ministers in the UK, the archetypal Westminster system. Across seven incoming governments, we find that around four-fifths of opposition frontbenchers were appointed to ministerial office, and roughly half retained responsibility for the same policy portfolio they had shadowed. At the government level, prime ministers’ idiosyncratic preferences affected overall levels of continuity, but these choices were constrained by electoral and party factors. At the individual level, we find no evidence that prime ministers retained their supporters in greater numbers, but party seniority, prior ministerial experience and time served in an opposition post were closely associated with portfolio continuity.

There are concerns about the distinctiveness of opposition party behaviour in parliaments, but the literature offers mixed findings. This article analyses how distinctive the opposition is from the government in its voting patterns and speech-making in four parliamentary democracies (Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands, United Kingdom [UK]) over a long time span (1945–2020). Our results show a diversity of trends in opposition distinctiveness. Overall, the distinctiveness in terms of parliamentary voting behaviour increased up to the 1980s, and slightly decreased or remained stable thereafter in most countries. Opposition sentiment in speech-making follows a different pattern, particularly in the UK and Canada, where the increasingly positive sentiment of governing party MPs and the increasingly negative sentiment of opposition parties has led to significant divergence over time. These trends in opposition distinctiveness in voting and speech-making are shown to be related most strongly to opposition parties’ prior governing experience, in particular in Denmark and the Netherlands.

This article seeks to explore the nature and determinants of political conflict in European Parliament (EP) debates within the unique context of the Rule of Law Crisis (RoLC). While previous research on this topic has mainly studied the ideological dimension of this conflict, we shift focus to the affective dimension, analysing the roles of negative sentiment and motive-based criticism through a quantitative analysis of 53 hand-coded debates. We find that negativity dominates, and that this tone is adopted by Members of the EP (MEPs) irrespective of the ideological orientation or geographical origin of their national party. However, concerning levels of motive-based cynicism are primarily driven by MEPs from more right-wing, Eurosceptic and, to a lesser extent, Central and Eastern European parties. These findings suggest that the EP, an institution traditionally geared towards compromise-building, is becoming increasingly susceptible to the normative jeopardies of negative and attack politics when it comes to the RoLC.

This review article examines the rise of democratic resilience as a central concept in the comparative study of regime stability and change. Over the past decade, resilience – understood not simply as institutional survival but as the capacity of democratic systems to adapt, regenerate and deepen democratic norms in the face of crises – has gained prominence in response to accelerating autocratisation. The article situates this shift within the diverse pathways through which democracies weaken and decline, including executive aggrandisement and growing political polarisation. While the existing literature has improved our understanding of autocratisation, much comparative research remains influenced by a relatively narrow set of Northern cases. As a result, it risks treating regional experiences as universal. Drawing on evidence from Africa, Asia and other parts of the Global South, the article argues for a comparative theory of democratic resilience that incorporates state capture, rapid authoritarian reversals and more diverse forms of aggrandisement.

Youth transitions to adulthood have become longer, more complex and diverse, yet these shifts are often overlooked in studies of political attitudes and behaviour, leading to contradictory conclusions. This article explores the evolving nature of youth political engagement through the concept of ‘engagement biographies’, drawing on biographical interviews with young activists in Spain. It examines the extent to which young activists experience political involvement as a dynamic, context-dependent process shaped by their individualised and de-standardised paths to adulthood, interpersonal relationships and broader socio-political contexts. Adopting a biographical perspective enhances understanding of key trends identified in the literature on youth and politics, including the volatility of participation, a preference for direct and less institutionalised activism, the integration of activism into everyday life, and increasing disengagement from formal politics. These insights contribute to a more nuanced understanding of young people’s patterns of political engagement and their broader implications for democracies.

Using original survey data from seven Western European countries, this article investigates which social conflicts populist radical right parties (PRRPs) represent. Methodologically, it innovates by measuring individuals’ positions within conflicts combined with the importance they attach to them, capturing both attitudinal alignment and salience. The analysis tests whether traditional cleavages or new conflicts related to globalisation and cultural value change better explain PRRP voting. Findings show that PRRPs predominantly represent new conflicts – individuals opposing cosmopolitanism, LGBTQ+ rights and environmental sustainability – rather than class or territorial divides. While socio-structural traits such as being a production worker or rural resident predict PRRP voting, supporting these groups does not. This decoupling of structure and conflict positions suggests working-class and rural voters are motivated more by culturally reframed grievances than by class- or place-based solidarities. These results highlight the weak link between classic cleavages and PRRP voting, underscoring the centrality of cultural demarcation in today’s political conflict.

In a previous volume of this journal, scholars of consociational power-sharing counselled against reform of Northern Ireland’s power-sharing institutions. Since then, repeated episodes of collapse and dysfunction have necessitated reconsideration of the case for institutional reform. This article argues that a sensible case now exists for reforms to enhance the stability and functionality of Northern Ireland’s consociation. Situating its analysis within broader debates on the evolution of consociational systems, it draws on elite political discourse and original public opinion data (N = 2,034) to assess support for reform and to consider associated trade-offs. We show that changing electoral and ethnonational dynamics have occasioned shifts in elite political attitudes to reform, and highlight public appetite for reform, including in relation to one of the consociation’s most powerful vetoes. Sustainable reform, the article concludes, will be most feasible when elite receptivity to change, civic involvement and (subtle) external support converge.

While many citizens support expanding direct democracy, its institutionalisation lags behind popular demand, presumably due to limited enthusiasm among political elites. This article explores both ideological and instrumental reasons why political parties support or avoid direct democracy. Using an original dataset of 701 election manifestos from German parties (1975–2017) and employing a custom dictionary and large language model, over 2,000 relevant statements were classified. Mentions of direct democracy are predominantly positive, as parties opposing it omit the topic, consistent with salience theory. Regression analyses reveal robust support among left-of-centre and populist parties. Moreover, challenger parties emphasise direct democracy more than mainstream parties, but maintain their stance when going mainstream. In contrast, parties are less likely to promote direct democracy when in government than when in opposition. These findings help explain the gap between citizen preferences and actual institutional reforms.

This article provides a multi-dimensional perspective on parliamentary composition in an era of political turbulence. It extends existing turnover models by proposing a three-dimensional framework to understand persistence which includes the structure of the ballot, electoral volatility and institutional career opportunities. Using novel comparative data from 14 European democracies (1965–2021), where we distinguish between newcomers, seniors (3+ terms) and super-seniors (5+ terms), we find that persistence is most likely in politico-institutional contexts characterised by candidate control over ballot access, low electoral volatility and unicameral legislatures. Super-seniors seem to occupy an advantaged position, as prior seniority levels strongly shape subsequent ones, and they are also less vulnerable to electoral shocks. At the same time, we descriptively show that none of the countries in our sample provide the full configuration conducive to persistence, suggesting that contemporary democracies contain institutional arrangements that promote circulation within the legislative elite and limit concentration.

While research has traditionally linked resistance to negative emotions like anger and frustration, a growing body of work now emphasises the importance of positive emotions such as trust and hope. This article analyses Hezbollah’s speeches from 2001 to 2023, focusing on anger and trust while incorporating positive and negative affect. Using quantitative methods to detect emotions and affect in natural language, our findings reveal that positive affect – often overlooked in resistance studies – is expressed most frequently, followed by trust, negativity and anger. Positivity and trust appear in discussions of Hezbollah’s in-group and ideology (Islam), while negativity and anger surface in discourse on violent resistance and regional security. These findings challenge Western media portrayals that associate Hezbollah with hate and negativity, suggesting that Hezbollah uses positivity and trust to reinforce cohesion, while leveraging negativity and anger to rally support for resistance activities.

An extensive literature has investigated the importance of governing political elites in the transition from authoritarianism. However, we still know very little about the role of opposition forces, especially in conflict zones within the Global South. This article addresses this research gap by analysing how parliamentary opposition strategies contributed to Libya’s transition outcome. It examines the opposition strategies directed against the Islamic majority within the General National Congress, the country’s first elected parliament after Gaddafi’s fall in 2011. It uses primary data drawn from semi-structured interviews conducted in 2023 with former politicians, academics, political journalists and non-governmental organisation (NGO) activists. The findings illustrate how, although opposition strategies were aimed at countering Islamic influence, they resulted in the destabilising consequences of affective polarisation and institutional fragmentation.

The political resource curse posits that newly resource-rich states risk experiencing authoritarianism and conflict. This article examines Guyana as a most-likely case of that phenomenon. Drawing on interviews and quantitative indicators, we find that oil has not driven the recent democratic backsliding and rising geopolitical tensions. Instead, Guyana’s democratic fragility stems from winner-take-all electoral institutions in a context of deep ethnic polarisation and major parties’ limited normative commitment to democracy. Regarding conflict, Venezuela’s domestic politics, not oil, is the key driver of regional tensions. We therefore argue that the political resource curse framework may at times obscure more than it reveals, misattributing long-standing political tensions to resource wealth. Domestic and international political dynamics may be better understood as ‘politics with resources’ than politics cursed by oil. Promoting electoral reform, fostering stronger commitment to democratic norms within political parties and ensuring credible deterrence may therefore matter more than technocratic resource governance.

Despite their demographic size and growing political influence, African youth remain understudied in research on political participation. This article examines how two structural shifts, youth cohort size and social media use, independently and jointly shape electoral and protest behaviour across 40 African countries. Using Afrobarometer data (2016–2023) and complementary contextual datasets, we find that individual socio-economic factors remain the strongest predictors of participation, but demographic structure and digital engagement also matter. Larger youth cohorts are associated with a greater likelihood of voting. Social media use is connected with increases in protest participation while reducing the likelihood of voting, and its interaction with youth cohort size shapes both behaviours in important, non-linear ways. These findings challenge assumptions that youthful populations inherently drive unrest and show that digital mobilisation is strongly conditioned by the demographic context. Our study has significant implications for democratic legitimacy and youth inclusion in Africa’s rapidly changing political environments.

The literature has explained the success of the populist radical right (PRR) through demand-side and supply-side factors, but it has typically adopted an ‘external’ perspective, leaving unexplored how PRR parties themselves interpret their success. This article investigates the winning formula of this party family from an ‘insider’ perspective, drawing on 21 in-depth interviews with representatives of a clear case of PRR success: Brothers of Italy (Fratelli d’Italia, FdI). Rather than testing the causal claims of the literature, we theorise these insider accounts as strategic narratives of success: they show how FdI representatives draw on ideological, organisational and leadership repertoires, selectively appropriate elements of the external environment, and, most distinctively, mobilise valence-inspired self-descriptions (especially coherence) to construct a claim of distinction within the party system. In this context, coherence operates as a strategic device that signals the party’s unity and political consistency – anchored in FdI’s refusal to join broad coalitions – performing discursive work of self-legitimation in PRR normalisation.