EU building policy faces interlinked challenges: issues like the housing crisis and energy poverty persist, while buildings contribute significantly to global resource consumption and related environmental impacts. Resolving these issues may require more than improvements in efficiency and clean technology. Sufficiency offers a complementary strategy – reducing the resource consumption of buildings to what is really needed while ensuring decent living standards for all. Yet, the role of sufficiency in EU building policies remains underexplored. This study assesses how sufficiency is integrated into EU policies, identifying key gaps and opportunities for strengthening it in the building sector.

Buildings are responsible for a large share of the EU’s resource consumption and environmental impacts, while access to living space is highly unequal. Technological innovation alone may not adequately address this social-ecological challenge; however, sufficiency offers a complementary solution. Most research on sufficiency policy for buildings examines national or subnational policies, leaving the EU level underexplored, while studies on policy mixes rarely assess the built environment in an EU context. Our study addresses these gaps by providing, to the best of our knowledge, the first investigation into how sufficiency is integrated into EU policies for the built environment. We use content analysis, applying a conceptual framework for sufficiency with four dimensions: reduced consumption, environmental sustainability, behavioural and lifestyle change, and equitable welfare. The findings indicate that the EU policy mix for buildings incorporates measures in all four sufficiency dimensions, although the social aspects are acknowledged to a lesser extent. Most measures remain technical, but some exceptions align more with existing suggestions for sufficiency policy. Still, we spot significant gaps in the policy mix. This highlights the potential for the EU to adopt sufficiency principles by strengthening existing measures and combining them with more ambitious approaches.

An analysis of EU building policies through the lens of sufficiency: balancing environmental goals and societal needs.

European climate plans call for a doubling of onshore wind capacity by 2030, yet over the last 15 years growth has largely stagnated – contradicting technology diffusion theories that predict smooth acceleration until a substantial share of the market is reached. We show that early slowdowns in large countries were associated with the withdrawal or weakening of policy support, while reinstating support and higher electricity prices drove reaccelerations. Despite these pulses, the average deployment pace remained steady and below the first peak rate. Current targets aim for historical peak speeds, but forecasts revert to long-run rates, suggesting persistent limits that only sustained policy effort can overcome.

Mainstream theories predict S-shaped technology growth with a single peak followed by slowdown, but recent literature has observed low-carbon technologies often departing from this pattern. We systematically show that over four decades, onshore wind trajectories in 16 of the 18 largest European Union countries have strongly deviated from S-curve expectations. Initial acceleration ended at just 2% of capacity potential (Interquartile range: 1–4%) or 4% of electricity (IQR: 1.5–6%), coinciding with the withdrawal or weakening of policy support. In 14 countries, the first slowdown was followed by secondary and sometimes tertiary reacceleration, forming distinct growth pulses, with peak growth rates at subsequent pulses statistically similar to the first. Pre-2021 reacceleration closely followed the reinstating or introduction of support schemes, while several post-2020 pulses were likely driven by better market conditions. Over the full period, the cruising speed – average additions after the first peak – was about one-quarter below the peak rate. National 2030 targets require growth close to historical peaks, yet the latest forecasts converge on the cruising speed. Germany is the sole outlier, consistent with unprecedented institutional reforms beyond financial incentives. Our multi-segment growth model, combined with growth metrics and policy mapping, can be extended to other policy-driven technologies.

Policy-driven technologies grow in pulses, not S-curves. Despite higher 2030 targets, EU wind expands at unchanged speed.

Latin Americans strongly support climate action, yet their governments have struggled to implement effective climate policies. We surveyed adults in Chile and Mexico to explore the key features of climate policy support. We found that while carbon taxes, fuel bans, and vehicle mandates meet resistance, opposition is lower than in wealthier Global North countries. Chileans show higher support overall, especially among those who do not fear economic downsides. Many prefer economic growth that reduces emissions rather than growth at all costs. The findings suggest that framing climate policies as good for jobs, health, and long-term economic stability can boost public support.

Despite strong public support for climate action across Latin America, governments have largely failed to enact effective policies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. This study employs a web-based survey conducted in Chile (n = 1,000) and Mexico (n = 1,001) to examine public support for climate policies and the relationship between perceived emissions–economy trade-offs and policy support. Results indicate that compulsory consumer-facing policies, including carbon taxes, fossil fuel bans, and zero-emission vehicle sales mandates, face the highest opposition in both countries. Nonetheless, resistance to these policies is lower than in the Global North, suggesting a stronger appetite for climate action in the studied jurisdictions. Chileans have significantly higher mean support for all climate policies, except for business subsidies. Policy support is highest among those who are unconcerned about potential negative economic impacts of climate policies. Furthermore, decoupling emissions from economic growth instead of pursuing a growth-at-all-costs approach is the preferred economic approach in both countries. These findings suggest that governments could frame climate policies as a means of growing the economy and protecting against economic losses, thereby strengthening public support, particularly among individuals concerned about economic growth. Communicating policy-specific emissions reductions and co-benefits, such as improved public health and job creation, may further enhance support.

Surveys in Chile and Mexico show strong climate policy support, especially when policies link emissions cuts with economic growth.

Corporate mitigation and adaptation responses to climate change are still considered as distinct strategies, rather than complementary ways of managing climate risk. An analysis of 5,910 companies that responded to the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) questionnaire in 2021 suggests that companies perceiving physical climate risks are more likely to define low-carbon transition plans, adaptation measures, and integrated climate strategies combining both. Other climate-related risks (e.g., technology risk) also drive adaptation and a comprehensive climate strategy. This argues for interpreting the business response to climate change from a mitigation and adaptation resilience perspective.

In current scientific debate and practice, corporate mitigation and adaptation responses to climate change are often investigated in isolation. Drawing on a global sample of 5,910 companies responding to the 2021 CDP questionnaire, predominantly from Asia (37.1%), the Americas (31.5%), and Europe (28.2%), across Manufacturing (37.7%) and Services (21.9%), we conducted a logistic regression to identify key drivers of corporate responses to climate change. 41.3% of firms develop a low-carbon transition plan, 6% adopt adaptation measures, and 3.9% integrate both. Companies perceiving physical risks exhibit higher odds of implementing mitigation (p-value < 0.001, Exp(β) = 1.65), adaptation (p-value < 0.01, Exp(β) = 2.19), and a comprehensive strategy (p-value < 0.01, Exp(β) = 4.42). Nested other climate-related risks further increase the odds of adopting adaptation (p-value < 0.01, Exp(β) = 11.02) and a comprehensive strategy (p-value < 0.01, Exp(β) = 38.96). These results support interpreting business responses to climate change from a mitigation and adaptation resilience perspective.

Mitigation and adaptation are complementary. CDP data from 5,910 firms show risk perception drives climate action.

Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) countries have advanced circular economy (CE) policies, but guidelines for companies are lacking. The goal of this research was to develop a model from circular design (CD) to guide companies to implement CE. A circular design model (CDM) was co-created with companies in the oil and gas sector to demonstrate its applicability across sectors. In this case study, we found opportunities related to water, energy, materials, and social aspects and drew strategies to improve management and reuse of equipment and materials. The model contributes to the CE transition of companies in LAC.

The need for circular economy (CE) frameworks applicable outside of high-income regions is imperative for a global-level implementation of circular strategies. These can help fill gaps in practical company-level guidelines for transforming business operations across key economic sectors. This paper presents the development of a circular design model (CDM) tailored to Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC). The model was tested and refined through a participatory co-creation process with five oil and gas companies in Colombia and Peru. The findings demonstrate the model's effectiveness in analyzing material, water, and energy flows and social aspects, ideating circular initiatives, and fostering collaboration among stakeholders. Results show that in those companies where visual thinking and circular design (CD) tools were applied and embraced, the number of circular initiatives identified and implemented was higher. The CDM provides a practical and transferable framework for companies in any sector across LAC to diagnose their CE performance, identify circular opportunities, and develop actionable strategies.

A co-created circular design model to help Latin American companies diagnose performance and develop circular economy strategies.

Fisheries encompass humans and fish, but fisheries researchers rarely model human–nature interactions over space and time. I filled this information gap for dolphinfish (Coryphaena hippurus), a popular, widely distributed species that supports industrial, artisanal, recreational, and subsistence fisheries. Dolphinfish human–nature interactions showed a long-term up-and-down pattern in 1950–2019. Recent declines in catch mirror decreases in abundance and size that have been observed in parts of the species’ range. This research provides a robust perspective on the recreational, economic, cultural, and nutritional significance of dolphinfish while creating an approach for evaluating human–nature interactions in fisheries worldwide.

Fisheries are coupled human and natural systems, but rarely does research examine metacouplings: human–nature interactions within and between adjacent and distant fisheries. I used the metacoupling framework to compare dolphinfish (Coryphaena hippurus) catches in exclusive economic zones (EEZs) in 1950–2019; model interactions and forecast catches of dolphinfish across sectors; and examine management implications of metacouplings. Dolphinfish catches increased in 1950–1998, decreased in 1998–2000, and increased in 2000–2012 before declining in 2012–2019, mirroring recent declines in abundance and size that have been observed in parts of the species’ range. The most common fishing-sector interactions were bidirectional positive relationships between small-scale industrial and artisanal fishing, although large-scale industrial fishing negatively affected artisanal catches in some EEZs. Despite the economic and cultural importance of recreational dolphinfish fisheries, industrial fishing accounted for 49% of metacouplings in 1950–2019, followed by artisanal (29%) and recreational (20%) fishing. Subsistence catches – a small but nutritionally significant portion of dolphinfish fisheries – were predicted to decline in four EEZs in 2020–2035. This research provides a holistic perspective on the recreational, economic, cultural, and nutritional importance of dolphinfish while generating a template for social–ecological synthesis to inform fisheries management and conservation worldwide.

Dolphinfish metacouplings (multiscalar human–nature interactions) are common, diverse, and management-relevant worldwide.

A key process suggested to foster fast, nonlinear change and accelerate the energy transition is social tipping. Social tipping dynamics in low-carbon transitions occur when a small change or intervention in the socioeconomic system has a large effect on emission reductions. When tipping in one system or sector spills over to another system or sector, this may lead to tipping cascades, accelerating the overall transition, further weakening the old system, and reinforcing the new, ultimately reaching the regime tipping point. Leveraging such tipping cascades requires a model of how social processes and interventions scale up (upward scaling cascades) through socioeconomic systems. In this paper, we therefore present a stylized agent-based model to explore the emergence of cascades from the existing evidence about interactions within and between sectors. The model provides insights into the interactions between positive and balancing feedback loops, the potential for lock-ins (or reverting to the old system), and potential leverage points. Specifically, we focus on interactions between energy, mobility, and housing.

The challenge of climate change mitigation is unprecedented. Staying within a maximum global warming of 1.5 requires accelerating the transition to a low-carbon society. We model how interactions between heat pumps (HPs), electric vehicles (EV), solar panels, and home batteries (HBs) can accelerate the transformation to decentralized and sustainable household energy provision.

Modeling how interactions between HPs, EV, solar panels, and HBs can accelerate the energy transition.

The European Union presents its green transition (GT) as a transformative response to climate change and environmental crisis. This article examines whether the current policies live up to that promise, and how transformation is interpreted within the European Green Deal and the EU bioeconomy as flagships of the EU's GT. It shows that while climate urgency and public pressure push for transformations, geopolitical competition, and economic growth-first approach pull policy in a different direction. It shows how transformative concepts, including transformations, degrowth, and (decolonial) justice, get systematically co-opted and deradicalized in the process.

This article analyzes how socioecological transformations are interpreted and operationalized within EU green policy, focusing on the European Green Deal and the EU bioeconomy. Drawing on qualitative interviews and a policy workshop with European Commission policy officers, it demonstrates that tensions between the EU's green transition and broader transformative agendas originate at the policy design stage rather than implementation alone. Two contradictory motives shape the EU's engagement with transformation narratives: (i) climate urgency and associated social movements, and (ii) EU's ambition to be(come) important global actor in green transition and decarbonization. While the former opens spaces for transformative change, the latter prioritizes competitiveness, growth, and domination. The article advances the concept of deradicalization to explain how transformative agendas – particularly those associated with degrowth and decolonial environmental justice – are selectively translated, depoliticized, or displaced. Structural, political–strategic, corporate, and procedural barriers reinforce this process, stabilizing capitalist agendas and growth-dependent governance under the language of sustainability and green growth. The analysis argues that such deradicalization inhibits movements and initiatives for more justice-centered, decolonial, and post-growth futures, while enabling continuity of socioecological injustices and (neo)colonial relations within EU green politics.

How the EU’s green transition deradicalizes transformation through growth imperatives and geopolitical ambitions.

Sand is essential for building cities, roads, and homes, yet the small-scale miners who produce it are often overlooked in policy. This study examines how sand mining in Indonesia has been governed over time and why it remains poorly regulated despite its importance. By tracing laws and policies from the colonial period to today, it shows that sand has long been treated as low-value and therefore neglected. This has led to environmental damage and weak support for miners. The study highlights the need for more practical, effective rules for river-based sand mining to support both communities and sustainable development.

This paper examines the historical evolution of environmental governance in artisanal and small-scale sand mining (ASSM) in Indonesia. Using a political ecology approach and narrative policy analysis, it traces regulatory developments from the colonial period to the present through legal documents, archival records, and secondary data. The findings show that sand has consistently been framed as a low-value, abundant resource, leading to its exclusion from strategic mineral classifications and to limited regulatory attention. While artisanal mining has been formally recognised since the 1960s, governance frameworks have largely been adapted from large-scale mining systems and remain poorly suited to river-based extraction. This mismatch has contributed to weak enforcement, limited institutional support, and ongoing environmental degradation. The study further demonstrates that mineral security priorities continue to favour high-value and export-oriented commodities. Recent policies that promote high-quality industrial sand show a growing gap between large industrial operations and small-scale construction sand mining, especially in river systems. The paper argues that improving governance of ASSM requires river-specific regulatory approaches and greater recognition of sand as a development mineral. These findings provide a basis for more inclusive and context-appropriate governance reforms.

Why is sand, the world's second most used resource, still poorly governed? This study traces sand governance in Indonesia.

Scientific knowledge has become a powerful force in global sustainability politics, shaping discourses and legitimising solutions. Particularly for countries in the Global South, which are often disproportionately vulnerable to global environmental change and lack the adaptive capacity to cope with the impacts, scientific information is crucial. Yet the role of these countries in sustainability science remains insufficiently examined. What role do scientists based in the Global South play in the production and dissemination of knowledge on sustainability? This article sheds light on this crucial question by analysing the representation of Global South scientists in major sustainability-related academic journals and networks.

The Anthropocene carries major risks for countries in the Global South, which are disproportionately vulnerable to sustainability challenges. Given their high vulnerability, these countries need to play a central role in knowledge production on sustainability. Yet is this the case? This article studies the marginalisation of the Global South in the structures and practices of sustainability science, with a focus on the ‘least developed countries’, a group of countries classified as such by the United Nations. We examine, first, how scientists from least developed countries are represented in knowledge production in five major sustainability-related academic journals. Second, we explore the governance of scientific production and evaluation and how least developed countries are represented by examining editorial board membership in these five journals and conducting a qualitative assessment of barriers to publishing. Finally, we assess how scientists from least developed countries are represented in three major sustainability science networks, offering a detailed analysis of conference participation. We find that, overall, scientists from least developed countries, remain marginalised in the production and dissemination of knowledge on sustainability. This marginalisation, we argue, may legitimise scientific discourses and governance instruments that exclude the interests of the poorest in the Global South.

New evidence confirms that the Global South is epistemically marginalised in global sustainability science

In this paper, we aim to understand climate adaptation technologies by focusing on artificial ice reservoirs (AIRs) in Ladakh, India. The cryosphere-fed irrigation network of Ladakh has always been prone to water scarcity in spring. To address this, different types of AIRs, such as ice stupas, were introduced as adaptive technologies to aid during this scarce season. By using Ladakh as a case study, we argue that these technologies can configure hydrosocial relations and power across actors.

AIRs have emerged as climate adaptation technologies to cope with seasonal water scarcity in the changing cryospheric environments of Ladakh. In the era of climate change, it is important to study technologies promoted as climate adaptation solutions to uncover how they relate to the needs of communities and existing power relations. Taking AIRs in Ladakh as a case, this study uses qualitative methods, political ecology perspectives on water, and hydrosocial theory to show how hydrosocial relations are (re)configured in the development, adoption, and implementation of these technologies. Findings show that hydrosocial relations are configured between different actors through shared values, integration of new technologies with existing infrastructures, integration of different knowledges, and collective understanding of the sacredness of water and land. However, value conflicts and lack of integration into existing water governance and traditional infrastructures can lead to reluctance to accept AIRs, discontinued maintenance, fragmented implementation, and confusion between actors regarding the uses of meltwater, potentially leading to conflict. This study shows that while complex socio-natural power relations are embedded within these technologies and in their implementation, not all power relations are necessarily visible or rooted in resource conflict. Competing knowledge systems can be negotiated, tested, and modified, influencing the acceptance of climate adaptation technologies such as AIRs.

Climate adaptation technologies introduced to address cryospheric changes affect the circulation of water and societal relations in many ways.

Digital Product Passports (DPPs) could help make products easier to repair, refurbish, and recycle by improving access to information about their materials and life cycle. This study examines their potential across major European product groups, including heat pumps, solar panels, printers, ICT equipment, and batteries. For the EU27, we estimate that DPP-enabled improvements could raise circularity from 14.8% to 45.0%, with substantial material and economic savings. The results provide a practical baseline for assessing how digital tools may support the European transition towards a more circular economy.

DPPs are expected to support circular economy strategies by improving information availability across product value chains. Building on the CE-RISE project, we assess their potential contribution to recycling- and refurbishment-related circularity for heat pumps, photovoltaic panels, printers, ICT equipment, and batteries. The analysis combines production and trade statistics, a PRISMA 2020-compliant systematic review, and evidence-informed scenario parameterisation. We construct material-flow and circularity indicators for Europe over 2010–2023, distinguish the EU27 from non-EU Europe (Switzerland, Norway, and Türkiye), and quantify a DPP scenario with sensitivity intervals. For the EU27 in 2023, baseline circularity is estimated at 14.8%, compared with 45.0% under the DPP scenario (95% sensitivity interval: 28.6–61.4). This corresponds to potential savings of 2.5 Mt of materials and EUR 27.9 billion (bn), with sensitivity intervals of 1.1–3.8 Mt and EUR 12.7–43.1 bn. We additionally estimate refurbishment-related employment exposure using Eurostat production value per employee in NACE J. The results establish an evidence-informed baseline for evaluating DPP-enabled circularity gains and future policy impacts.

DPPs could raise EU27 circularity from 14.8% to 45.0%, with major material and economic savings.

Electric vehicle (EV) adoption is not determined by technology alone. It also depends on how governments, industries, infrastructure, and public support develop together, while overcoming resistance from established fossil-fuel and automotive interests. Comparing California, Texas, and Michigan, we show why some states have progressed much faster than others. As responsibility for transport decarbonization increasingly shifts to state governments in the United States, our findings highlight the need for policies tailored to local economic, political, and industrial conditions rather than a one-size-fits-all approach.

Although socio-technical feedback studies have recently raised increasing interest in understanding the acceleration of sustainability transitions, limited studies can explain why these feedback loops differ across places. Thus, they provide limited explanations for why different places manifest different paces of low-carbon transitions. To address this gap, we develop a framework that links feedback loops with contextual moderators to reflect place-specific feedback dynamics. We identify five reinforcing loops: industrial transformation, technological change, infrastructure investment, behavior change, and environmental legitimacy, with two balancing loops rooted in fossil-fuel resistance and legacy automotive lock-ins. Additionally, we argue that state-level governance capacity and policy orientation perform as contextual moderators shaping the strength and interactions of these feedback loops. We apply our framework to a comparative case study of EV transitions in California, Texas, and Michigan to demonstrate how these feedback dynamics, together with their divergent contextual moderators, impact their different paces of EV transitions. Studying state-level EV transitions in the United States is particularly timely and policy-relevant, considering recent federal rollbacks.

Why do some U.S. states lead in EV transitions? Place-specific governance shapes the pace of change.

Addressing sustainability challenges entails collaborating between people with different backgrounds, knowledge, and experiences to co-create change strategies. In this work, we share how a group of livestock producers, non-profit organization members, scientists, and government officials became a partnership aimed at promoting sustainable cattle ranching in Mexico. We identified three key ingredients for fostering meaningful partnerships: i) promoting horizontality among participants; ii) reframing participation beyond sectoral roles; and iii) co-creating a common actionable world. Nurturing these conditions at the onset of a co-design project phase is essential for catalysing the transformative potential of initiatives seeking transformative change towards sustainability.

Literature concerning sustainability-related endeavours seeking transformative change increasingly acknowledges the importance of creating more meaningful interactions within transdisciplinary partnerships. Yet, further research is needed to understand what these interactions entail and which enabling conditions can create partnerships required to catalyse transformative change. Framed in the initial co-design phase of a Social-ecological Innovation Laboratory aimed at fostering change towards sustainable cattle ranching, and based on notions of safe-enough and public spaces, in this article we elaborate on certain enabling conditions for creating meaningful partnerships. We describe how participants collectively articulated an actionable shared world, represented by a network of changes, and positioned themselves as relational agents co-designing the strategies to enact the desired changes from within, not from outside. From this experience, we discuss the conditions identified as enablers for facilitating meaningful transdisciplinary partnerships: i) promoting horizontality among participants, ii) reframing participants’ sector-specific identities into genuine and relational subjects, and iii) co-constructing and institutionalizing a shared actionable world. Our findings emphasize the relevance of a co-design phase centred on nurturing the quality of social interactions through context-specific conditions. We posit that such enabling conditions are essential for accumulating the transformative potential of initiatives seeking to catalyse significant change towards sustainability.

Nurturing meaningful relationships in a shared world for co-designing transformative change.

Climate policies increasingly frame Himalayan forests as carbon sinks and sites for restoration. In Lahaul Valley, state-led programmes invoke women’s participation to demonstrate success and attract climate finance. Drawing on participatory and ethnographic community engagement, this study shows how such narratives often obscure deeper questions of land rights, labour, and decision-making. Women's collectives play a central role in caring for forests and responding to climate risks, yet their work remains unpaid, their knowledge marginalised, and their tenure rights weakly recognised. The paper argues for moving beyond technocratic green-growth approaches towards forms of climate justice rooted in democratic forest governance, local authority, and women’s collective political agency.

As climate policy increasingly recasts Himalayan landscapes as carbon sinks and conservation zones, participatory nature-based solutions have become key instruments for mobilising finance. This paper critically examines claims of participation within state-led forest governance initiatives in the trans-Himalayan tribal region of Lahaul, Himachal Pradesh. Grounded in environmental history, feminist political ecology, and climate justice, it traces how socio-ecological systems historically organised around mobility, agro-pastoralism, and reciprocal commons relations were gradually transformed through colonial forest enclosures, postcolonial development policies, and contemporary climate-oriented interventions. Drawing on participatory fieldwork with grassroots leaders, mahila mandals, archival sources, and Right to Information (RTI)-based document analysis (2021–2025), the study shows how donor-driven restoration programmes prioritise afforestation, carbon sequestration, and market-oriented livelihoods while marginalising open grassland ecologies, agroforestry systems, and claims to land, tenure, and decision-making authority. Women’s collective action emerges as central yet deeply constrained within unequal structures of labour and authority. Mahila mandals regulate forest use, patrol commons, and respond to climate-related disasters through unpaid labour, producing a decentralised environmentality that redistributes responsibility without power. The paper argues that climate justice in the trans-Himalaya requires re-centring forest governance around local authority, secure tenure, and recognition of forests as lived socio-ecological landscapes rather than sites of green accumulation.

Who bears the labour of climate action in the Himalaya? Forests, rights, and women’s agency.

Researchers increasingly work where science, public policy, and international relations meet, especially on climate and sustainability challenges. Yet they receive little practical guidance on the capabilities needed to translate evidence, use digital tools responsibly, and collaborate across cultures and institutions. This article proposes a three-layer model covering Mission Literacy, Digital and AI Capabilities, and Science Diplomacy Capabilities. It explains how these competencies can support credible evidence, policy relevance, trust, and cooperation without compromising academic freedom. The framework can guide researcher training in Europe and EU-linked international settings, while requiring adaptation to local contexts.

European science diplomacy has become more prominent in research and external-action policy, but existing frameworks do not specify an integrated competency architecture for researchers at the science-policy-diplomacy interface. Using a conceptual framework-building approach, this paper synthesises EU policy instruments, GreenComp, DigComp 2.2, and scholarship on boundary spanning, knowledge brokerage and competence-in-action. It develops a three-layer model comprising Mission Literacy, Digital and AI Capabilities, and Science Diplomacy Capabilities. The model links each layer to mechanisms and proximal contributions: contextualisation and reflexive role awareness support policy relevance and legitimacy; evidence stewardship, transparency and interoperability support credibility and trust; and translation, relationship brokerage, process design and negotiation support stakeholder alignment and cooperation. Transformation capacity connects the layers through reflexive integration and adaptation. The framework distinguishes core, supporting, and context-dependent competencies and relates capacity building to SDGs 4, 9, 13, 16, and 17. An illustrative application to UNFCCC COP processes demonstrates analytical utility without claiming empirical validation. The model is intended for EU-linked and multilateral settings and requires context-sensitive adaptation beyond Europe. Future research should empirically test the hierarchy, mechanisms, and role-specific proficiency levels.

A three-layer model links green, digital, and diplomatic competencies for researchers in science diplomacy.

River sand is essential for construction, but poorly governed mining can damage rivers, reduce water availability, and create conflict within communities. This study explores how Makueni County, Kenya, has responded to these challenges over time. Different actors, including local communities, county governments, and national agencies, have each developed their own approaches to regulating river sand mining, but they have often worked separately rather than together. We show how a more collaborative approach, known as ‘polycentric governance’, can improve coordination, strengthen community participation, and help balance economic development with healthy rivers, reliable water resources, and sustainable livelihoods.

Demand for sand on a global scale has far outpaced governance, particularly in the Global South, where it is essential for infrastructure, urbanization, and livelihoods. In Makueni County, Kenya, for instance, sand governance has evolved from open access to community-driven informal regulation and, more recently, formal county-level control, all evolving against the backdrop of a tapestry of national codes that could provide some control. However, institutional disconnects across the local, county, and national levels continue to undermine sustainable river sand governance. Drawing on a historical-institutional analysis, this paper argues that Makueni's governance system displays signs of latent polycentricity. If properly institutionalized, this could support more resilient and equitable river sand management that reconciles the competing objectives of the economic use of sand and the effective conservation of its ecological functions within these vulnerable river systems. Applying three of Ostrom's principles (Principles 2, 7, and 8), we propose three key interventions:

1. Institutional diagnosis using the established building blocks approach to determine the roles, rules, interests, stakes, and interactions of community, county, and state sand governance actors;

2. Formal recognition of community organization and rules;

3. Strengthening mandates by internal vertical coordination and role clarity across actors.

From fragmented efforts to coordinated action: a polycentric path for Makueni County's river sand governance.

Companies around the world face increasing scrutiny for Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) controversies, yet it remains unclear why these incidents occur more frequently in some countries than others. This study analyses more than 300,000 ESG incidents to understand how a country's institutions – such as rule of law, corruption levels, labor protections, and press freedom – shape the likelihood that problems become public. By linking these factors with company characteristics, we show that both national context and firm attributes jointly determine the risk of reported ESG incidents. These insights can improve global sustainability, governance, and risk management.

This study investigates the determinants of ESG incident occurrence by integrating country-level institutional indicators with firm-level attributes in a unified empirical framework. Using a global sample of over 300,000 incidents recorded by RepRisk between 2008 and 2023 – covering more than 10,000 firms across 236 countries – we model the probability of ESG controversies using quasi-Poisson, hierarchical Poisson, and Bayesian negative binomial specifications. The dataset links each incident to firms, incident locations, and relevant ESG categories, enabling us to capture variation arising from both institutional context and company characteristics. Results show that incident counts are strongly associated with country-level factors such as gross domestic product, rule of law, labor rights, and press freedom, alongside firm-level characteristics such as market capitalization and sector. Liberal democracies and countries with higher press freedom systematically report more incidents, highlighting substantial observation bias, whereas stricter rule of law is associated with fewer reported events. The company size, along with country size and wealth, is positively correlated with the number of reported incidents, reflecting heightened scrutiny of larger companies. The findings underscore the importance of integrating institutional conditions into ESG incident prediction and offer new tools for regulators, investors, and sustainability officers seeking to manage global ESG risks.

What drives ESG scandals? Global evidence shows that country institutions and firm size jointly shape the risk of incidents.